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1 General Background
One of the areas in economics bout which the economists seem to disagree most
is the eld of public economics, and in particular, the role and the functions of
a government. Two extremist views compete: one emphasizes government work-
ing for the public interest to provide value for the citizens, while another regards
government mainly as a workhorse for private interests. The proponents of the
latter view favor the ideal that the government should interfere with the markets
as little as possible, whereas the proponents of the former view note that there are
areas where e¢ cient outcomes are not attainable or where market outcomes are
not socially desirable. In this case, the governments role is to alleviate the market
failures, while minimizing the distortions its interventions create in the markets.
Even if the government is expected to provide public goods, there is a somewhat
troublesome trade-o¤ between providing enough public goods and distorting the
markets as little as possible.
As the sole legitimate authority, the government has the right to dene the
rules and laws as well as to enforce them. Above all, it has the right to use coercion
and force. Clearly, such rights put the government in a dominant position with
regard to the citizens, giving government o¢ cials the incentive and the opportunity
to (mis-)use their authority for private interests. Thereby it is not necessarily the
case that both the size of the government or its regulatory actions are greater in
a regime where government is held as optimizing the public rather than private
interest. With respect to regulation, two extremes arise: from too little regulation
to too much of it. If the government does not function or ceases to exist, the state
falls into anarchy or chaos (Somalia). If it regulates too much, it will completely
su¤ocate private activities, which might be considered extralegal (the former Soviet
Union).
The role and the functions of the government were already debated by Plato
in his Republic approximately 2400 years ago. In the Republic Plato laid down his
ideals of morality, justice, governance and the role of the state in a society. On the
other hand, quite recently Maddison (1991) listed 11 key long-run forces of capitalist
development running from institutions to physical capital. While many of Platos
ideals serve as ideals even today, they seem to interact with the forces of capitalist
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development. This thesis debates these two seemingly unrelated issues, showing
that the morale, governance and economic well-being are closely connected. This
in fact in the current economic crisis seems intuitive and topical.
The four essays in this thesis debate some of the same ideals that were debated
by Plato; I scrutinize the role of social norms and tax morale in the coexistence
of legal and illegal production; the need for law enforcement in the presence of
organized crime; the measurement of the size of the shadow economy; the measure-
ment of material well-being; the role of public policy and institutions in economic
growth and material well-being; and demographic transition as an impetus for eco-
nomic growth. The governments interventionist policies and the question of how
to measure production and promote economic well-being are present in all of these
essays.
The rst two essays are in the nexus of public economics and law and economics,
utilizing the apparatus familiar from industrial economics and measurement theory,
while the third and fourth essays build more on what is traditionally regarded as
empirical macroeconomics. The rst two essays evaluate the dynamics and causes of
the shadow economy. The rst essay presents a model where the government and its
challenger, an extralegal authority, collect rents from legal and illegal entities. The
optimal policies of the government and the best responses from the challenger are
evaluated. The second essay tackles the complex task of quantifying non-observables
using structural equation techniques.
The last two essays view the dynamics of economic well-being. Maddisons
(1991) Dynamic Forces in Capitalist Development lists the following long-run forces
of capitalist development: 1) institutions, 2) demographic change, 3) role of gov-
ernment, 4) structural change, 5) human capital, 6) physical capital, 7) technical
progress, 8) growth of labor supply, 9) natural resources, 10) international trade and
11) colonialism. The last two essays debate the rst six of them and the rst three
in particular. The third essay considers the nexus of institutions, transition from
socialism to capitalism, role of government in this transition and structural change.
It evaluates their role, but also role of human capital and physical capital as engines
of growth during transition. The third essay also reviews the issue of measurement
but contrasts two common ways to measure economic well-being: real GDP per
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capita and real GDP per worker. The fourth essay reviews the old question put
forth by Malthuss Essay on the Principle of Population in the 18th century, i.e.,
the question of how demographic change a¤ects well-being, and whether it is plau-
sible to expect that poor countries will achieve the same standard of living as the
rich ones. In the last two essays, by using frontier techniques in econometrics, we
seek an answer to the question of how to best promote the economic well-being of
transition economies and underdeveloped nations. In both of these essays, we pay
attention to the non-linearities and di¤erences in models across a cross-section of
countries.
The rst essay assumes that the governments policies might promote illegal ac-
tivity. It takes a look at an economy where the presence of underground production
gives an incentive for an extralegal authority to extract rents from vulnerable pro-
ducers. The paper evaluates the interaction between the (Leviathan) government
and the maa, and pays attention to the law enforcement of underground produc-
tion. The main questions this paper asks are the following: What are the optimal
policies of the government, and how do these a¤ect legal and illegal production?
What is the best response by the maa? Should a revenue-maximizing government
enforce laws, and what are the implications for welfare? One of the main ndings
is that the producers all su¤er from an enforcement policy.
The second paper regards the illegal activity as an entrepreneurs response to
regulatory setting. It tackles the issue of the measurement of the size of the shadow
economy, which is problematic since there are no direct ways to measure hidden
activities. To formulate policies it is essential to know the approximate magnitude
of these activities and in particular what drives illegal economic activity; is it the tax
burden, excess regulation, corruption or a weak legal environment? In this paper we
propose an additional explanation for tax evasion and shadow production, namely
cultural factors manifested by religion as determinants of tax morality. We evaluate
whether Catholic and Protestant countries di¤er in their tax morale and whether
this is seen in the size of the shadow economy. According to our ndings, this might
not be the case.
The third paper contributes to the literature discussing the role of the govern-
ment in promoting economic growth. The common view holds that the quality of
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government is critical for economic success. The evidence for this idea is, however,
unequivocal in the context of economies in transition, creating a need to verify
whether this view is true. As informal production makes up a big portion of the
total production in these countries, we make an attempt to correct for this bias
by using the real GDP per worker. By concentrating on those who are listed as
working in the formal economy, we better measure the average productivity and
the growth potential of these nations. Lastly, the paper scrutinizes some earlier,
contradictory ndings regarding the drivers of economic growth in transition. Our
main result is that, given the complex relationship between economic growth and
economic freedom, marketization has not necessarily been benecial in terms of
growth.
The last paper builds on traditional growth literature and revisits the debate
on convergence clubs arising from demographic transition. We scrutinize the pres-
ence of demographic clubs and the ongoing process of demographic transition. We
provide new evidence against the idea that countries within a club would converge
over time. Instead, we propose that since the demographic transition is a dynamic
process, one can expect countries to enter the last regime of stable, modern growth
in stages. Prior to that, no convergence can be plausibly expected, and there might
be countries that are left behind in a demographic trap, as proposed by Malthus
(1798).
2 Background for the Essays
In this section, I discuss the background and literature of each essay. I briey
summarize my reading about the literature concentrating on those that are closest
to my own contribution, which should help the reader to put my contribution in
the context. For a broader and more in-depth debate on the literature, I encourage
the reader to take a look at individual essays.
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2.1 Optimal Law Enforcement in the Presence of Organized
Crime
It appears that the economic crime is often organized, yet in realms of economics
this phenomena was almost utterly neglected until mid 90s and in particular until
the frame-breaking contribution of Garoupas (2000). Since the complexity of the
topic, there are controversies and even contradictory views on this phenomenon as
will be manifested in what follows.
The International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Science denes
organized crime as follows a) it has some manner of formalized structure whose
primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities; b) it has continuity
over time; and c) it maintains its position through use of violence or threat of
violence, corruption of public o¢ cials, and extortion. This denition is in stark
contrast with the traditional, somewhat romanticized, view that for example Cosa
Nostra in Italy emerged as a defense mechanism for impoverished rural peasants
against their landlords (e.g. Allum and Sands, 2004).
While the strength of the government, or lack of it, has been highlighted by
many authors1, the excessive regulation and the potential for illegal market are
also important for the birth of organized crime (see Anderson 1995). Thereby
the problem with organized crime is and has been more rampant in transition
economies as they have undergone a major institutional reform from communism
to market economies. According to Johnson and Kaufmann (2001), these economies
experienced a growth of illicit activities and organized crime while the state was
weak. It is well known, as soon as they have emerged, crime and corruption are
di¢ cult to root out.
Several papers have discussed the behavior of the criminal organization and
optimal law enforcement. The seminal contribution is Garoupas (2000) with verti-
cal structure between the principal (criminal organization) and agent (individuals),
where the former extracts rents from the latter. Garoupa shows that there are
cases where the presence of criminal organization reduces the need to enforce laws
by the government, since the presence of crime group makes the illegal activity more
1See for example Williams and Godson (2002), Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1995), and Frye and
Shleifer (1997).
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costly. This result has been replicated by many papers with di¤erent assumptions
on the organization structure2, the information structure and with the possibility
of the collusion between the police and the criminals3. What is interesting for sake
of optimal law enforcement, they all contradict Beckers (1968) famous result on
maximal ne. Instead, they propose that under certain circumstances increasing
policing and sanctions can generate higher crime rates. This view is sometimes
repeated in public and it merits more discussion as to some extend it runs counter
to intuition and common sense.
While the studies cited above narrowed the role of the maa only to a harmful,
rent-extracting organization, some studies have evaluated the possibility that the
maa would provide public goods. These studies regard the maa as an author-
ity competing with the government. For example Anderson and Bandiera (2000)
present maas as enforcement coalitions, which protect property from predators.
Also Grossman (1995) and Alexeev et al. (2004) emphasize the role of the maa
as a provider of public goods. In the rst paper, the private producer is better o¤
as the governments and the maas competition increases the production of public
goods, while in the latter the revenue-maximizing government may actually benet
from the presence of the maa as the maa makes the underground production
costlier. In reality, the maas public good is, however, merely defense from its
own violence and not from an outside threat. Then the question is how does these
results hold in more general setting where the maa does not provide anything in
exchange for the rent.
2.2 Do The Catholic and Protestant Countries Di¤er by
Their Tax Morale?
On moral norms the seminal paper is due to Macaulay (1963), who suggests that
people behave honestly because honesty is rewarded and defection punished in
future transactions. Brekke et al. (2003) propose a model where a consumers
self-image can only be improved by striving towards what she truly believes to
be morally right. This idea is replicated by Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson
2For interesting paper with and endogenous gang structure see Mansour et al. (2006).
3See Bowles and Garoupa (1997), Garoupa and Jellal (2007) and Kugler et al. (2005).
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(2006).
The theory of tax evasion goes back at least to Allingham and Sandmo (1972),
but it was Baldry (1987) who suggested that there are moral costs to cheating and
that moral feelings have to be incorporated in the theory of tax evasion. Following
this line of argument, Gordon (1989) incorporates social norms into the evasion
decision assuming that the utility cost to evasion increases in the proportion of
taxpayers who do not evade. The experiment by Myles and Naylor (1996) conrm
a tax evasion model where a social custom utility is derived when taxes are paid
honestly and a conformity payo¤ from adhering to the standard pattern of social
behavior4. The experimental results of Orvaska and Hudson (2002) suggest that
evasion is condoned by a large proportion of the population though people appear
to be deterred from tax evasion by the consequences of being caught.
The interaction of tax ethics and tax rates has been evaluated by Reckers et
al. (1994). One of their ndings is that those who already have a low tax morale
or do not condemn tax evasion seem to respond more in terms of noncompliance
to the increases in tax rate. Reviewing literature Pilkington (2007) suggests that
tax evasion is subject to group norm; if tax evasion is widespread one may cheat
without feeling guilty. This view is veried by Feld et al. (2008) who evaluate
the tax morale in Germany after German unication. They nd that from 1990
to 1999 the initially higher East German tax morale converged to the lower West
German levels. Lastly, other researches propose that there exist cultural di¤erences
regarding tax morale across countries. For example, Alm and Torgler (2006) suggest
that northern Europeans have higher tax morale than southern Europeans.
There are numerous empirical studies on the economic e¤ects of religion (cf.
Iannaccone, 1998). Substantial di¤erences exist between Catholicism and Protes-
tantism in both the structure of their beliefs and their enforcement mechanisms.
Arrunada (2004) argues that the catholic theology and practice facilitate personal
transactions while protestantism favors values and types of moral and legal enforce-
ment better adapted to impersonal trade. Guiso et al. (2003) nd an empirical
4Falkinger (1995) notes that perceived fairness and equity of the political and economic system
increases the bad conscience of evaders. Fortin et al. (2004) nd that perceived unfair taxation
may lead to increased tax evasion.
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relation between religion and peoples attitudes toward legal rules. In particular,
they nd that religious denomination a¤ects attitudes toward legal norms, as cheat-
ing on taxes. On the causes of the shadow economy, Loyaza (1996) nds that the
size of the shadow economy is positively related to the tax burden and negatively
on the quality of government institutions. Johnson and Kaufmann (2001) nd that
the underground economy in transition economies has mainly been driven by ex-
cess regulation and corruption and weak legal environment and to a lesser extent
by taxation.
While other methods have also been used, structural equation models have be-
come a standard technique for estimating the size of the shadow economy. Its
origins are in simultaneous equations models (Haavelmo 1943), while the treatment
of latent variables was incorporated by Zellner (1970) and Jöreskog and Goldberger
(1975). The existing empirical studies quantifying the size of the shadow economy
have been evaluated critically by several authors. According to Hill (2002), there is
typically no theory behind the estimated model. He also questions the identication
of the latent variable and the reliability of the results, which are di¢ cult to judge as
there are no reliable alternative methods. Hillscritique is echoed by Smith (2002),
who also argues that as the size of the shadow economy must be calibrated by using
"outside information", this "other source" for obtaining the benchmark becomes
critical.
The most severe critique is due to Breusch (2005a,b) who points out several aws
in the previous studies. Foremost, he reminds that the MIMIC model assumes that
the relations the indicator variables have with the causal variables are solely carried
through the latent variable. In other words, the specications used by the existing
studies assume that there are no direct e¤ects between the cause variables and the
indicators - an assumption which is not likely to hold. It is, however, possible to
identify some direct and indirect e¤ects, and the identication and estimation of
direct and indirect e¤ects has been discussed by Fox (1980) and Bollen (1987).
2.3 Economic Freedom as a Driver for Growth in Transition
The quality of government is critical for economic success since the government
a¤ects the economy at least via two channels. First, the government has an indirect
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role as an economic player, since it provides the economic and political institutions.
Market reforms and controlling against opportunities for rent-seeking and corrup-
tion are emphasized (see Frye and Shleifer (1997) and La Porta et al. (1999)).Vested
interests for government o¢ cials can halt the reform process, create incentives for
the underground production, and slow progress in the o¢ cial economy (see Harstad
and Svensson, 2006). As Hay and Shleifer (1998) puts it, sometimes the failure of
the state to enforce its own laws is due to weak incentives in the government to
provide law and order. In the grabbing-hand model of Frye and Shleifer (1997),
the government is above law and uses its power to extract rents. Policies and in-
stitutions are shaped by those in power to stay in power and to transfer resources
to themselves (for example Turkmenistan under Saparmurat Nijazovs rule). For
example, Johnson et al. (2000) report a nding that for 90 % of Russian and
Ukrainan mangers it is a custom to bribe the government o¢ cials, yet the rms in
their industry also pay for protectionof their activities.
Second, since the government is an independent economic entity with its own
income and spending, it may directly a¤ect the economy altering the composition of
its budget. Typically the public investment can spur the growth, while the taxation
and wasteful spending may depress it. Clearly these two functions of the government
interact and are not set independent on each other. How the government allocates
its budget is largely dependent on whether the government is working for the public
or private interest.
The bad economic policy and corruption are likely to promote the informal
economy. At least part of that production will be away from the o¢ cial economy
hence the tax base, while the income created in informal economy will contribute
to the economic well-being of citizens. According to Schneiders (2004) estimates,
the size of the shadow economy in transition countries ranged from 20.1% in Czech
Republic to 68.0% in Georgia at 2002/2003. These omissions of income and intra-
national transfers are huge, whereby the welfare comparisons and the productivity
growth estimates that account only for measured production (and observed trans-
fers of income) are misleading. This idea has already received some attention, as
Feige and Urban (2008) review the issue of measurement. They concentrate on
the measurement of non-reported income and acknowledge that until the problems
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of measurement are resolved, investigations of the relationship between economic
reforms and economic outcomes during the transition decade must be viewed with
considerable caution.
There are papers detecting the role of the institutions on the economic growth
in the context of economies in transition. Fidrmuc and Tichit (2007) nd that the
pattern of growth in transition has changed at least twice; yielding three di¤erent
models of growth associated with di¤erent stages of reform. In the last stage of
transition, which is model three, the reform has a positive e¤ect on growth.5 Iradian
(2007) nds that growth in CIS (The Commonwealth of the Independent States)
has been higher because of the recovery of lost output, progress in macroeconomic
stabilization and market reforms, and favorable external conditions. About half of
the growth is due to progress in macroeconomic stabilization and market reforms.
The other sources of growth seem to be outside the governments control. Lastly,
Babetskii and Campos (2007) review the studies trying to investigate the e¤ect
of institutional reform to growth and conduct a meta-analysis on othersresults.
They nd that approximately one third nds positive and signicant relationship,
another third nds negative and signicant relationship, while the nal third nd
no signicant relationship between reform and growth. In line with Fidrmuc and
Tichit (2007), they also show that the estimated relationship between reform and
growth seems to change over time. In addition, they note that existing results are
sensitive to the choice of the measure of reform used in these studies. Bearing
Feiges and Urbans (2008) criticism in mind, it is interesting to see how the reform
policies a¤ect growth of total output or GDP rather than the observed one.
The number of empirical, cross-country studies on growth is huge and this is
also reected in the existing number of models and variables. Durlauf et al. (2005)
list 145 potential explanatory variables in growth regressions. Recently, Magnus et
al. (2008) took an attempt to reduce the model uncertainty and to determine the
focusand auxiliaryregressors for growth. They nd that constant, initial GDP
per capita, real equipment investment share of GDP, initial total gross enrollment
5Also Roland and Verdier (2003) nd di¤erent kinds of trajectories of economic transition from
socialism to capitalism, and the failures in law enforcement are not so bad in other transition
economies as in Russia.
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ratio for primary education and the initial life expectancy at age 0 are the focus
variables. In other words, these variables should be included or at least tested in
all empirical investigations. Minier (2007) tests the presence of scal variables and
non-linearities of growth model and shows that either squared terms or interaction
terms of scal variables should be present in growth models. Furthermore, allowing
for the non-linearities the several scal variables become robust - a nding that is
conrmed by some previous studies.
On the public expenditure, Munnell (1992) criticizes the proponents of spend-
ing advocates for their failure to recognize the common trends in public capital and
productivity. Devarajan et al. (1996) nd that the share of current expenditure has
a positive e¤ect on growth, while an increase in the capital component of public ex-
penditure has a negative growth e¤ect. Aschauer (2000) argues that the relationship
between public capital and economic growth is non-linear; permanent changes in
public capital are associated with permanent changes in economic growth. Fölster
and Henrekson (2001) nd a negative relationship between government expenditure
and growth in rich countries, while Blankenau et al. (2007) nd a positive relation-
ship between public education expenditures and long-term growth after controlling
for government budget constraint.
2.4 Economic Growth and Demographic Transition: A Club
Approach
The literature on the cross-country convergence of incomes is full of controversies
and puzzles. One of them is that convergence fails in heterogenous samples of
countries if growth is non-linear in key factors. To control for the observed het-
erogeneity the theory and practice o¤ers several factors: mutual trade (Ben-David
and Loewy1998), common history (Baumol 1986), geographical location (Maddison
1994) etc. Recently, Galor (2007) and Galor and Weil (2000) among others, revisit
the centuries old hypothesis postulated by Thomas Malthus (1798), whereby the
population grows in geometrical ratio while the subsistence only increases in an
arithmetical ratio. While Malthus suggested that if unchecked the population will
grow beyond its subsistence the modern researchers present more optimistic views.
Firstly, Galor (2007) suggests that an uneven demographic transition may explain
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several controversial observations. Secondly, di¤erences in the timing of the transi-
tion have segmented countries to di¤erent regimes, and they exist simultaneously.
The process, however, is dynamic whereby all countries should progress through
these regimes until they reach the stable growth regime.
In the demographic transition considerable changes take place in all demographic
related factors, yet di¤erent authors have emphasized di¤erent perspectives. Soares
(2007), for example, maintains that the infant mortality has a leading role; if it
starts to fall fertility will follow, and the transition will proceed according to its
own internal laws. Ram (1998), Fogel (1994, 2004), Becker et al. (2005), and
Lorenzen et al. (2008) claim that life lengthening is the revolutionary factor, as
short-sighted and deterministic attitudes give way to optimistic views. With regards
to the number of demographic clubs or stages Bloom and Williamson (1998) stress
the role of dependency rate and argue that the number of clubs should be limited to
two, namely to Demographic Burden" and Demographic Gift". Galor and Weil
(2000), on the other hand, advocate the presence of three stages labeling them the
Malthusian", "Post Malthusian" and Modern". The rst one is best described as
a demographic trap in spirit of Malthus, while the second is characterized as a stage
of industrial revolution or a take-o¤ and the last stage is the regime of sustained
growth.
The early empirical literature suggested that the OECD countries exhibit a ten-
dency to convergence, while results for Africa, Latin America and Asia-Pacic were
more mixed. Recently Li and Papell (1999) and Pedroni (2007) present evidence for
the non-convergence of the output in the OECD, and suggest that only a fraction of
countries exhibit tendency for convergence. With the exception of Pedroni (2007),
all of these works su¤er from an important drawback: the selection of countries is
prone to the cross-section dependency biasing the test results. In the context of
output convergence, this means that convergence can be found where it does not
exist. To correct for this bias Pesaran (2007a) proposes a use of a modied panel
unit root test in the presence of a single unobserved common factor.
Demographic transition is a dynamic process, far from completed in many coun-
tries, whereby in the future countries may move ahead toward more mature demo-
graphic stages. Thereby the demographic transition can increase our understanding
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about the distribution of world incomes and foreshadow the prospects of conver-
gence in the future. These insights have some relevance to policy-makers, not only
for the sake of demographics, but for the sake of equalizing the distribution of
world incomes. Uncovering the demographic dynamics and its impact on growth is
therefore prerequisite for forming the right policies to tackle poverty.
3 Summary of the Essays
3.1 Optimal Law Enforcement in the Presence of Organized
Crime
In this essay we build a model, to evaluate the interaction between the government
and the maa, and to study the law enforcement of underground production in the
presence of organized crime. The question asked, is how the size of the shadow
economy, the optimal tax and public goods are a¤ected by the policing of the
shadow economy in the context of dys-functional government. We evaluate how the
government and rms are a¤ected by the presence of organized crime. We ask, who
gains and who looses when the illegal producers can be monitored and punished by
the government that is not concerned on the welfare of the citizens.
We analyze the interaction between the government and the crime group (aka
the maa) in a context of a relatively stable state. We consider a sector of econ-
omy where the business can be plied either legally or illegally and where the rm
makes this choice in the presence of governments and maas rent-seeking. The
government is not concerned on the welfare of the citizens; instead it maximizes
its own payo¤ using taxation, monitoring and public goods as a tool. The illegal
rms have a partial access to public goods. We assume that the government does
not have enough resources to ght the organized crime, but can monitor the illegal
production.
We rst solve the model in the absence of the maa as a benchmark. We then
introduce the organized crime and explore both the static and the dynamic games.
To compare our results with previous studies, and to name the winners and the
losers, we consider the game without monitoring.
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The main results are the following. Firstly, it is always the case that the revenue-
maximizing government will monitor the shadow economy, with and without the
presence of maa, as monitoring contributes to the governments revenue. Secondly,
the governments tax policy is backed up by its monitoring policy that is the rate
of tax is increased by the expected punishment at the shadow sector. Thereby the
government uses its power to monitor to extract more from the formal economy.
Thirdly, the entry of the maa increases the governments revenue since the exit
option is now more expensive. By the same token, both legal and illegal rms are,
in general, hurt by the entry of the maa. It is, however, plausible that legal rms
might benet by the entry of the maa.
Results related to monitoring give some additional insights. Firstly, the size of
the shadow economy is independent of monitoring. Second, the legal and illegal
rms are better o¤ without monitoring, whereas the government is worse o¤. The
maa goes completely una¤ected by monitoring. From the normative point of
view, whether the government should have a possibility to monitor shadow economy
depends on whose benets are emphasized. If the ne is viewed as a hidden tax
or a bribe, then corrupted governments should be stripped o¤ their right to punish
o¤enders.
3.2 Do The Catholic and Protestant Countries Di¤er by
Their Tax Morale?
In the second essay, the key question is whether a religious denomination can explain
di¤erences in tax morale. For example, in the southern catholic countries, religion
has a built-in tradition of forgiveness. One is tempted to suggest that this may
support an equilibrium where the social punishment of, say, tax evasion, can have
a di¤erent role than in the protestant countries. Should this hypothesis be valid, it
will be reected in the elasticity of the size of the shadow economy with regard to tax
morale. To evaluate the e¤ects of tax morale, taxation, government consumption,
social security, crime and interest rates on the shadow economy we work with the
data from the OECD. We estimate both the direct and indirect e¤ects between
some causes and indicators.
In our data, we identify two regimes. The rst regime, 1979-1992, can be char-
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acterized as a regime of public sector growth, whereas during the latter regime,
1992-2003, the growth of the public sector came to an end. To test the hypothesis
that religion a¤ects tax morale and hence tax evasion, we use the data from the
World Values Surveys to group the countries according to their primary religious
denomination. The countries form natural groups of the catholic south and the
protestant north, whereby the other countries make up the reference group that
facilitates the comparison between groups and with the previous studies.
We report three major ndings. First, there are some di¤erences in tax morale
across religions, but for the latter regime we reject the hypothesis that countries
with a di¤erent religious background exhibit di¤erent tax morale. Our estimates
suggest that within the OECD, the norms have become global. Second, even though
we do not calibrate the index of the size of the shadow economy, our results suggest
that the shadow markets are probably not of the magnitude that has previously
been proposed. The main reason for this result is that we have included the direct
e¤ects of the cause variables on the indicators. Third, our results support the view
that there was a regime switch in the evolution of the public sector in the early
1990s and that the evolution of the shadow economies within these regimes di¤ers.
3.3 Economic Freedom as a Driver for Growth in Transition
The evidence for the idea that good governance is critical for economic success
is unequivocal, creating a need to verify whether this view is true in transition
economies. As the informal production makes up a big portion of total production
in these countries, we take an attempt to correct for this bias by using real GDP per
worker. By concentrating on those who are listed as to work in formal economy, we
better measure the average productivity and the growth potential of these nations.
There are several ndings in this paper as to the economic growth in transi-
tion. First, we nd no regimes on growth; all countries surveyed obey the same
model and laws of motion and the relationship between growth and human capital
(institutions) is linear across space. Second, at the beginning economic freedom
and investments contribute positively on growth in transition. When the countries
reach their population averages in terms of economic freedom or investments the
negative interaction takes its toll; the full marginal e¤ect of investments (economic
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freedom) to growth is negative if the economic freedom is above its average. As
economic freedom (investments) increases, greater investment (economic freedom)
appear to have a detrimental impact on growth, suggesting a joint too much of a
good thingphenomenon in transition economies. Third, contrary to some earlier
ndings, our results suggest growth is inuenced by government policies on shaping
institutions and setting the size of the government. This inuence is, however, more
complicated than previously thought.
All these ndings are robust when we drop resource-rich countries from the
dataset. We show that non-linearities are present in the growth model in terms
of interactions. Our results indicate that the somewhat contradictory results in
the earlier literature might be due to use of a inappropriate model. Moreover, we
nd that how we measure institutions makes a di¤erence; our results change when
we use Fidrmuc and Tichits recalibrated index of economic reform. Finally, our
robustness analysis shows similar results when evaluating real growth per capita,
although investment and size of government seem to matter more for productivity
growth than growth per capita.
A useful observation is that growth researchers should use care in selecting
indicators for measurement of economic well-being, institutions and the model. The
main policy implication is that some transition countries might have over-done both
private investments and marketization, which has hurt the productivity growth.
3.4 Economic Growth and Demographic Transition: A Club
Approach
On the relationship between economic growth and demographic transition, our main
ndings are as follows. We nd that the non-linearities are present. The number of
the demographic clubs is three and the discriminating variable turns out to be life
expectancy, since it gives incentives and possibilities to accumulate human capital
and to invest. Furthermore, the increasing life-expectancy status from Club I to
Club III seems to give support to their interpretation as three successive demo-
graphic stages, as proposed by Galor and Weil (2000).
We nd -convergence in all clubs and divergence in the full sample, i.e., our
club approach has succeeded in uncovering three traditional convergence clubs on
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the demographic basis alone. As the -convergence, however, is probably not valid,
we used both rst and second generation unit root tests as well.
For the club of low-life expectancy some of the traditional tests support condi-
tional convergence with xed e¤ects and individual trends. Moreover, there is also
some support for the typical nding of the (un-) conditional convergence among
the high-life expectancy club. The more robust second generation unit root test
undermines this result. This nding is in line with the trends in the literature,
where the earlier tests suggest convergence but the most recent tests show that ho-
mogenous clubs are di¢ cult to uncover, even among the industrial countries. The
demographic transition is a continuous rather than discrete process, leaving some
heterogeneity in the timing of it even within the clubs. Furthermore, the phase of
transition di¤ers across countries. Over time, this gives rise to the heterogeneity
within the clubs that cannot be controlled for simply by controlling the initial life
expectancy. These concerns regard Club II most seriously, in which take-o¤s and
leapfrogging not only in terms of output but also in terms of life expectancy is
typical. In this club our results show no convergence by any of the tests. The rapid
progress in the eld of panel estimation techniques may shed further light on this
subject in the future.
Lastly, as the demographic dynamics seem to support transitional rather than
permanent clubs, we forecast the future of these countries and extrapolate their
real GDP per capita by using Club-specic growth rates. This information gives no
support to the convergence of world incomes; the income gaps have already widened
to such an extent that even the take-o¤ is unable to rise the incomes of the poor
su¢ ciently. Thus, new economic miracles will hardly arise on the demographic basis
alone. Therefore, economic policies should be targeted to help that minority which
is left behind in the lowest club. With regard to economic policy, an interesting
question is, whether the most e¢ cient policy is to concentrate on health and life-
expectancy, as longer and healthier life should give incentives to save and invest in
human capital, both of which are the impetus of growth.
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1 Introduction
Many countries host crime groups (maas, clans, triads, gangs, etc.) that engage
in illegitimate activities such as drug dealing and extortion. Certain government
actions (poorly designed tax policies, excessive or heavy-handed regulation, failures
to deal with corruption, etc.) can distort the market equilibrium and create incen-
tives for rms to enter the shadow economy or black market.1 This shifts the scal
burden onto honest actors. However, legitimate rms, unlike their counterparts
operating in the shadows, often enjoy full access to goods and services produced by
the government. On the other hand, the government can inadvertently, negligently,
or even deliberately, create rent-seeking opportunities for nefarious operators. In
the worst case, citizens and businessmen nd themselves vulnerable to extortion
from both the government and the maa (Johnson et al., 2000 and Los, 2003).
Along these lines, this paper considers the economic consequences of a Leviathan
government that monitors and punishes underground production. This issue is par-
ticularly relevant for Europes transition economies, which are still experiencing
major institutional reforms as they move to market economies. A common pat-
tern seen in European transition experiences is that the state enters the process
enfeebled, resulting in a boom in illicit activities and organized crime (e.g. Johnson
and Kaufmann, 2001). As the transition process advances, however, reform of the
state apparatus and institutions forces decision-makers to seek optimal policies on
taxation, provision of public goods, and the judiciary.2 At the start of transition,
proponents of the big bang approach argued that the market economy o¤ered
such a huge benets so countries could initially forego e¤orts at democratizing the
political system and focus on reform of the economy. Nearly two decades into this
process, we see transition economies where democratization has yet to materialize
1Loyaza (1996) observes the size of the shadow economy is positively related to the tax burden
and negatively to the quality of government institutions. Johnson and Kaufmann (2001) nd
the underground economy in transition economies has been driven mainly by excess regulation,
corruption, a weak legal environment, and, to a lesser extent, by taxation.
2Torgler (2003) notes that it has been di¢ cult to nd the right equilibrium of state activity
in transition economies; there are strong traditions of state interventionism and bureaucracy
without adequate protections for property rights. In the early years of transition, post-communist
governments often extracted rents for their own use. Eventually, many governments evolved into
constrained Leviathans, i.e. non-welfarist, revenue-maximizing states that produce a few public
goods to keep people happy. See also Konford (2000).
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despite their big banging. Instead, we nd Leviathan-type governments occupied
by members of the nomenklatura and persistent failures in the market and political
sphere (e.g. Åslund, 2007 Ch 9.).
Previous work has considered the origins of organized crime and the interac-
tion of the government and a maa. Anderson (1995) considers three examples of
conditions that fostered the emergence of maas: the abdication of legitimate gov-
ernment power (Sicily), excessive bureaucratic power (former Soviet Union), and
the potential of illegal markets (United States). Williams and Godson (2002) pro-
pose that a weak state, lacking in democracy or rule of law, o¤ers fertile soil for
the growth of organized crime. In the grabbing-handmodel of Frye and Shleifer
(1997), a weakened Leviathan-type state is characterized by predatory regulations,
corrupt o¢ cials and a dysfunctional legal system.3
Several studies take up government-maa interaction, particularly in the context
of law enforcement. Anderson and Bandiera (2000) study maas as enforcement
coalitions to protect property from predators.4 Grossman (1995) builds a model
where public services enter in the production functions of legal and illegal rms
alike, while the maa produces a public good solely for illegal rms. As long as
the government remains viable, the lot of the private producer improves as compe-
tition between the government and maa increases the production of public goods.
Alexeev et al. (2004) emphasize the role of the maa as a provider of public goods.
They show that when public goods are unimportant, the government actually ben-
ets from the presence of the maa as the maa makes underground production
costlier.
Based on what follows, it is not clear how the shadow economy or the maa
a¤ects the society as a whole. The social welfare might be inadequate measure for
the total welfare as for instance, it does not account for the fairness (see e.g. Kaplow
and Shavell, 2002). The standard is to account both the costs and benets from
crime to the social welfare and deviations from the tradition are hard to justify.
Along these lines, some conclusions regards to the desirability of shadow economy
and organized crime have been o¤ered, although the treatment of social harm varies.
3Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1995) model the emergence of gangs in the absence of control by
the state. Anderson and Bandiera (2000) point out that even strong, welfarist states like Japan
host maas. Moreover, they show that wherever a maa has emerged, it has been di¢ cult to root
out.
4A popular view is that Italys Cosa Nostra emerged as a defense mechanism for impoverished
rural peasants against their landlords (e.g. Allum and Sands, 2004).
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Garoupa (2000) and Mehlum et al. (2003) treat crime groups as rent-extracting,
harmful organizations that do not o¤er public goods.5 Garoupa shows that as
long as extortion constitutes a costless transfer from individuals to the criminal
organization, extortion improves the social welfare by decreasing the incentive for
harmful criminal o¤enses and allowing the government to reduce spending on law
enforcement.6 Mansour et al. (2006) treat gang structure as endogenous; an increase
in deterrence can lead to an increase in the number of competing criminal gangs and
raise total illegal output.7 Bowles and Garoupa (1997), Garoupa and Jellal (2007),
and Kugler et al. (2005) evaluate the case where the police and criminals collude.
The ndings of all these researchers contradict Beckers (1968) famous maximal ne
result that proposes that increasing policing and sanctions beyond an optimal point
merely boost crime rates.
The paper studies a question that is completely new, i.e. how might policing the
shadow economy of a rotten state a¤ect the size of the shadow economy, taxation
policy, and production of public goods. We evaluate how organized crime inuences
the government and rms. In particular, we consider who gains and who loses when
illegal producers are monitored and punished.
We analyze the interaction of the government and the crime group in a context of
a relatively stable state. As in Alexeev et al. (2004), we consider a sector of economy
where a business can be conducted either legally or illegally, e.g. construction, trash-
hauling and harbor services. The rm makes a choice between legal and illegal
production in the presence of government and maa rent-seeking.8 Following the
argument put forth by Baumol (1995), the Leviathan government is not concerned
with the welfare of its citizens but rather maximizing its own payo¤.9 The Leviathan
5Berkowitz and Li (2000) study a situation common in transition economies: poorly dened
government tax rights. As a result, other agencies levy their own taxes on the same tax base. A
standard tragedy-of-the-commons problem emerges in which the tax base is over-grazed.The
economy faces two equilibria according to the number of tax agencies with the implications for
the share of illegal production, governments tax revenues, and production of public goods.
6Konrad and Skaperdas (1998) reach the same conclusions with a model in which the gang
extorts from both legal and illegal enterprises.
7See Garoupa (2007) for a similar analysis.
8Baumol (1990) views the history of productive, unproductive, and destructive entrepreneur-
ship. Acemoglu (1995) models the allocation of talent in the presence of rent-seeking.
9Baumol (1995) comments that dynasties are typically established through violence; govern-
ments concerned with the welfare of citizens and constrained by the law are historical rarities. See
also La Porta et al. (1999).
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state produces public goods to which illegal rms have partial access. The crime
group does not provide protection or anything else in exchange for the rent, but
aims to maximize its rent income in accordance with the cost of collecting rent.
We assume the government lacks adequate resources to ght organized crime, but
can monitor illegal production. No collusion of government agents and criminals is
allowed. Since the act of illegal rm itself is legal, but the rm is extralegal in the
sense that it either has no operating license or it evades taxes, we assume there is
no direct cost from the existence of an illegal rm. The cost arises in terms of scal
externality and the possibility that the provision of public goods is reduced.
We rst solve the model in the absence of the maa as a benchmark, then
introduce organized crime and explore both the static and the dynamic games. To
compare our results with previous studies and name the winners and losers, we
consider the game without monitoring.
The main results are the following. First, it is always the case that a revenue-
maximizing government will monitor the shadow economy, regardless of the presence
of a maa. Second, a policy of monitoring supports government tax policy. Tax
rates can be increased if the shadow sector expects punishment for tax evasion, i.e.
the government uses its power to monitor to extract more from the legal sector.
The entry of a maa increases the governments revenue since the exit option of
a legal rm to the illegal sector is now more expensive. By the same token, both
legal and illegal rms are hurt by the entry of a maa. There are, however, subsets
of solutions where illegal and legal rms, the latter in particular, can potentially
benet from the entry of a maa. In one case, two evenly matched authorities
compete in the Cournot competition, causing the government to decrease the tax
and increase the production of public goods to downsize the scal burden. This
option is not available in a Stackelberg competition, which is the worst case for
both types of rms.
Results related to monitoring provide additional insights. The size of the shadow
economy is independent of monitoring, because the government increases taxes when
it monitors, while the public goods are una¤ected. Moreover, legal and illegal rms
alike benet in the absence of monitoring, while the government is the clear loser.
The maa goes completely una¤ected by monitoring. From the normative point of
view, whether the government should monitor shadow economy depends on whose
benets are emphasized.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 phrases the model and Section
3 presents the benchmark results absent organized crime. Section 4 introduces a
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crime group into a Cournot game and a Stackelberg game. Section 5 discusses the
welfare e¤ects of monitoring under various assumptions. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
Assume a continuum of rms with the mass of one and that each rm produces one
unit of output at the market price of one. Following Alexeev et al. (2004), a rm
entering an industry faces a choice between legal or illegal production. The rm
chooses its sector by comparing the potential payo¤s or refrains from production if
it cannot make the reservation prot 0. Although legal production is subject to tax
t, the rm benets from public goods g produced by the government. We write the
payo¤ l of a legal rm as
l = 1  (t  g) ; (1)
where (t  g) is the net scal burden borne by the legal rm.
An illegal rm, in contrast, pays rent r to the maa.10 The public goods are
partially excludable and parameter b represents the factor of public goods enjoyed
by the illegal rms 0 < b < 1. An example of a public good denied from illegal rms
would be contract enforcement. On the other hand, the illegal rm clearly benets
from many public goods such as roads and other infrastructure. Illegal rm also
faces an exogenous penalty, z < z, if their activities are discovered by government
monitoring agents. We assume that the ne is not optimized but instead it is set
by an independent court, which is yet to be reformed. The probability of getting
caught is p.11 Thus, payo¤ ij for the illegal rm may be described as
ij = 1  r + bg   pz   cj; (2)
where cj is the cost of operating in shadow economy for rm j. By setting (1) equal
to (2), we solve the threshold cost for going underground
c = t+ (b  1) g   pz   r: (3)
10Here it is assumed that the rent is the only cost the rms face because of the maa. It could
well be that both legal and illegal rm are harmed by a cost, say, k, which would not a¤ect the
outcome as long as both types of rms must deal with it and the maa draws no benet from it.
11One way to see the role of p and g are to think of them as the institutions provided by the
government.
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Firms with cj > c enter the legal sector; the rest enter the illegal sector. The cost of
operating in the shadow economy, cj, can be viewed as the cost di¤erence between
legal and illegal production, where the negative values suggest that some rms ben-
et from going underground. Extra costs associated with illegal production include
the lack of access to the formal credit and nance. Benets may include freedom
from accounting systems and operating licenses. Indeed, much of the bureaucratic
burden facing legal rms is avoided by going underground. Whether the costs or
benets dominate depends on the skills of the entrepreneur, i.e. the sign of cj. The
cost is distributed uniformly between [ x; x], where x < 1 illustrates the degree of
the heterogeneity of entrepreneurs; the larger the value of x; the more heterogeneous
community of entrepreneurs. The cumulative distribution function of c and the size
of the shadow economy is
F (cj) =
1
2x
(c+ x) ; (4)
where c is dened by (3).
The government maximizes its prots that are the revenue from taxes and from
nes minus the production of public goods and monitoring services. We simplify the
model by assuming that collecting taxes involves no costs. Next, the government
chooses t, g and p to maximize its payo¤
G (t; g; p) = (1  F (c)) t+ F (c) pz   1
2
g2   1
2
p2; (5)
subject to the constraint that l (c)  0, i.e. the marginal rm will receive its
reservation prots.12 In the equation (5), the rst term is the expected tax revenue
from the legal sector, the second term is expected income from nes from the illegal
sector and the last two term are the cost of producing public goods and policing.
Similarly, the payo¤ for the maa is dened as the income from rent-extracting
minus costs of collecting the rent which is relative to the size of shadow sector. More
rms there are in the shadow economy the higher the cost of collecting protection
fees. Thus, the maa will seek to maximize its payo¤ with respect to r
M (r) = F (c) r   a
2
F (c)2 : (6)
where a > 0. The timing of these games is such that in a static game, the gov-
ernment and the maa move simultaneously and are followed by the rms. In a
12Here, all rms choosing to remain in the legal sector receive the same prot as the marginal
rm. Those in the illegal sector obtain higher prots due to their entrepreneurial skills.
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dynamic game, the legal authority, i.e. the government moves rst, then the extra-
legal authority, i.e. the maa. Only after the maa has moved do rms decide
whether to move themselves.
In the present analysis, we focus on interior solutions and the comparability of
results among di¤erent scenarios (a detailed description is given in Appendix A). To
this end, we make certain restrictions on x and z. As stated, it is a reasonable intu-
ition that the cost of operating underground and the penalty of discovery are both
less than the income generated by illegal production. Obviously, rules governing
legal production, i.e. l (c) > 0, must exist in all these set-ups.
To make our three set-ups comparable and obtain interior solutions, we must
identify the sub-set of fx; b; zg where all these solutions exist. Assume that 3x >
(b  1)2 is true. Then we write Assumptions 1 to 2:
1. Assume 2x > (1  b) and z2 < 1   ((4x+1)+(b 1))(3x+1)
2(4x+1) (b 1)2 are both true (Region
1).
2a. Assume 2x < (1  b) and z2 < 1   ((4x+1)+(b 1))(3x+1)
2(4x+1) (b 1)2 are both true (Region
2a).
2b. Assume 2x < (1  b) ; 4x < (1  b) and z2 < 1   ((4x+1)+(b 1))(3x+1)
2(4x+1) (b 1)2 are all
true (Region 2b).
In the essence, the restrictions here are relations between the heterogeneity of
the rms and their ability to benet from the public goods in each sector. (1  b)
denotes the extra benet from the public good if the rm stays at legal sector,
while x is the highest possible expected extra cost that the rm faces if it goes
underground. In Region 1, if the extra costs of going underground are high com-
pared to the extra benets of remaining in the legal sector, then the government
should not collect an excessively high penalty to keep both sectors viable in all these
set-ups. With less heterogeneity, the need to set restrictions to the penalty arises,
particularly in the case of the Stackelberg game.
Figure 1 illustrates regions where di¤erent outcomes exist. Limits to the penalty
are not considered here, but are expected to hold. Bold curve illustrates restriction
3x > (b  1)2, i.e. the solutions exist only above it. The line farthest to the left
illustrates restriction 2x > (1  b), above which we operate under Assumption 1 in
Region 1. If we operate below 2x < (1  b) but above 3x > (b  1)2, we are either
in Region 2a or 2b (Assumptions 2a 2b). Outcomes that are true in Region 1 are
not necessarily true in Region 2a and Region 2b.
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Figure 1: The bold curvature illustrates restriction 3x > (b  1)2while the straight
line furthest to left illustrates restriction 2x > (1  b) : The shaded region in the
upper-left corner is Region 1, while Regions 2a and 2b are areas below it, Region
2b being below Region 2a.
Equations (1) to (6) with Assumptions 1 to 2b describe the full model, which
includes shadow production, a maa, and the possibility to monitor by the govern-
ment. Most of the following results are true under all assumptions; thereby only
exceptions for this rule will be indicated. First, we address our baseline scenario: a
maa-free economy.
3 The birth of shadow markets in the absence of
a maa
Obviously, if there is no shadow economy, rms have nowhere to go to escape the
grabbing hand of the government. The government, in turn, has full power to
determine the tax rate, what public goods it provides, and appropriate a part of
the prots of rms. Of course, if a rm is left with nothing, entrepreneurs have a
strong incentive to start producing illegally.
First, we rewrite equation (2) as
ij = 1 + bg   pz   cj:
The threshold cost for rms entering the shadow economy is obtained from the
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indi¤erence l = ij, with the result that c1 = t + (b  1) g   pz, where subscript
1 indicates the game in the absence of the maa, i.e. r = 0. Thus, the size of the
shadow economy, i.e.
F (c1) =
1
2x
(c1 + x) =
1
2x
(t+ (b  1) g   pz + x) ; (7)
increases as taxation rises or public goods, penalties or monitoring are reduced. It
is crucial here to acknowledge that there are indirect costs transmitted via changes
in the size of the shadow economy in addition to the direct costs of producing public
goods and monitoring.
The payo¤ for the government follows equation (5). Subject to l (c)  0, we
optimize the Lagrangian with respect to the tax rate, public goods, and monitoring.
The FOCs are
@G
@t
= 0 () @F (c1)
@t
(pz   t) + (1  F (c1)) = 0
@G
@g
= 0 () @F (c1)
@g
(pz   t)  g = 0 (8)
@G
@p
= 0 () @F (c1)
@p
(pz   t)  p+ F (c1) z = 0;
On the basis of (8), we put forth the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The government should strive to collect taxes at an optimum rate
t > 0. Moreover, monitoring should always be part of an optimal policy from the
governments standpoint.
Proof. Since 0 < F (c1) < 1, it must be that @G@t jt=0= (1  F (c1))+ @F (c1)@t pz > 0
for all non-negative p. Similarly, setting p = 0 gives @G
@p
jp=0=  @F (c1)@p t+F (c1) z > 0.
The intuition is that the government does not incur direct costs from taxation
even with indirect costs from an increase in the size of the shadow economy. Clearly,
when t is small, benets exceed the costs of taxation. Note that when p = g = 0,
the size of the shadow economy in equation (7) is never zero as long as t > 0. The
intuition for the second result is that when p is small, income generated under a
monitoring regime exceeds the costs of monitoring. Therefore, monitoring increases
the payo¤ for the government. The optimal solution for the tax rate, the amount
33
of public goods and the monitoring are
t1 =
 2x2
 4x+ (b  1)2 + z
2;
g1 =
x (b  1)
 4x+ (b  1)2 ; (9)
p1 = z:
We now analyze how exogenous variables a¤ect the optimum, noting rst that
increases in b decrease both the tax rate and the amount of public goods. The
intuition here is that when b (the benet an illegal rm draws from public goods)
increases, production in the shadow economy becomes more attractive. The gov-
ernment reacts by decreasing the production of public goods (which now hurts the
illegal rm more than previously) to decrease production costs. At the same time,
decreased taxation makes operating in the legal economy more attractive. Indeed,
the increased size of the legal sector may be enough to o¤set the e¤ect of lost
government income from an increased b.
Second, increases in the penalty z always increase the tax rate and monitoring
without a¤ecting production of public goods. In particular, since p1  z is z2, the
rm faces a penalty in one form or another, and that cost will not a¤ect the choice
of sector. This comports with expectations. From (5), we observe that when the
government is able to monitor, albeit the cost for the illegal rm is probabilistic,
so the government can collect at least some rent from all the rms in the econ-
omy. From (9), we observe that we may write t1 = p1z + d: Setting the expected
penalty as a minimum rent collected from all rms, while collecting something ex-
tra from legal rms, say a, the income for the government can now be rewritten as
(1  F (c)) (p1z + d) + F (c) p1z = p1z + (1  F (c)) d. Thus, income p1z is always
certain for the government, and since rms will face it at both sectors it will not
a¤ect rms decision on which market to enter. The size of the shadow economy
can be written as 1
2x
(d+ (b  1) g + x), i.e. the e¤ect of monitoring on the shadow
economy is completely neutralized. Therefore, increases in the penalty z lead, one
to one, to increases in monitoring, while the government neutralizes the e¤ect of
the expected penalty by increasing one to one the tax rate and leaving everything
else una¤ected. In essence, monitoring not only increases the (scal) burden borne
by the illegal rm but also the scal burden borne by the legal rm. Moreover,
since public goods are not a¤ected by monitoring, the legal rm is still the sole
contributor to the production of public goods, while the income from monitoring is
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wasted.
Finally, increases in the heterogeneity of the skills of entrepreneurs, x, decreases
the amount of public goods and increase taxes. Monitoring remains una¤ected.
Thus, the most skillful entrepreneurs can make more prot operating in the shadow
economy, while those less skilled benet more from remaining in the legal sector.
The overall productivity of the rms increases, allowing the government to grab
more revenue. Although increasing the tax rate and decreasing the production of
public goods drives some entrepreneurs to the illegal sector, the government collects
more from individual rms remaining in the legal sector and enjoys lower costs for
production of public goods.
Substituting the solutions to the payo¤ for legal rms gives a strictly positive
result; the government can never extract all revenues of legal rms:
l1 = 1  z2 + (b  1) + 2x 4x+ (b  1)2x > 0: (10)
Evaluating (10), we nd the revenue of legal rm decreases when b rises. An
increase in b decreases the amount of public goods and the tax rate, so the net e¤ect
on the legal rms payo¤ is negative. Increases in penalty z decrease the revenue
of the legal rm. Thus, we intuit that when the amount of public goods produced
remains unchanged while the tax rate is increased with the penalty the net e¤ect is
to hurt the legal rms prots.
Solving for this threshold, we obtain
c1 =
 2x+ (b  1)2
 4x+ (b  1)2x:
Evaluating the threshold, we nd that c1 < 0 if x < 12 (b  1)2, and positive other-
wise. Since the penalty does not a¤ect the threshold, we infer that the size of the
shadow economy is also una¤ected.
Proposition 2 The size of the shadow economy is una¤ected by monitoring.
Firms with a cost of entering the shadow economy below c1 will choose illegal
production. The size of the shadow economy decreases if the benet from public
goods decreases for rms in the illegal sector. The higher the excludability of public
goods, the greater the incentive for rms to stay in the legal sector. Increases in x
boost the size of the shadow economy, giving the most skillful entrepreneurs more
opportunities in the shadow economy.
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Solving for the governments payo¤, we get
G1 =
1
2

z2 +
x2
4x  (b  1)2

: (11)
The benet the illegal rm draws from public goods decreases governments payo¤,
while the governments payo¤ is increased in the penalty. The ability to monitor
benets the government in two ways: nes increase direct income from the shadow
economy and higher taxes increase income from the legal sector without disturb-
ing the amount of public goods produced. In other words, monitoring supports
government tax policy.
4 The maa arrives
We now assume the market is occupied by two authorities, both capable of ex-
tracting rents. The government has two unique features: it can produce public
goods, and, as sole legal authority, can monitor the shadow economy. On the other
hand, the government is too weak to control the maa fully or eradicate it. The
choice a rm faces under this scenario requires comparing equations (1) and (2).
The threshold cost for going underground is determined, following equation (3), by
the decisions of the government and the maa. For example, a decrease in rent r,
ceteris paribus, means more rms will nd it protable to operate underground.
The size of the shadow economy is determined according to equation (4), and the
government chooses t, g, and p to maximize its payo¤ at equation (5). The maa
maximizes its payo¤ from equation (6) with regard to r.
Now the game can be played either as a Cournot competition, where the maa
and the government move simultaneously, or as dynamic game as Stackelberg game
where one party moves rst. While the Cournot game is simpler, the Stackelberg
game seems closer to reality as there is a likely pattern whereby the legal authority
emerges rst and the second authority (maa) is extralegal by denition and follows
in reaction.13 We rst analyze the Cournot competition.
13Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1995) view the gangs as primitive states emerging from anarchy.
Since the legality of authority is important here, we expect that the rst authority is legal and the
second one extralegal by denition. Following Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1995) we note that the
relationship between state and organized crime is seldom completely antagonistic and as suggested
by Baumol (1995) we assume the government has intrinsic motives.
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4.1 Simultaneous moves
The payo¤s for the government and for the maa in the static game are presented
by equations (5) and (6), now denoted by subscript 2. To solve for the tax rate,
monitoring, public goods, and the rent, we attempt to identify the best-response
functions for the government and the maa. Optimizing G with respect to t; g; and
p, results in the reaction functions for the government. Optimizing M with respect
to r yields the reaction function for the maa. From the FOCs of the government,
we get
@G
@t
=
@F (c2)
@t
(pz   t) + (1  F (c2)) = 0
@G
@g
=
@F (c2)
@g
(pz   t)  g = 0 (12)
@G
@p
=
@F (c2)
@p
(pz   t) + F (c2) z   p = 0:
Upon evaluation, we see Proposition (1) also applies in this set-up. The FOC for
the maa can be written as
@M
@r
=
@F (c2)
@r
r + F (c2)  aF (c2) @F (c2)
@r
= 0: (13)
Equation (13) illustrates how the optimal rent depends on the existence and size of
the shadow economy. As t, g and p are not directly present in (13), government poli-
cies can inuence maas decisions only through the impact of government actions
on shadow economy.
Proposition 3 When there is a shadow economy, the maa should strive to collect
rents.
Proof. Evaluating the maas FOC at r = 0 gives @M
@r
jr=0= F (c2) aF (c2) @F (c2)@r >
0, since @F (c2)
@r
< 0 and 0 < F (c2) < 1.
Proposition 3 states that collecting rents is predicated on the existence of a
shadow economy. But as was shown in Proposition 1, it makes sense for the govern-
ment to monitor the shadow economy and try to extract rents when the activities
of illegal rms are detected.
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Solving the unknowns from these linear equations, we obtain
t2 =
2x (1 + 3x)
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2 + z
2;
g2 =   (b  1) (1 + 3x)
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2 ;
p2 = z; (14)
r2 =
(2x+ 1)
 
3x  (b  1)2
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2 :
These results are quite similar to the situation in a maa-free system.14 Evalu-
ating the maas rent according to Assumption 1, we nd it increases in line with
benet gained from partaking in public goods. Thus, the maa taxes the in-
creased benet enjoyed by the illegal rm. Note that maa rent is clearly below the
tax rate, even in the absence of monitoring. Using the solutions in (14), we nd the
size of the shadow economy is diminished by the presence of a maa (see Appendix
B).
Comparing our results for with and without a maa, we nd that the optimal
amounts of monitoring are the same. Evaluating the optimal tax and amount of
public goods shows that t2 > t1 and that g2 > g1, i.e. while the emergence of a
maa allows the government to raise taxes, it also requires to increase production
of public goods. How these changes a¤ect the prots of rmsdepends in which
region we operate. Operating under Assumption 1, as the government is unable to
extract all prots of legal rms, we reach
Proposition 4 Both legal and illegal rms are worse o¤ once a maa enters the
shadow economy.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In Region 1, the net scal burden of legal rm is increased, while the net scal
burden of illegal rm is decreased. The illegal rm, however, faces an extra cost in
terms of rents, whereby its net prots are decreased and both rms are worse o¤.
As soon as we exit Region 1 this is no longer the case. Instead, we reach,
14In fact, assuming that also the legal rm had to pay rents for the maa would lead the
government making its decision as if there was no maa. Then the results would be similar to
those of the rst set-up, with the exception that maas payo¤ would increase and legal rms
prots would decrease.
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Proposition 5 The entry of a maa benets legal rms. For small enough x (As-
sumption 2b) also illegal rms benet.
In Region 1, the arrival of the maa places the government in a stronger position
vis-à-vis legal rms; it can increase taxes more than it increases public goods. While
these changes create the incentive to go underground, the entry of a maa increases
costs of illegal production. The overall incentive to produce underground is reduced,
so illegal rms are generally worse o¤ after the arrival of a maa. Thus, the size
of the shadow economy decreases with the entry of a maa. There is, however,
a region where this does not hold and the government reacts by increasing public
goods more than taxes. Then, legal rms actually benet from the entry of a maa.
If the public goods are increased more than the value of a rent, then also illegal
rms benet from the entry of a maa. The increased competition whereby the
government and the maa compete neck and neck may benet rms! Moreover,
the governments prots exceed those of the maa, because the government has
multiple means to grab rmsrevenues.15 Particularly, the government is free to
collect rents from rms in both sectors, while the maa can only collect rents from
rms in the illegal sector. Since the rent or the size of the shadow economy is not
determined by the ne, the maas payo¤ is una¤ected by it.
Proposition 6 The arrival of a maa increases the governments payo¤.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Surprisingly, the government is better o¤ when a maa enters the shadow econ-
omy. Indeed, as soon as the shadow economy has emerged, the government has no
incentive to get rid of the maa.
In the presence of shadow production and a maa, government policies have the
similar e¤ects on government income as before. Taxation incurs no direct costs, but
there are indirect costs through the changes in the size of the shadow economy and
the tax base. From a strategic standpoint, it is wise for the government to neutralize
the e¤ect of monitoring by setting it as a base tax. What is di¤erent from the
previous set-up is that rent paid to the maa benets the government indirectly,
since the rent has the tendency to decrease the size of the shadow economy and
thereby boost tax income. Thus, the governments tax policy is supported by both
its own monitoring and maa rent-seeking.
15It is straightforward to establish G2 > M2 is true under Assumption 1.
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4.2 Stackelberg game
We now make the natural assumption that a legal authority emerges before the
maa arrives. Here, we analyze a dynamic game where the government is the
Stackelberg leader and the maa is the follower. The threshold cost and the payo¤s
follow equations (3) - (6). Hence, optimizing for the follower yields the FOC for the
maa as in equation (13) or in terms of the best-response function
r =
2x+ 1
4x+ 1
(t+ (b  1) g   pz + x) ; (15)
where increases in taxation have a tendency to increase rents, while the increases in
public goods or monitoring tends to decrease rents. Optimizing the governments
payo¤ with regard to t, g, p, and simplifying gives
@G
@t
=

@F (c3)
@t
+
@F (c3)
@r
 @r
@t

(pz   t) + (1  F (c3))
@G
@g
=

@F (c3)
@g
+
@F (c3)
@r
 @r
@g

(pz   t)  g (16)
@G
@p
=

@F (c3)
@p
+
@F (c3)
@r
 @r
@p

(pz   t) + F (c3) z   p:
Comparing optimality conditions in (16) to those in (12) shows that the optimal
solutions for t, g, p, are di¤erent from those in Cournot. Then the solutions for
unknowns are
t3 =
(4x+ 1) (3x+ 1)
2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2 + z
2;
g3 =   (b  1) (3x+ 1)
2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2 ;
p3 = z; (17)
r3 =
(1 + 2x)
 
(5x+ 1)  (b  1)2
2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2 :
Evaluating these and comparing the solutions to those for the Cournot competition,
we see that t3 > t2; g2 > g3, p2 = p3, and r3 > r2 (see Appendix B).
In the Stackelberg game, the government can increase the tax rate and simul-
taneously decrease the amount of public goods it provides. Monitoring is constant
from one set-up to another as it serves as a minimal rent the government will collect
from all rms. The governments actions increase the size of the shadow economy,
which forces the maa to raise its rents since its costs are increased. Ceteris paribus,
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increases in r decrease F (c), i.e. the costs of collecting rents are decreased. The
size of the shadow economy is larger here than in the Cournot competition (see
Appendix B). Strikingly, under all Assumptions
Proposition 7 Both legal and illegal rms are worse o¤ in the Stackelberg game
than in the Cournot competition.
Proof. Since g3   t3 < g2   t2, legal rms must be worse o¤ in the Stackelberg
game than in the Cournot game. Since p2 = p3 and r3 > r2, illegal rms must also
be worse o¤ in the Stackelberg game.
Since both the legal and illegal rms lose in the Stackelberg game, it would seem
that the government, the maa, or both, benet. Is it possible, however, for both
the government and the maa to increase their income in the Stackelberg game?
Regarding maa income, we know that the size of the shadow economy is larger
in the Stackelberg game than in the Cournot competition so rents are higher than
under Cournot, implying that maa income is higher. On the other hand, the
maas costs for collecting rents also go up, so the overall impact is ambiguous.
For the government, we know that the amount of monitoring does not change, yet
the increased size of the shadow economy income necessarily means greater income
from penalties. Since the amount of public goods the government produces is lower,
the costs of producing public goods decreases. Moreover, the tax rate rises, while
the legal economy shrinks, so again the overall e¤ect of the higher tax rate on the
payo¤ is ambiguous. Comparing G3 > G2 and M3 > M2, however, shows that
Proposition 8 Both the government and the maa gain more income in the Stack-
elberg game than in the Cournot competition.
Proof. See Appendix B.
In the Stackelberg game, the government and maa increase their payo¤s. Of
course, we expect here that the rst-mover will capitalize on this advantage and
try to grab as much as possible behavior that results in a larger shadow economy.
Since the maa sets rents according to the size of the shadow economy, it will surely
raise its rents as long as the costs for doing so do not impair the overall benets.
From the rms point of view, the best scenario is where the government and maa
are evenly matched to compete; if there is a leader and a follower authority, rms
inevitably lose.
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5 Welfare and enforcement
Sections 2 to 4 hold powerful implications about the governments ability to monitor
shadow production. Since the literature largely neglect the monitoring of shadow
production, and hence, optimal law enforcement, let us briey consider the welfare
e¤ects of monitoring and enforcement.
While the social welfare is a standard measure of well-being, there is no consen-
sus on its denition with respect to individual ethics, fairness concerns nor crime.
Harsanyi (1955) suggests that a public policy aimed at satisfying the preferences
of the individual members of society, the welfare function should take the form of
a sum of individual utilities. The problem is that, for example, a theft is just a
transfer, which might not inict any cost for the victim and as such does not a¤ect
the social welfare. In the context of shadow economy where there is no conict of
interest between the members of society and no negative externalities involved, then
the illegal production must be fully accounted for in the sum of utilities and may,
in fact, increase welfare.16 Clearly there are limits to this approach as conicting
interests in the context of criminal.
Considering the above observations, we write the ordinary social welfare dened
as a sum of the utilities of rms and the authorities, i.e. the sum of costs and benets
associated with the production of goods and services in the economy. Taxes, the
income from monitoring, and rents are transfers, so they cancel out. The costs of
producing them, however, are apparent. As a result, we formulate the welfare e¤ect
in the presence of a maa as
W = (1  F (c)) (1 + g) + F (c) (1 + bg) 
cZ
 x
c
2x
dc  1
2
g2   1
2
p2   1
2
F (c)2 : (18)
We assume that the planner is now responsible for maximizing the welfare after all
the players have made their decisions. If we let the planner choose the penalty, then
there is only one sensible course of action:
16Weiss (1976) concludes that a possibility of cheating on income taxes and random taxes in
form of a probabilistic penalty might be socially useful. Davidson et al. (2007) propose that,
depending on the attributes of the goods supplied on the black market, the black market may
actually increase welfare. Schneider (2008) presents evidence for that working in the shadow
economy is often considered as a petty crime. For in-depth discussion see Kaplow and Shavell
(2002).
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Proposition 9 Under a Leviathan government, the planner should set the penalty
to zero.
The intuition here is that since there are only costs and no benets associated
with monitoring, the planner has no incentive to punish o¤enders. Shadow produc-
tion is a petty and victimless crime, i.e. nobody gets hurt from it. As there are net
benets associated with illegal production, i.e. cj < 0 for some rms, it is always
welfare-increasing to have a shadow economy.
While it appears that the externalities are completely absent in our model, this
is not the case. Legal producers su¤er from a scal externality as they are the sole
contributors to the production of public goods. Here, the legal rms benet from
the entry of the maa when the maa and the government compete equally as in a
Cournot competition. Even monitoring does not alter this result. This somewhat
counterintuitive result becomes evident in the following analysis.
To evaluate the e¤ect of monitoring on the optimum, we set p = 0 and redo the
analysis in Sections 2 and 4. Comparing the results with and without monitoring,
simply evaluating the FOCs proves that in all these set-ups t > tp=0 and gp=0 = g,
i.e. the tax collected is greater with monitoring while public goods production
remains una¤ected. This means that, even in the presence of scal externality, a
legal rm is better o¤when the government does not monitor the shadow economy,
i.e. 1   tp=0+ gp=0 > 1   t + g for all these set-ups. The incentive to engage in
shadow production, in turn, must increase, since there is no cost for getting caught.
The maas rent, however, is unaltered by monitoring. Also the size of shadow
economy is una¤ected by monitoring. Then it must be the case that both types of
rms are hurt by monitoring, the government benets from monitoring, while the
maa is una¤ected by it.
Proposition 10 Monitoring strengthens the governments position over rms, but
does not a¤ect the maas position. Both legal and illegal rms are worse o¤ under
a monitoring regime.
Thus, governments that are not concerned with the welfare of their citizens
should be stripped of their power to monitor illegal producers, since monitoring
acts as a rent-extracting tool comparable to bribery. Correspondingly, if the planner
cares for the total welfare, not to mention the position of legal rms, it should set
z = 0.
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6 Conclusions
This paper considered the interactions of a government, an organized crime group
(maa), and rms operating in the legal and illegal sectors of the economy. Our
results highlight the role of the public policy in shaping production, since the gov-
ernment creates the incentives for illegal production. Maas ourish when there is
an opportunity to extract rents on production in the shadow economy.
The ability of the government to monitor illegal activities does not alter the
size of the shadow economy. When the government monitors illegal production, it
collects higher taxes thereby in the margin the incentives for rms are una¤ected.
Moreover, the government has the authority to punish o¤enders, so it has an ex-
tra tool for extracting rents from rms. This means that a revenue-maximizing
government should always monitor the shadow economy, even though the maa is
completely una¤ected by monitoring. Indeed, even in the situation where there is
no collusion between the government and the maa, monitoring benets both of
them.
When discussing the winners and losers in these di¤erent set-ups, we note that,
in a maa-free environment, legal rms benet from shifting to the shadow economy
to increase prots. In a Cournot competition, however, the appearance of a maa
on the scene changes the outcome as the protability is likely lowered for both legal
and illegal rms. When the maa collects rents in the shadow economy, illegal
rms seek to abandon the shadow economy. At the same time, the government
can increase the tax rate more than it increases the production of public goods,
thereby harming both legal and illegal rms. If the government, however, ends up
increasing the production of public goods more than it increases the tax rate (rent),
both types of rms actually benet from the entry of a maa. Thus, the intensied
competition of authorities eliminates a part of the scal externality of tax evasion.
In a Stackelberg game, the prots of both legal and illegal rms decrease, while
the payo¤s for the government and the maa increase. Here, the appearance of a
maa is strictly harmful to rms in both the legal and illegal sector. Meanwhile, the
government benets as the maas activities indirectly support its policies. If the
ne is viewed as a hidden tax or a bribe, then the government should be stripped
of the right to punish o¤enders.
The study has raised several interesting questions that suggest lines of further
study, including a rich vein of potential work in the area of social welfare. Indeed,
what would the equilibrium look like and the social welfare consequences be if
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the government and maa colluded? Would a more welfare-oriented government
be more successful in limiting the size of the shadow economy? Finally, if illegal
production is a victimless crime, is it worthwhile to reduce the incentives to go
underground in the absence of harm? This result would probably not hold if the
government would use all the revenue to produce public goods.
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A Restrictions for interior solutions
A.1 Sub-rules for the existence
Before evaluating the existence rules, we derive several auxiliary proofs. Let 3x >
(1  b)2 hold. Then
Corollary 11 It is obvious that the following statements are true 2 (4x+ 1) >
(6x+ 1) > (5x+ 1) > (4x+ 1) > 4x > (1  b)2.
Corollary 12 Also whenever 2x > (1  b) is true then (4x+ 1) > 4x > (1  b)
must also be true. If 4x < (1  b) then 2x < (1  b) :
Evaluating the limits of the penalty is useful for the later comparisons.
Corollary 13 Comparing z21 > z
2
2 reduces to
(b 1)+2x
4x (b 1)2x <
(2x+(b 1))(1+3x)
(6x+1) (b 1)2 , which is
true for all 2x > (1  b). The contrary is true when 2x < (1  b) :
Corollary 14 Comparing z22 > z
2
3 reduces to
2x+(b 1)
(6x+1) (b 1)2 <
4x+1+(b 1)
2(4x+1) (b 1)2 . Re-
arrange to (2x+ b  1)  2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2 (4x+ 1 + (b  1))  (6x+ 1)  (b  1)2<0,
which is equal to   (2x+ 1)    (b  1)2 + 4x+ 2  b < 0. This is true for all x; b.
It appears that for the existence of the interior solution in both Cournot and
Stackelberg games, the penalty must be less than z23 . It is worth noticing, that
when 2x < (1  b) and z22 > z21 , then z23 < z21 since (b 1)+2x4x (b 1)2x < 0 while 0 <
((4x+1)+(b 1))(3x+1)
2(4x+1) (b 1)2 < 1. We prove
Proposition 15 ((4x+1)+(b 1))(3x+1)
2(4x+1) (b 1)2 < 1, i.e. ((4x+ 1) + (b  1)) (3x+ 1) > 2 (4x+ 1) 
(b  1)2. First, it is obvious that j(b  1)j >   (b  1)2 for 0 < b < 1. Then it
follows that (4x+ 1) + (b  1) < (4x+ 1)   (b  1)2. Multiply through by (3x+ 1)
and compare (3x+ 1) (4x+ 1)   (3x+ 1) (b  1)2 with 2 (4x+ 1)   (b  1)2. The
comparison of weights of positive and negative terms yields (3x+ 1)  2 while
(3x+ 1) > 1 for all x 2 (0; 1). Then it must be that 2 (4x+ 1)   (b  1)2 >
((4x+ 1) + (b  1)) (3x+ 1), which completes the proof.
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A.2 The regions
We evaluate the restrictions necessary to have an interior solution in each game
(benchmark, Cournot and Stackelberg) under three existence rules: legal and illegal
production must exist, and the government must produce public goods. Although
these restrictions seem to change from one set to another, there is a sub-set of
the restrictions where all games have an interior solution. Inserting solutions in
(9) to F (c1) gives the size of the shadow economy in benchmark,
3x (b 1)2
4x (b 1)2 , while
inserting (14) to F (c2) gives the size of the shadow economy in the Cournot game,
3x (b 1)2
(6x+1) (b 1)2 , and inserting (17) to F (c3) gives the size of the shadow economy in
the Stackelberg game, (5x+1) (b 1)
2
2(4x+1) (b 1)2 . For all, it must be that 0 < F (c) < 1.
In the rst two set-ups for the existence of the shadow economy, it must be that
3x > (b  1)2 (19)
is true. As shown in Corollary 11, the shadow economy also exists in the Stackelberg
game.
Then for the existence of the public goods in the rst set-up, it is required that
x(b 1)
 4x+(b 1)2 > 0; i.e. 4x > (b  1)
2. In the second set-up, the existence of public
goods requires that   (b 1)(1+3x)
(6x+1) (b 1)2 > 0, or (6x+ 1) > (1  b)
2, while in the third
set-up, it requires that   (b 1)(3x+1)
2(4x+1) (b 1)2 > 0 or 2 (4x+ 1) > (1  b)
2. All of these
requirements are inferior to 3x > (b  1)2, i.e. they are satised (19) is satised
as was suggested in Corollary 11. Thus, it is su¢ cient to have 3x > (b  1)2 for
interior solutions for public goods and for the shadow economy in all these set-ups.
Indeed, it turns out that (19) is the su¢ cient condition for the existence of interior
solutions of all three games.
Finally, there must be existence rules for legal production, i.e. lj > 0. Evalu-
ating these existence rules is a bit more complicated, since they set limits on the
penalty. First, we evaluate these under an assumption that 3x > (b  1)2. Then
we write Assumption A1 for our benchmark game without the maa, Assumption
A2 for the Cournot game and Assumption A3 for the Stackelberg game. To have
lj > 0 requires that
A1 Whenever 2x < (1  b), we have l1 > 0. Whenever 2x > (1  b), it must be
that z21 < 1  (b 1)+2x4x (b 1)2x, i.e. the penalty cannot be excessive.
A2 As in the rst set-up, whenever 2x < (1  b), we have l2 > 0. When the
contrary is true, we must have z22 < 1  (2x+(b 1))(1+3x)(6x+1) (b 1)2 .
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A3 To have l3 > 0, we must have z23 < 1  ((4x+1)+(b 1))(3x+1)2(4x+1) (b 1)2 .
Comparing the existence rules for the legal sector from A1 to A3, we nd that
for 2x < (1  b) we need to set restrictions for the penalty only in the Stackelberg
game. Whenever 2x > (1  b), it must be that one of the three upper bounds for
the penalty is enforced. Corollaries 13 and 14 suggest that the most restrictive is
the requirement z23 < 1  ((4x+1)+(b 1))(3x+1)2(4x+1) (b 1)2 to be binding.
Assuming that 3x > (b  1)2, we have been able to identify the rules that
provide the existence of an interior solution within three regions. Therefore, we
write Assumptions 1, 2a and 2b as
1. Assume 2x > (1  b) and z2 < 1   ((4x+1)+(b 1))(3x+1)
2(4x+1) (b 1)2 are both true (Region
1).
2a. Assume 2x < (1  b) and z2 < 1   ((4x+1)+(b 1))(3x+1)
2(4x+1) (b 1)2 are both true (Region
2a).
2b. Assume 2x < (1  b) ; 4x < (1  b) and z2 < 1   ((4x+1)+(b 1))(3x+1)
2(4x+1) (b 1)2 are all
true (Region 2b).
B Proofs
B.1 Cournot vs. No maa
To show that the tax in a Cournot competition is higher that the tax in the bench-
mark, and setting t2 > t1
2x (1 + 3x)
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2 + z
2 >
 2x2
 4x+ (b  1)2 + z
2
(1 + 3x)
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2 >
x
4x  (b  1)2 (20)
(1 + 3x)
 
4x  (b  1)2 > x  (6x+ 1)  (b  1)2
(2x+ 1)
   (b  1)2 + 3x > 0;
is true always.
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Comparing the amount of public goods as g2 > g1 reduces to
  (b  1) (1 + 3x)
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2 >  
x (b  1)
4x  (b  1)2
(1 + 3x)
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2 >
x
4x  (b  1)2 ;
which must be true since (20) holds. The size of the shadow economy F (c1) is
derived by plugging (9) into (4) and F (c2) by plugging (14) into (4). Setting
F (c1) > F (c2)
3x  (b  1)2
4x  (b  1)2 >
3x  (b  1)2
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2
1
4x  (b  1)2 >
1
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2
is true.
The prots of the legal rm are derived by substituting (9) and then (14) into
(1). Setting l1 > l2
1  z2 + (b  1) + 2x 4x+ (b  1)2x > 1  z
2   (2x+ (b  1)) (1 + 3x)
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2
x
 4x+ (b  1)2 >  
(1 + 3x)
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2
this result is subject to that of Corollary 13. It is true whenever 2x > (1  b), i.e.,
under Assumption 1.
For the illegal rm we show that i1 > i2, which reduces to showing that bg1 > b
g2   r2
x (b  1) b
 4x+ (b  1)2 >  
(b  1) (1 + 3x) b
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2  
(2x+ 1)
 
3x  (b  1)2
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2
x (b  1) b
4x  (b  1)2 <
(b  1) (1 + 3x) b+ (2x+ 1)  3x  (b  1)2
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2 :
Evaluating 
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2 x (b  1) b < (b  1) (1 + 3x) b+ (2x+ 1)  3x  (b  1)2  4x  (b  1)2
and simplifying yields   (2x+ 1)   3x  (b  1)2 (4x+ (b  1)) < 0, which is true
under Assumption 1, but not true under Assumption 2 if 4x < 1  b.
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The payo¤s for the government and the maa are
G2 =
1
2
"
(3x+ 1)2
 
4x  (b  1)2
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)22 + z2
#
;
M2 =
(4x  a+ 2)  3x  (b  1)22
2

(6x+ 1)  (b  1)22 :
where 0 < a < 2x+ 1: Comparing the government benets G2 > G1,
1
2
"
(3x+ 1)2
 
4x  (b  1)2
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)22 + z2
#
>
1
2
z2 +
x2
2
 
4x  (b  1)2
(3x+ 1)2
 
4x  (b  1)2
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)22 > x
2 
4x  (b  1)2 ;
is true since (20) holds.
B.2 Cournot vs. Stackelberg
Comparing the optimal solutions in a Cournot game to those of a Stackelberg game,
and proposing t3 > t2
(4x+ 1) (3x+ 1)
2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2 + z
2 >
2x (1 + 3x)
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2 + z
2
(4x+ 1)
2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2 >
2x
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2
(4x+ 1)

(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2 > 2x 2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2
  (2x+ 1) (b  1)2 >   (2x+ 1) (4x+ 1)
(b  1)2 < (4x+ 1)
is true as proposed by Corollary 12.
Comparing the amount of public goods g2 > g3 shows that
  (b  1) (1 + 3x)
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2 >  
(b  1) (3x+ 1)
2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2
1
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2 >
1
2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2
is true as proposed by Corollary 13.
50
Comparing the rents suggests that r3 > r2
(1 + 2x)
 
(5x+ 1)  (b  1)2
2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2 >
(2x+ 1)
 
3x  (b  1)2
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2
(5x+ 1)  (b  1)2
2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2 >
3x  (b  1)2
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2 
(5x+ 1)  (b  1)2  (6x+ 1)  (b  1)2 >  3x  (b  1)2  2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2
6x2 + 5x+ 1 > 0
is true. This is also enough to prove that F (c3) > F (c2) as
(5x+ 1)  (b  1)2
2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2 >
3x  (b  1)2
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2 : (21)
The prots of the legal rm are l3 < l2 as
1  ((4x+ 1) + (b  1)) (3x+ 1)
2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2 < 1 
(2x+ (b  1)) (1 + 3x)
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2
((4x+ 1) + (b  1)) (3x+ 1)
2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2 <
(2x+ (b  1)) (1 + 3x)
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2
(4x+ 1) + (b  1)
2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2 <
(2x+ (b  1))
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)2
then from Corollary 14 we know that this is true in all regimes.
For the illegal rm we show that i2 > i3, which reduces to showing that
bg2  r2 > bg3  r3. Now since g2 > g3 while r3 > r2 and z2 = z3 then this is always
true.
The payo¤s for the government and the maa are
G3 =
(3x+ 1)2
2
 
2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2 + 12z2;
M3 =
(4x  a+ 2)  (5x+ 1)  (b  1)22
2
 
2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)22 :
To show that G3 > G2
(3x+ 1)2
2
 
2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2 + 12z2 > (3x+ 1)
2  4x  (b  1)2
2
 
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)22 + 12z2
1 
2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2  4x  (b  1)2 > 1 (6x+ 1)  (b  1)22
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reduces to
 
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)22 >  2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)2  4x  (b  1)2 : Simpli-
fying yields (2x+ 1)2 > 0 which is true for all x.
To show that M3 > M2
(4x  a+ 2)  (5x+ 1)  (b  1)22
2
 
2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)22 > (4x  a+ 2)
 
3x  (b  1)22
2

(6x+ 1)  (b  1)22 
(5x+ 1)  (b  1)22 
2 (4x+ 1)  (b  1)22 >
 
3x  (b  1)22 
(6x+ 1)  (b  1)22
is true since (21) is true.
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1 Introduction
One of the most inuential analyses of the links between the economy, religion and
morality has been Max Webers Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism from
1904. The popular view - though an imprecise one - is that it has been protestant
ethics which has been benign to the work ethic, having promoted the success of
capitalism. Such a proposition may also be translated into an empirical predic-
tion of how people adhering to di¤erent religions judge illegal economic activities.
For example, Schneider (2005) suggests that the shadow markets are larger in the
Mediterranean countries than, say, in the northern welfare states.
In their ground braking paper, Reckers et al. (1994) studied the interaction
of tax ethics with the tax rates. An increase in the marginal tax rate seems to
increase the noncompliance among those individuals who strongly disagreed with
the statement that tax evasion is morally wrong. Conversely, those who condemned
tax evasion as morally wrong did not alter their responses. Other researchers have,
however, presented more skeptical views and pointed to group norms: if others cheat
then one may cheat without feeling guilty (for discussion see Pilkington 2007). Alm
and Torgler (2006) propose that there are cultural di¤erences regarding tax morale
across countries and in particular that northern Europeans have higher tax morale
than southern Europeans. Studying Austria, Torgler and Schneider (2005) nd
that from 1990 to 1999 the tax morale has decreased, yet is high compared with
other European countries. More recently, Feld et al. (2008) evaluate the tax morale
in Germany after German unication. They nd that the tax morale in the East
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and the West Germany converged from 1990 to 1999 being almost identical in the
end. Most interestingly, it was the initially higher East German tax morale that
converged to the lower West German levels, i.e., the standards decreased.
In this paper, we ask whether a religious denomination can explain di¤erences in
tax morale and tax compliance in particular. There is indeed evidence to support
this view, as some empirical studies evaluate the economic e¤ects of religion (cf.
Iannaccone, 1998). Substantial di¤erences exist between catholicism and protes-
tantism in both the structure of their beliefs and their enforcement mechanisms.
Kirchgässner (1999) argues that historically in north Europe, state and religious au-
thority were largely held by one person and o¤ences against the state were therefore
religious o¤ences (and consequently a sin). Arrunada (2004) also argues that the
catholic theology and practice facilitate personal transactions while protestantism
favors values and types of moral and legal enforcement better adapted to impersonal
trade. Guiso et al. (2003) nd a relation between religion and peoples attitudes
toward legal rules, such as trust in the legal system, cheating on taxes, or paying
bribes. In particular, they nd that the willingness to cheat on taxes is weakest in
judaism followed by protestantism, catholicism, hinduism and islam.
The theory of tax evasion goes back at least to Allingham and Sandmo (1972),
and the subsequent literature has linked social norms to tax evasion (see Gordon
(1989)) and to punishment. Brekke et al. (2003) propose a model where a con-
sumers self-image can only be improved by striving towards what she truly believes
to be morally right. The experiment by Myles and Naylor (1996) supports a tax
evasion model where utility is derived from a social custom when taxes are paid
honestly. Fehr and Gächter (2002) indicate that people are willing to invest in pub-
lic goods as long as they have the opportunity to inict punishment on those who
free ride on cooperation. Orvaska and Hudsons (2002) results suggest that evasion
is condoned by a large proportion of the population although people appear to be
deterred from tax evasion by the consequences of being caught.
Recently, Katungi et al. (2006) surveyed the motives for informal work in the
UK. While the single most signicant reason for informal work was to alleviate
poverty the respondents gave also other reasons: employers are avoiding paperwork
in times of critical sta¤ shortages (in the construction industry and in the clean-
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ing services in particular), respondents took informal second job to top up their
low wages, foreign students and asylum seekers make their living in informal em-
ployment, graduates perceived lack of formal jobs matching their skills, and some
respondents are avoiding the application costs of formal jobs. In general, many
respondents saw the informal job as a route to the formal one.
Our paper contributes to the literature on tax morale and shadow markets.
We introduce a model of consumers and entrepreneurs who value their moral code
but are inherently opportunists in a sense that their morality is priced in market
transactions. In our model, entrepreneurs provide their services to consumers either
through the legal or illegal market. Tax morale is reected in the di¤erence in
the private valuation of the legal and illegal transactions, arising from the lack of
self-respect consequent on tax evasion.1 A legal producer benets from the moral
aspirations of consumers, which provide a compensatory mechanism for the tax to
be paid. An illegal producer avoids the tax and can contract with the consumers
visiting the shadow market at a lower price. It is not that in equilibrium all potential
entrepreneurs are active. They have an outside option in terms of benets when
choosing unemployment. Tax evasion results in a scal externality in the nancing
of public goods, which have the property that they enhance the private productivity
of entrepreneurs. The tax rate chosen by a revenue-maximizing government hinges
upon the tax morale of people in the economy.
While there exist both direct and indirect approaches for quantifying the size of
the shadow economy, structural equation models which incorporate latent variables
have become a standard technique for estimating the size of the shadow economy.2
The direct approaches make use of microeconomic data from tax auditing or surveys,
while indirect approaches typically dwell on discrepancies on the macroeconomic
measurements such as national expenditure and income statistics or o¢ cial and
actual labor force. On the use of the former approach there are two potential
problems. Firstly, the tax auditing data is di¢ cult to come by and the auditions are
often concentrated to one problematic sector, whereby the results are not general.
Second, in surveys the respondents tend to lie in such delicate matters, therefore
1Hausman and McPherson (1993) have provided a review of why and how morality inuences
economic outcomes. Cf. Frank (1987) for a pioneering analysis of honesty and dishonesty.
2For a review see Schneider and Enste (2000) and Lyssiotou et al. (2004).
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even if they were available the results are not necessarily very reliable. On the
use of the latter approach the problem has been that the studies typically rely on
one source of information, i.e. they concentrate on the discrepancy between two
indicators instead of many. The structural equation approach overcomes this fault,
although the existing studies have been evaluated critically by Breusch (2005 a,b)
among other. Three of his points are more critical, and while we are not able
to correct all the aws he demonstrates the previous studies have su¤ered, we take
several attempts to control for them. Also their impacts on our results are discussed.
We work with the data from the OECD to evaluate the e¤ects of tax, government
consumption, social security, and interest rates on the shadow economy. In our
data, we identify two regimes. In the rst regime, 1979-1992, the activities of
public sector grew than during the latter regime, 1992-2003. To test the hypothesis
that religion a¤ects tax morale and hence tax evasion, we use the data from the
World Values Surveys to group the countries according to their primary religious
denomination. The countries form natural groups of the catholic south and the
protestant north, whereby the other countries make up the reference group that
facilitates the comparison between groups and with the previous studies. Should
this hypothesis be valid, it will be reected in the elasticity of the size of the shadow
economy with regard to tax.
We report three major ndings. First, there are some di¤erences in tax morale
across religions, but for the latter regime we reject the hypothesis that countries
with a di¤erent religious background exhibit di¤erent tax morale. Our estimates
suggest that within the OECD, the norms are global. Second, even though we do
not calibrate the index of the size of the shadow economy, our approach with direct
e¤ects included suggests that the size of the shadow markets, however, has been
overestimated by previous studies. Third, our results support the view that there
was a regime switch in the evolution of the public sector in the early 1990s and that
the underlying model of the shadow economies within these regimes di¤ers.
The road map of our paper is that we rst develop our theoretical model in
Section 2. The model is estimated in Section 3, which also reports the econometric
results. Section 4 concludes.
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2 Model
2.1 Tax Morale
Does the tax morale di¤er across countries? It is possible that private incentives to
avoid taxes are su¢ ciently strong promoting shadow activities. We show rst that
countries can diverge to di¤erent levels of shadow activities, or they can converge
to the same level of shadow activities. Of course, also di¤erences in policy can
cause di¤erences in the shadow activities. Then we study the conditions as to when
it is the prisonersdilemma which in the rst place creates incentives for shadow
activities.
Our model is a version of the seminal vertical product di¤erentiation model
introduced by Mussa and Rosen (1978). To x the ideas, we consider an economy
where consumer services can be bought either in a legal or an illegal market. The
mass of consumers is normalized to unity. The number of producers is normalized
to ; where  > 0. Each consumer buys one service from either one of t he markets
at most while each producer can service several buyers. Legal producers are subject
to a tax,  > 0: Illegal producers can contract with the buyers at a lower price and
abstain from paying the tax.
People are assumed to be heterogeneous in terms of their moral aspirations,
reected in their willingness to pay. The consumer with the highest moral standard
values the transactions with a legal producer by 1 and the transactions with an
illegal producer by 2 where 1 > 2 > 0: This assumption captures the idea that
a deviation from the social norm results in stigma or a loss of self-respect. The
consumers are ordered with a linearly declining valuation of the goods.
Thus, if the consumer i buys from the legal and consumer j from the illegal
producer, their net (indirect) utilities, reected in their willingness to pay are3
ui = 1(1  i)  p1; vj = 2(1  j)  p2; 1 > 2 > 0; (1)
where p1; p2 are the market prices of the legal and illegal products, yet to be deter-
mined.
3For introduction of such utilities, cf. Katz and Shapiro (1985).
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For the sake of simplicity, the entrepreneurs have a choice between operating in
the legal or in the illegal market. Those choosing to operate in the illegal market
face a moral cost. Therefore we introduce the utility functions of the entrepreneurs
as
U l = 1; V
il = 2; (2)
where the prots they earn are denoted by 1; 2 and where  < 1 is the valuation
of the illegal prot.4 The legal and illegal outputs will be denoted by x1 and x2.
Public goods denoted by g will enhance private productivity. Inactive entrepreneurs
are entitled to a government transfer in terms of unemployment benet,  > 0; rep-
resenting an opportunity cost. We introduce linear revenue functions and quadratic
cost functions. Hence, the marginal costs are increasing in output. Then the prots
of the legal and illegal entrepreneurs are
1 = p1gx1   1
2
x21    ; 2 = p2gx2  
1
2
x22: (3)
Product markets are competitive and the entrepreneurs are price-takers. There
is free entry into both markets. The entry conditions are given by 1  ; 2  
where the unemployment compensation is used to measure the opportunity cost.5
The rst-order conditions are x1 = gp1 and x2 = gp2. Market prices adjust to
eliminate the rents. From 1 = 2 = ; we obtain the prices and the rst-order
conditions give the optimal outputs
p1 =
p
2( + )
g
; p2 =
p
2=
g
; x1 =
p
2( + ); x2 =
p
2=:
Provided that the tax rate exceeds the transfer by a margin,  >  (1  ) =; the
illegal price and output are lower than the legal price and output. The private
benets from tax evasion are split between the buyers and the legal entrepreneurs.
4Note that there is no cost of being caught operating in shadow economy in the model. Intro-
ducing such a cost would a¤ect the equilibrium and reduce illegal output.
5It is assumed that the illegal producers are not able to exploit government transfers if they
are active. Introducing the exploitation of government transfers by the illegal producers would be
trivial.
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Moreover, in equilibrium, those entrepreneurs operating in the illegal sector have
a greater prot than those operating in the legal sector, 1 =  < 2 = =: Yet,
their utilities are equalized as the illegal producer su¤ers a moral cost.
To solve for the aggregate legal and illegal production, we denote by m the mar-
ginal consumer who is indi¤erent between buying the legal and the illegal product.
Similarly, we denote by n the consumer who is indi¤erent between buying the ille-
gal product and none. The consumers in the interval (0;m) buy the legal product
and consumers in the interval (m;n) buy the illegal product. The net utility of the
consumer n is zero, i.e. 2(1 n) p2 = 0. Then the total number of customers, in-
cluding those visiting the legal and those visiting the illegal markets is n = 1 p2=2.
It holds for the marginal consumer m that 1(1 m)  p1 = 2(1 m)  p2: This
can be used to solve for the number of customers in the legal sector,
m = 1  p1   p2
1   2 = 1 
p
2( + ) p2=
g (1   2) :
Then, the size of the shadow sector, measured by the number of its consumers is
n m = p1   p2
1   2  
p2
2
=
p
2( + ) p2=
g (1   2)  
p
2=
g2
: (4)
From the condition n m > 0; we obtain
Lemma 1 The condition for the existence of the shadow sector is 2=1 >
p
=( + ).
Moreover, the weaker the tax morale of consumers (small 1 2) or producers (great
) is or the greater the tax rate  is, the greater is the shadow economy.
The condition for the legal sector to survive ism > 0; or 1 2 > 1g
p
2( + ) p2= :
Thus, only su¢ ciently strong tax morale can sustain the survival of the legal mar-
kets. In terms of a ceiling to the tax rate and transfer payments (unemployment
compensation), this amounts to max < 1
2

g (1   2) +
p
2=
2
  : Clearly, a
too high tax will kill the legal production.
2.1.1 La¤er-curve and Tax Morale
We now follow the tradition in public nance which considers a government as a
revenue-maximizing Leviathan, extracting a share  > 0 for its own consumption.
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It thus maximizes T , where T = m=x1 = g + u is the tax revenue available for
the government to produce public goods and provide benets. In Appendix A, we
show the following result:
Proposition 2 The economy faces a concave La¤er curve with the revenue maxi-
mizing tax rate satisfying   < max.
A small valuation di¤erence 1   2 points to low tax morale whilst the large
di¤erence points to high tax morale. An increase in tax morale enhances the govern-
ments ability to collect tax revenue, since @T=@ (1   2) > 0 and @max=@ (1   2) >
0 for any given g:This means that with increased tax morale, the La¤er curve moves
up and to the right.
The policy variables are inter-related through the government budget constraint.
An increased tax rate raises the equilibrium price in the legal market, @p1=@ > 0;
making each legal producer bigger, @x1=@ > 0: However, the number of legal
producers declines, @ (m=x1) =@ < 0. As a result, there will be more unem-
ployment. Now, the number of illegal producers, (n m) =x2 will increase, as
@ (n m) =@p1 > 0; reducing unemployment. Which of two e¤ects on unemploy-
ment dominates? Evaluating the total e¤ect and substituting the optimal produc-
tion solutions, we nd that @u=@ < 0 when  > 

1 


i.e., when the output
and price are lower in the shadow sector than in the legal sector. Suppose that the
economy is settled at the top of the La¤er curve with the property that @T=@ = 0:
Thus, an increase in the tax rate cannot generate additional tax revenue. However,
an increase in the tax rate increases the number of those eligible for unemployment
compensation.6
2.2 Multiple Equilibria and PrisonersDilemma
How does a shadow economy arise in the rst place? Consider an economy in an
initial equilibrium with no illegal sector all entrepreneurs having a prot 1 = : All
producers pay the tax. It now holds for the marginal consumer that 1(1 m) p1 =
0: Therefore, the number of buyers is m = 1  p1=1. The output and the price of
6Complications may arise if the economy is not settled down at the top of the La¤er curve.
Second, with access to public debt, the government may actually face a soft budget constraint.
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the legal rm are the same as above. In the absence of the illegal market, there are
more legal producers. This means that the governments tax revenue is greater, too.
The amount of unemployment compensation and the public goods to be supplied
in the equilibrium are
u = 

   m
x1

; g = T   

   m
x1

:
If each entrepreneur expects everyone else to commit to contributing to the tax
revenue and nancing of public goods, the economy can settle down in a "good equi-
librium". If each entrepreneur, however, expects that the others will not contribute
to the tax revenue, the economy can settle down in a "bad equilibrium" with the
substantially reduced supply of public goods. Though no one desires the economy
to settle down in the bad equilibrium every entrepreneur, however, has a private
incentive to deviate as he can increase his prot by establishing shadow activities.
The economy faces a prisoners dilemma. Thus,
Proposition 3 Shadow economy arises as prisoners dilemma once the moral code
- in terms of su¢ ciently high  - is violated.
Proof. A legal producer generates a prot 1 = (gp1)
2 =2  : Any legal producer
can, however, make a bigger prot by abstaining from the tax payment, provided no
other producer follows and the consumers cannot monitor the tax evasion. Such an
incentive arises for each producer whose valuation of the legal production satises
1 = (gp1)
2 =2   < 2 =  (gp1)2 =2: The parameter  has to be su¢ ciently high
for this condition to hold. However and given this condition, as every producer has
this incentive, the economy will settle down in the bad equilibrium.
The good equilibrium is therefore subject to private opportunism. When every-
one behaves according to this incentive, the resulting reduction in the tax revenue
leads to a reduction in the public goods and unemployment benet. Thereby the
utility of each producer is reduced.
2.3 Towards Empirical Hypotheses
What predictions are to be derived for an empirical study? First, assume that
people in a country A have developed a stronger attitude towards social norms
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than in country B. In terms of our model, consumers and entrepreneurs are then
equipped with the following preferences
A1 > 
B
1 ; 
A
2 < 
B
2 ; 
A < B:
In our model, we can trace the e¤ects of government policies on the structure of
the production sector. Accordingly, we formulate the following hypotheses, to be
briey repeated in Section 3:
1. An increase in the tax rate increases the size of the shadowmarket, @ (n m) =@ =
1
2
p
2(+)
p
2
g(1 2) > 0. This e¤ect is magnied by low tax morale whereby the
valuation di¤erence A1   A2 < B1   B2 .
2. An increase in public goods decreases the size of the shadow sector, @ (n m) =@g =
1
g2

1
p
2= 2
p
2(+)
2(1 2)

< 0, given the existence condition in Lemma 1. Again
the tax morale magnies this e¤ect.
3. The unemployment benet increases both prices, having an ambiguous e¤ect
on the size of the shadow market, @ (n m) =@ 7 0: The e¤ect is positive
when 2=1 > 1
p
 ( + ) = and negative otherwise.
Since all of these e¤ects are magnied by the low or high tax morale, we formu-
late the following hypothesis
4. The larger the valuation di¤erence between the legal and illegal product, i.e.
the stronger the tax morale, the more likely it is that an increase in the
tax variable, a decrease in the public goods variable, and a decrease in the
unemployment benets all increase the size of the shadow sector.
For the reasons discussed in this section, various scal variables are included
among the explanatory variables to study whether we can identify cross-country
di¤erences between the e¤ects of the policy variables when countries have a di¤er-
ent religious denomination. The comparative static analysis above demonstrates
that the e¤ects of the policy variables are magnied by the tax morale. The em-
pirical section estimates these relations taking that the tax morale operates as the
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transmission mechanism between those policies and shadow markets. The potential
cross-country di¤erences in tax morale are expected to show up in the estimated
coe¢ cients of tax, benets and government consumption variables.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Method
A latent variable is a random variable whose realizations are hidden from an ob-
server. Even though it may have operational implications for relationships among
observable variables. Also the shadow activities are unobservable which represents
a challenge for the econometric testing of the theoretical hypotheses. The problem,
however, is quite common in economics7 and can be coped by SEM (structural equa-
tion modeling). Its origins in econometrics are in simultaneous equations models
and dates back to Haavelmo (1943). The identication and estimation have been
discussed by Konijn (1962)8, and the estimation theory was further developed by
Zellner (1970) and Jöreskog and Goldberger (1975)9.
A structural equation model consists of two parts, the rst being the structural
model and the second being the measurement model (Figure 1). The structural
model links the observed causes to the unobserved variable. The measurement
model, also known as a common factor model, links the unobserved latent variable
to observed indicators. The Multiple-Indicator-Multiple-Cause (MIMIC) model is a
version of SEM with one latent variable. This method has been used to estimate the
magnitude of the shadow economy by Frey and Weck-Hanneman (1984), Aigner,
Schneider and Ghosh (1988), Giles and Tedds (2002), and DellAnno and Schnei-
der (2005) among others. For example, Schneider (2005) nds that the estimated
unweighted average of the size of the shadow economy in OECD in 2002/2003 was
16 % of that of o¢ cial GDP, the shadow economy being the smallest in the US (8
7The "causes" may be viewed as the instruments in IV-approach see Goldberger (1972) and
Angrist et al. (1996).
8See also Zellner and Theil (1962), Rothenberg and Leenders (1964), and Sargan (1964).
9The special issue of the Journal of Econometrics (1983) is devoted to this approach. See also
Aigner et al. (1984), Aigner and Goldberger (1979), and Schumacker and Lomax (2004).
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Figure 1: Modeling the size of the shadow economy
%) and the largest in Greece (28 %).
The studies using the MIMIC model to estimate the shadow economy have
been criticized by Hill (2002), Smith (2002), and Breusch (2005a,b). For example,
both Hill (2002) and Smith (2002) state that none of the studies has a theory
behind the estimated model. Breusch (2005a,b) points out several failures in the
previous attempts to estimate the size of the shadow economy as he replicates the
empirical analyzis of three papers. He documents several failures starting from
undocumented transformations of the data to the failure to recognize the critical
statistical implications that are present in the method. The rst aw the keen
advocates of the MIMIC-method fail to encounter is that the Maximum Likelihood
method assumes that the variables in the model are multivariate normal. Knowing
the data that is typically used in these applications this is unlikely. Thereby, the
inferences from these applications might be fallible. The second is that since the
reduced form model is estimated the cause variables should be (weakly) exogenous,
otherwise the estimates are biased. The third aw relates to the indicator variables
and here Breusch pinpoints two potential dangers. Accordingly, a MIMIC model
requires that the indicators are conditionally independent of the causes, given the
latent variable. Moreover, the indicators should be mutually independent, given
the latent variable. In other words, all the connections that the indicator variables
have with the causal variables, and with each other, are carried through the latent
variable (Breusch 2005b). These two assumptions run counter to the conventional
economic theory.
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To summarize, the latent variable approach is a valid method to overcome the
problem of non-observables. Yet its use is not a panacea, as Breusch (2005b) demon-
strates. This criticism is a valid one but it can be handled.
Suppose throughout that all variables are measured around their respective pop-
ulation means. Thus, the intercept is omitted. The structural model assumes that
the latent variable y is determined as
y = 1q1 + 2q2 + :::+ kqk + ; (5)
where the observable exogenous causes q1; :::; qk are obtained from the theoretical
model and where  is the disturbance term.
In our measurement model, the latent variable determines, together with (some)
cause variables and disturbances u1; :::; um; the set of observable indicators y1; :::; ym
y1 = 1y
 + ki=11iqi + u1, .... , ym = my
 + ki=1miqi + um: (6)
The earlier studies imposed the constraint ji = 0 for all j; i:We, however, estimate
the specication which allows for some non-zero 0s, i.e. allows for direct e¤ects.
The indicator variables are assumed to reect the evolution both of the unob-
served latent variable and the cause variables and are thought to covariate with
them. In vector-form
y = q + ; (7)
y = y + q + u; (8)
with E[] = 0; E[u] = [0 0::: 0]0; E [u] = [0 0::: 0]0, E(2) = 2 and E (u u0) = 2:
Substituting, we obtain the reduced-form relation
y = (+ )q + + u = 0q + v; (9)
where the reduced-form coe¢ cient matrix is  = 0 + 0 and where the reduced-
form disturbance vector, v = +u has covariance matrix 
 = E (vv0) = 20+2:
We estimate the coe¢ cient matrix  in equation (9) which contains only ob-
servable variables. Estimation of structural parameters is computed using full in-
formation maximum likelihood technique10, making use of the restrictions implied
10For the identication of simultaneous equation systems and FIML estimation see Intriligator
et al. (1996).
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in both the coe¢ cient matrix  and the covariance matrix of the error term . Such
restrictions are needed because without them the model would be under-identied.
To determine  and , one of the factor loadings has to be xed and it has become
a common practice to set 1 = 1.
With all direct e¤ects included, even those restrictions would not su¢ ce to iden-
tify the model. The identication of direct and indirect e¤ects has been discussed
by Fox (1980) and Bollen (1987)11. The a priori restrictions for direct e¤ects, i.e.
restrictions that some of the s are zero while others are not, are based on economic
theory and to our model.
3.2 Hypotheses and Data
3.2.1 Variables
There are di¤erences among countries according to their historical, regional and
cultural heritage, which might be reected in the evolution of the shadow economy.
Combining the evidence from the four waves of the World Values Surveys (1981-
2005), we have learned that those belonging to a religious denomination are on
average more likely to disapprove such behavior as cheating on taxes, claiming
government benets when not entitled to, and accepting bribes. In particular,
protestants are more likely adhere to their strict values than catholics.
Subsequently, we group countries according to their dominating religion, where
two indicators of the religious orientation are taken into account. The rst one is
the proportion of the citizens of a country who belong to a religious denomination,
while the second is the majority religious denomination of a country. Using these
two measures, there are two distinctive groups: the catholic south (CS) with a
membership rate of 80 - 95 per cent of the population (Greece, Italy, Spain and
Portugal) and the protestant north (PN) with a membership rate of 80 - 90 per
cent (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden). The remaining OECD countries
form a control group, the rest of the world (RoW; Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Germany, France, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand,
Switzerland, UK, the US). From the previous studies and WVS we conclude that
11See also Bielby and Hauser (1977) for the review of the issues.
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protestant north should obey the moral code of not cheat more strictly than the
catholic south. The control group should give us a reference point on where the
remaining, culturally more heterogenous countries are.
For the empirical analysis, we identify four cause variables and three indicators
(see Appendix B). The hypotheses will be tested using annual data for 21 indus-
trialized OECD countries for 1979 through 2003. All variables, except the nominal
interest rate, are measured as growth rates per annum.
Cause variables
1. Total tax revenue (). The higher the tax burden, the greater the shadow
economy. It thus reects both the tax evasion e¤ect and the strength of tax
morale.
2. Government consumption (g) as a measure of the public goods. According to
our model, the growth of the public goods production is expected to decrease
the growth of the shadow economy.
3. Government transfers (). We expect the transfer payments to reduce the
incentive to work in the shadow economy.
4. Nominal short-term interest rate (r): An increase in the interest rate increases
the opportunity costs of holding money, thus reducing shadow economy.
Indicators
1. Real GDP per capita (x): From our theoretical model we expect that higher
demand will increase the size of both sectors, i.e., when the legal economy is
booming, the uno¢ cial sector is also booming.
2. Labor force participation rate in the o¢ cial sector (l). There is evidence that
in industrialized countries, those who moonlight are already a part of the labor
force, contrary to the case of developing economies12. Therefore, we expect
12Katungi et al. (2006) surveyd the motives for informal work in the UK. The single most im-
portant reason for informal job was to alleviate poverty, while many respondents saw the informal
job as a route to the formal one.
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that increases in moonlighting and shadow activities will increase the labor
force by encouraging people to register for the o¢ cial labor market.
3. Real currency in circulation per capita (m). This variable measures changes
in payment habits. The greater growth of cash payments reects the greater
growth of the shadow transactions.
3.2.2 Statistical properties
Based on the Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) and Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) tests, we conclude
that these series are stationary. Since the series are non-stationary at their levels,
we prefer to use the di¤erences to avoid spurious regression. Moreover, scrutinizing
the public sector variables suggests that there are breaks in the data (see Appendix
B for details). Hence, we split the data into two periods, calling the rst the regime
of public sector growth (1979-1992) and the second regime of a mature public sector
(1992-2003).
ML-estimation infers that the data should be normal, which considering the data
in hand might not be feasible. At Table 1, we report the skewness, kurtosis and
Jarque-Bera test statistics for each of our variables. First of all, with the exception
of real GDP per capita, all data seem to be right tailed since the skewness is non-
zero. Second, all data seems to be leptokurtic, or peaked, since for all variables
the kurtosis is above three. Therefore, Jarque-Bera test is statistically signicant
for all variables, markedly so for real currency per capita. Hence, the data is not
univariate normal, and likely not multivariate normal either which, if not accounted
for, will a¤ect the estimated standard errors and the related test statistics. Since
the methods that rely on the normality of the data typically underestimate the true
standard errors in the presence of positive kurtosis, the hypothesis testing based on
those may be misleading.
There are methods that correct standard errors in the presence of non-normality,
for instance bootstrapping although it is not a panacea for small samples. In
small samples, the standard error estimates are almost always unreliable, yet also
size corrections may produce biased estimates for standard errors (for details see
Schermelleh-Engel et al., 1998). Foremost, the current bootstrapping procedures
cannot handle missing data, which occurs in our rst period. As the method is not
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Skew. Kurt. JB-test p-value
Indicators
GDP per capita -.26 5.5 144.41 .000*
currency per capita 1.20 25.6 11374.9 .000*
lf participation .47 6.6 302.7 .000*
Causes
tax .96 5.0 163.8 .000*
transfers .99 5.6 224.3 .000*
gov0t cons: .81 6.5 327.4 .000*
interest rate .16 3.6 9.2 .010**
Table 1: Indicators for the normality of the data
admissible in the presence of missing data, we resort to full information maximum
likelihood, knowing that hypothesis testing might be awed.
We address the endogeneity of the variables with Granger-causality test and
by estimating a simple general model to control for the impact of multiple causes
(for details see Appendix C). According to Granger causality tests, there is some
evidence that the proposed causes and indicators are not exogenous. In case of
causes the inference from the general model, which includes lags of other cause
variables and in particular two lags for each indicator variable. For instance, it
appears that real GDP per capita signicantly a¤ects all our cause variables, while
some of the causes are also a¤ected by another indicator. The causes are not strictly
exogenous, which will have an impact to our results. The more interesting result is
that, controlling for the cause variables as instruments for the shadow economy, our
indicators seem to be independent on each other. Only the labor force participation
seems to be a¤ected by the rst lag of real GDP per capita. Since the bias introduced
by the fact that the indicator variables are not exogenous is far greater than the
bias due to endogeneity of the cause variables, this is a good sign.
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3.3 Estimation Results
To identify the model, we impose two kinds of restrictions as discussed above. First,
to x one of the factor loadings, we impose the restriction 1 = 1, suggesting that
an increase in the shadow economy increases real GDP per capita, both in growth
terms. Second, we set some of the direct e¤ects to zero, seeking the parsimonious
representation of the model. Since the model is not identied if too many direct
e¤ects are included at the same time, we seek the ones that are signicant by an
iterative process guided by the t statistic and the t criteria. We rst add the
direct e¤ects one by one, keeping those that are signicant. We iterate the process
starting from alternative direct e¤ects. Note that this type of iteration probably
distorts the nominal signicance level of the model.
The method does not allow for testing whether the same structure applies from
one period to another in a multiple group setting. Hence, we estimate the models
for the two periods separately. As the models are, however, nested in a particular
period, we may test whether s and s di¤er across groups of countries. In the rst
regime, the default model allowing for the di¤erences in s is accepted, indicating
that the e¤ects of the shadow economy on our indicator variables di¤er across groups
of countries. In the second regime, we reject the default model; i.e., s are equal
across country groups. We also reject the hypothesis that s are equal across the
groups.
The estimation procedure converges, yielding a positive semidenite covariance
matrix.13 The diagnostic test results for the two regimes are mixed, yet provide
some support for the model(s). For the rst regime, the value of the 2-test with 33
degrees of freedom is 33.32 (p-value 0.00), which is non-supportive for the model,
whereas for the latter regime it is 28.67 with 28 degrees of freedom (p-value is 0.43)
which is supportive. Since the 2-test is sensitive to the sample size and the non-
normality of the variables, we resort to other t criteria, where TLI in particular
has proven to be least a¤ected by the biasing factors (see Appendix D). The t
indices for the rst regime are as follows: NFI 0.96, RFI 0.77, TLI 0.86 and CFI
0.98, while the root mean square error of approximation is 0.07. The indices are
13Since we minimize the distance between the sample and model implied covariance matrices,
it is important that the minimum is achieved.
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slightly better in the latter period, as NFI 0.93, RFI 0.84, TLI 0.99 and CFI 0.99,
while the root mean square error of approximation is 0.01. Since several t indices
o¤er support for our model, we conclude that the t of the model is reasonably
good and that a latent variable has been identied.
For the rst period, the estimated s are the following.14 In the Nordic coun-
tries, the estimate for the growth of the currency is 1.35 by a highly signicant
t-statistic of 4.14 and the estimate for the growth of the labor force participation
rate is 0.82, also accompanied by a highly signicant t-statistic 3.10. Then for the
Mediterranean countries, the estimate for the growth of the currency is 4.75 with
a highly signicant t-statistic, 3.64, and the estimate for the growth of the labor
force participation rate is 0.05, but insignicant with the t-statistic of 0.08. For
the control group, the estimate for the growth of the currency is 1.45, again with
a highly signicant t-statistic, 5.56, and the estimate for the growth of the labor
force participation rate is 0.33, also accompanied by a highly signicant t-statistic,
2.86. The s do indeed seem to di¤er across countries.
Table 2 presents parameter estimates for s and s in the rst regime. As the
tests for the existence and timing of potential break points suggested (see Appendix
B) that there might be a break in 1983 in the data for the Mediterranean economies,
the results are reported with some reservation for the rst regime. The government
consumption, taxation, and the interest rate have signicant direct e¤ects on the
labor force participation rate. As to the causes of the shadow economy, taxation has
a signicant but ambiguous e¤ect on the shadow economy. While it has a positive
e¤ect in the Nordic countries and the rest of the world, it seems to have a negative
e¤ect in the catholic countries. Benets have a signicant and negative impact on
the shadow economy in the Nordic countries and the rest of the world, but not in
the Mediterranean countries. While the government transfers seem to bribe people
away from the shadow economy in the Nordic countries and our control group,
it has no e¤ect on the shadow activities in the catholic countries. Government
consumption has only weakly signicant impact on the shadow economy. Lastly,
the interest rate has a negative and signicant impact on the shadow economy both
in the Nordic and the Mediterranean countries as the theory suggests. The impact
14All structural models are also accompanied with positive and statistically signicant intercepts.
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is, however, insignicant in our control group.
PN CS RoW
Causes
 t-stat  t-stat  t-stat
tax 0.200 5.10* -0.101 -2.94* 0.212 5.91*
transfers -0.286 -4.05* -0.021 -0.65 -0.258 -7.40*
gov0t cons: 0.16 1.77*** 0.071 1.74*** -0.067 -1.25
interest rate -0.250 -2.04** -0.218 -2.92* 0.019 0.39
Direct e¤ects on labor force
 t-stat  t-stat  t-stat
by interest rate 0.100 0.57 0.042 0.19 -0.139 -2.60*
by tax -0.089 -1.16 -0.117 -1.16 -0.019 -0.38
by gov0t cons: 0.127 1.60 0.160 1.70*** 0.149 2.56**
Table 2: Estimates for the rst regime, 1979-92 with *, ** and *** 1, 5 and 10 per
cent levels of signicance.
Table 3 presents the results in the latter regime. This time, the tests support
the constrained model, in which mi = mj, i.e., the parameters are the same across
the groups.15 The common 2; the e¤ect of the shadow economy on the labor force
is then 1.23 and is accompanied by a highly signicant t-statistic, 5.88, but 3; the
e¤ect on money, is 0.71 and insignicant. This time, there is only one signicant
direct e¤ect - that of taxation on the labor force participation rate.
Compared with the results of the rst regime, the estimator of the tax variable
is positive and highly signicant. We take this as an indication of the tax morale
in catholic south is similar to that of the protestant north and the control group.
The transfer payments have a negative and signicant e¤ect in all these groups as
well. It seems a robust nding that the transfer payments tend to decrease the size
of the shadow economy. Clearly, since people have to make a living in one way or
another, a government concerned with the welfare of its citizens should o¤er benets
and transfers for those who cannot go without. Government consumption on the
15Even in the unconstrained model, the following estimates for s would be almost the same,
i.e. the reported parameter changes are not caused by a change in the model denition.
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other hand tends to increase shadow activity in the Nordic countries and our control
group, but not in the Mediterranean countries. Does this nding suggest that people
in the Nordic countries and in the control group regard government consumption
as waste by the government?16 The opportunity cost of holding money has lost
much of its importance in the latter period, although now also being signicant
for our control group. This could be an indication of that as there are now more
variety for the means of payments at the o¢ cial economy, the currency has gone
more underground.
PN CS RoW
Causes
 t-stat  t-stat  t-stat
tax 0.190 4.98* 0.200 4.78* 0.266 8.65*
transfers -0.174 -3.45* -0.122 -2.73* -0.117 -3.92*
gov0t cons: 0.183 2.51* 0.017 0.43 0.132 4.17*
interest rate -0.197 -2.69* -0.167 -3.92* -0.080 -2.03**
Direct e¤ects on labor force
 t-stat  t-stat  t-stat
by tax -0.197 -2.50* 0.014 0.147 -0.242 -3.41*
Table 3: Estimates for the second regime, 1992-2003 with *, ** and *** 1, 5 and
10 per cent levels of signicance.
In a sense, our results appear to contradict those of Alm and Torgler (2005), who
suggest that southern Europeans have lower tax morale than northern Europeans.
While the magnitudes of the estimated coe¢ cients of the tax variable di¤er in the
rst period they are virtually the same in the later period across the groups of
countries. When it comes to the government transfers, it appears that our results
are more in line with Guiso et al. (2003), who nd that in the Nordic countries
attitudes are more rmly against claiming government benets when people are
not entitled to them. There the government may rely more on the notion that the
welfare benets are not to be abused. Interestingly and according to our study,
16We also tested this e¤ect by using data on government investment. It had a similar, albeit
smaller, impact on the shadow economy.
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the attitudes seem to have converged, since the estimates have come closer to each
other, which is in line with the ndings of Feld et al. (2008) on the experiment
after German unication. Perhaps during the later period the norms have become
global.
3.4 Caveats
Our data is not multivariate normal, whereby the estimates for standard errors
are downsized. Since we could not produce the bootstrap estimate for standard
errors, we have to make inferences based on potentially fallible results. This is a
serious drawback, which we could not overcome. On the positive side, we were
able to demonstrate the causal variables were less susceptible to endogeneity than
expected. Foremost, the indicator variables were also more independent on each
other than Breusch (2005b) supposes. The reason for these ndings might be the
fact that we used growth rates rather than level variables.
Comparing our results across groups of countries in the two regimes, we nd
that there are signicant di¤erences in the parameter estimates. These di¤erences
should be taken into account when calibrating the size of the shadow economy.
This problem is magnied by the existence of direct e¤ects which, if omitted, will
be carried by the indirect e¤ects, i.e., the estimates for s and s. While our
method has its problems we show that Breuschs critique considering the direct
e¤ects might be valid. Our results demonstrate the previous studies have probably
presented fallible results.
4 Final Remarks
The econometric results provide support for the proposed model, albeit some caveats
remain. Taxation, government consumption and social security were all found sig-
nicant. As a policy implication, this nding suggests that an increase in the size
of the public sector with the high tax burden has side-e¤ects: hidden economy ex-
pands. The signicant negative estimator for the benets points to the possibility
that they might operate like a bribe on people, persuading them out of the shadow
economy.
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No evidence is found to support the view that tax morale today di¤ers between
the catholic south and protestant north. Moreover, since both the e¤ect of tax
and the e¤ect of social security on shadow economy has converged across countries,
there is indication on that attitudes towards public policy have converged.
With regard to the estimates for the size of the shadow economy, several im-
portant empirical results are found in this paper. We used the data typically used
when quantifying the size of the shadow economy and demonstrated the data is
not multivariate normal. Also the causal variables are susceptible to endogeneity
as proposed by Breusch (2005b). Moreover, direct e¤ects are signicant and regime
switches have taken place. Our results demonstrate the previous studies have prob-
ably presented fallible results. Subsequently, calibrating the index of the size of the
shadow economy is more complicated than thought.
79
A Proof of Proposition 3
In the equilibrium with shadow economy, the number of tax paying entrepreneurs
is m
x1
= mp
2(+)
: Then, the total tax revenue is
T = 
m
x1
=
0@1 
p
2( + ) p2=
g (1   2)
1A p
2( + )
: (10)
Developing the rst derivative,
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 + ) g (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2) :
The revenue maximizing tax rate   satises @T
@
= 0. Yet, no closed-form solution
is available. However, it holds that T (0) = 0. Evaluating the rst-order condition
at the origin,
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La¤er-curve is increasing at the origin. Developing the second derivative, @2T=@ 2;
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reveals that the curve must have a global maximum. In addition, we know that at
 = max; where
max =
1
2

g (1   2) +
p
2=
2
  ;
the legal sector ceases to exist. Thereby, a unique revenue maximizing tax rate
0 <   < max must exist with T ( ) > 0 .
B Data
B.1 Denitions
In Table 4, we list the variables used in this study. Column 1 lists the abbreviations
for the variables and Column 2 the names of the variables as they appear in the
(primary) data source. The main source of data is OECD Economic Outlook 76,
except for the currency in circulation. For the members of the EU and the ERM
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Variable Denition
r Short-term market interest rate
x Real GDP per capita
m Real Currency in circulation, per capita
l Labour force participation rate
 Social Benets Paid by Government17
g Government consumption
 Total direct and indirect taxes
GDP Nominal gross domestic product
pop Population of a country
P Consumer price index
s GDP deator
Table 4: List of the variables and their sources.
I or II (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) we had to retrieve data from the IMF IFS
and convert the currency by using the ERM I exchange rates.
Table 5 presents the averages of each variable for both periods across countries.
Reading from this table, it is generally the case that the growth rate of taxes has
been greater in the rst than in the second period. This is also true for the benets
variable, but not for the government consumption. Since the two activities of the
government have grown faster in the rst period, we name the periods as the regime
of the growing public sector and of the mature public sector.
B.2 Break Point Tests
There is casual evidence for the idea that there might be breaks in the public
sector variables during the economic turbulence years of early 1990s. Therefore,
we estimate the following model by OLS for all three country groups (t = calender
time)
qi;t = ai;t + bi;tt (11)
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Country x l m  g  r
period I II I II I II I II I II I II I II
Australia .57 1.1 .37 .21 1.4 2.1 4.4 2.7 1.3 1.1 1.6 1.8 5.4 2.4
Austria .84 .67 -.22 -.06 .47 -.22 2.7 1.6 1.3 .42 1.3 .92 3.1 1.9
Belgium .87 .68 .04 .58 -1.3 .10 2.3 2.0 .55 1.1 .78 .73 4.3 2.0
Canada .46 .93 .57 .24 1.1 .33 3.82 1.7 .98 .60 2.1 .65 4.6 2.0
Denmark .57 .74 .39 -.20 1.7 1.1 3.5 1.9 .67 .96 1.4 .78 4.9 2.2
Finland .78 .96 -.01 -.01 1.2 3.1 4.0 1.8 1.9 .82 2.9 .93 5.1 2.1
France .72 .58 -.20 .41 -.86 1.7 .3.8 1.9 1.2 1.0 1.3 .96 4.4 2.1
Germany .54 .43 .56 .30 .97 -.13 2.5 1.3 1.4 .38 1.3 1.2 3.0 1.9
Greece .17 .89 .35 .72 -1.1 .21 8.5 4.8 .32 .84 1.8 1.9 7.6 4.6
Ireland 1.24 2.55 -.04 .97 .12 1.3 5.0 4.2 1.3 3.0 1.7 2.2 5.1 2.4
Italy .95 .57 -.10 .25 .17 .38 6.9 2.4 2.0 .48 2.1 .99 5.9 2.8
Japan 1.4 .40 .43 .26 2.0 1.0 3.5 -.74 1.6 1.2 1.7 1.8 2.7 .48
Netherl. .65 .73 .19 1.0 .69 -.67 2.0 1.7 .65 1.2 .71 -.38 3.2 1.9
New Zeal. .51 1.0 -.29 .31 1.2 2.2 1.5 2.0 .53 1.2 1.6 .22 6.1 2.8
Norway 1.1 1.1 .17 .28 1.3 1.4 3.6 2.9 1.2 1.7 2.1 1.5 5.2 2.7
Portugal 1.4 .72 .48 .39 -1.2 1.9 9.4 3.4 2.4 1.8 2.9 2.4 7.1 2.9
Spain .88 .93 -.22 1.35 1.4 -.57 7.2 3.1 2.2 1.3 2.4 .90 6.0 2.7
Sweden .63 .78 .05 -.56 -.14 1.1 3.9 1.1 .79 .98 1.5 .73 4.7 2.4
Switzerl. .59 .24 1.00 -.09 .44 .69 1.6 .69 .92 .50 3.6 1.5 2.4 1.2
UK .65 1.0 .25 .08 2.4 1.5 4.1 1.5 1.1 1.5 1.9 1.3 5.0 2.5
the US .75 0.83 .37 .01 .05 .61 2.9 2.0 .80 .82 1.6 1.4 3.9 1.9
Average .77 .85 .19 .31 .57 .91 4.1 2.2 1.2 1.1 1.8 1.2 4.8 2.3
Table 5: Averages of each variables over the rst and second period, as per cents.
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PN CS RoW
Variable LR prob. year LR prob. year LR prob. year
transfers 60.53 0.00 1992 26.24 0.00 1983 16.30 0.01 1992
gov0t cons: 7.22 0.27 1991 15.44 0.01 1983 3.79 0.76 1997
tax 14.83 0.01 1990 12.08 0.04 1982 23.83 0.00 1990
Table 6: Quandt-Andrews breakpoint tests.
and test for the presence of a break, examining whether ai;t = ai;t 1 and bi;t = bi;t 1
for all t. The Quandt-Andrews unknown breakpoint test seeks the presence of a
breakpoint at any t and reports the maximum of LR-statistic and the year of the
breakpoint. The results are presented in Table 6.
The results indicate that both the benets in the North and in the Rest of the
World exhibited a break in 1992 while the tax variables exhibited the break already
in 1990. There is no evidence of a break in the government expenditures in these
two groups. The results for the Catholic South suggest a break in 1983 both in
the benets and in the government expenditure variables while the break in the
tax variable appears a year earlier. Our ndings suggest that multiple breaks are
present. Yet to have at least one period where no breaks occur, we choose to split
our data in 1992.
C Endogeneity
Typically the endogeneity of the instruments can be tested by Granger-causality
test, whereby "y should not cause x". While this test is easy to implement, the
problem is that it does not control for other variables besides one proposed cause.
This may result wrong inferences on the endogeneity of the variable x, due to
missing variable problem. Using the more general version, whereby "x should be
independent of past y conditional on past x" is probably closer to the true model
and mitigates the problem of missing variables. Therefore to test the endogeneity
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of the variables we test the following two propositions
xj;t = 0 +
2X
k=1
j;t kxj;t k +
3X
i=1
2X
k=1
i;t kyi;t k + "j;t; (12)
where xj;t is the current value of each cause variable j and yi;t k are the past values
of each indicator variables i. As our T = 25 in the full sample and since we work
with annual data, we set k = 2, i.e. we have two lags of each variable in the model
we test.18
It is also crucial that indicator variables are independent on each other. Testing
it in the presence of non-observed variable, which we expect to a¤ect all indicators
is, however, di¢ cult. What one can do is to propose a model where the non-observed
variable is replaced by the cause variables as in the instrument variables procedure
to control for latent variables absence from the model. Therefore we proceed to
test the following model
yj;t = 0 +
3X
i=1
2X
k=1
i;t kyi;t k +
4X
j=1
j;t 2xj;t 2 + "j;t; (13)
where the current values of each indicator variable yj;t are explained by the lags of
all three indicators and the the lags of all proposed causes. In order to save the
degrees of freedoms we set the number of lags for indicators to 2 and include only
the second lag of each proposed cause variable.
We rst test the simple Granger causality applied to the pooled, cross-country
data of our cause variables. The Granger causality test suggests that our measure
of tax is probably caused by real GDP per capita, which seems plausible. The
transfers, on the other hand, might be caused by labor force participation and real
GDP per capita - again a result in accordance with the expectations. Government
consumption might be caused by real GDP per capita and interest rates are caused
both by real GDP per capita and currency in circulation. As to indicators, labor
force participation might be caused by real GDP per capita and somewhat surpris-
ingly might real GDP per capita be caused by real currency in circulation, but not
the other way around. According to Granger causality tests, there is some evidence
that the proposed causes and indicators are not exogenous.19
18Other lag lengths were also tested and the results were similar to those reported here.
19All the results presented here are available from the author at request.
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tax transfers gov0t cons: interest rate
Causes, xj;t k signicant signicant signicant not signicant
Indicators coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
(GDP = capita)t 1 .345 .051*** -.192 .022** .257 .000* .193 .001*
(GDP = capita)t 2 -.243 .064*** .210 .115 .193 .028** .017 .782
(currency =capita)t 1 .005 .838 -.002 .875 .003 .749 .009 .063***
(currency = capita)t 2 -.036 .522 .007 .697 .001 .929 .018 .067***
lf participationt 1 .091 .589 -.004 .957 .052 .402 .015 .811
lf participationt 2 -.070 .550 .173 .087*** .089 .232 -.007 .878
Adjusted R2 .419 .238 .206 .095
F -test 42.69 .000* 18.09 .000* 15.33 .000* 7.33 .000*
Table 7: Results from the general causality test for proposed cause variables *, **
and *** 1, 5 and 10 per cent levels of signicance.
Table 7 presents the results from the general causality tests for our proposed
causes. Again, for sake of simplicity the tests are applied for the pooled data,
whereby we report White heteroscedasticity corrected standard errors. Firstly, as
already manifested by Granger causality tests, it appears that real GDP per capita
signicantly a¤ects all our cause variables, although its impact on tax is weakly
signicant. In addition, it appears that transfers might be caused by labor force
participation and the interest rate is caused by real currency in circulation. The
results are in line with Granger causality tests and suggest the proposed causes
might be endogenous. Even though one could have expected that the endogeneity
would have been more severe than it appears to be.
Table 8 presents the results for indicator variables. Since we are not interested
on the e¤ects of our causes for the indicators per se, we suppress the information and
present whether there was any signicant cause for the indicators. As it turns out,
the second lags of our proposed cause variables seem not to cause real currency per
capita. The more interesting result is that, controlling for the cause variables, our
indicators seem to be independent on each other. Only the labor force participation
seems to be a¤ected by the rst lag of real GDP per capita. Since the bias introduced
by the fact that the indicator variables are not exogenous is far greater than the
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GDP = capita currency =capita lf participation
Causes, xij;t 2 some signicant none signicant some signicant
Indicators coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
(GDP = capita)t 1 .404 .000* .028 .908 .261 .001*
(GDP = capita)t 2 .023 .743 .493 .105 .082 .132
(currency =capita)t 1 .017 .145 -.107 .578 -.006 .435
(currency =capita)t 2 .017 .364 -.263 .020** -.030 .370
lf participationt 1 .009 .833 .211 .431 .235 .000*
lf participationt 2 -.042 .420 -.261 .388 .111 .078***
Adjusted R2 .291 .055 .262
F -test 18.50 .000* 2.64 .004* 16.05 .000*
Table 8: Results for the general causality test for indicator variables, *, ** and ***
1, 5 and 10 per cent levels of signicance.
bias due to endogeneity of the cause variables, this is a good sign.
To summarize, the endogeneity of our cause and indicator variables is less of
a problem than one would have expected. While our results are probably not
heavily inuenced by the endogeneity bias, the estimated standard errors are instead
downsized because of non-normality and small sample size.
D Fit criteria
In principle there are three criteria according to which one may judge the signi-
cance or goodness of the model. The rst and the obvious one is the magnitude and
the direction of the parameter estimates and whether they are in accordance with
underlying theory. The second, also related to the rst one, is the statistical sig-
nicance of individual parameter estimates, measured typically by the t-test. The
third criteria are the global t measures.
There are several t criteria available for the SEM users, although they seem
to be closely related to each other. 2 -test compares two models; the saturated,
theoretical model, which includes all paths and the hypothesized model we impose.
Since the idea is to nd an optimal parsimonious presentation on the true structures
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in the data, the simplest model that conveys the information in the data would
be ideal. A low and statistically insignicant 2-value suggests that our model
resembles that of the saturated model. However, the 2 -test statistic is a¤ected
by several factors, such as the sample and the model sizes, i.e., bigger the model
the better the t. Hence we also report other t indices, albeit to some extent they
su¤er from the same problems as they are derived from 2-tests.20
The normed t index (NFI) is computed by comparing the 2-value of the null
model (i.e. independence model, where the covariances are assumed to be zero in the
model) and the hypothesized model, whereby NFI = (2null   2mod el) =2null. The
idea is to test how much better our hypothesized model performs compared with
the null model. Conventionally a test value close to 0.95 indicates a good t. The
relative t index is similar to NFI, but it accounts for the di¤erent decrees of freedom
these two models have, whereby RFI = 1   [(2mod el=dfmod el) = (2null=dfnull)]. We
also report Bentlers comparative t index (CFI), and Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI)
which are written as
CFI = 1  (
2
mod el   dfmod el)
(2null   dfnull)
= 1  M
N
;
TLI =
(2null=dfnull   2mod el=dfmod el)
2null=dfnull   1
= 1  M=dfM
N=dfN
;
where M = (2mod el   dfmod el) and N = (2null   dfnull). While CFI and TLI seem
to test the same hypothesis, i.e. they test the null of no latent variable against the
alternative of latent variables existing, the former is a¤ected by the sample size as
well as non-normality of the data (Bollen, 1990). TLI, in the other hand, has proven
to be least a¤ected by the biasing factors (non-normality, small sample size, model
complexity etc.).
Lastly to avoid the problems documented with the t criteria related to 2 -test
we report standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). The test reects the
closeness of the empirical covariance-variance matrix (S) and the model implied
covariance matrix (). Comparing these two matrices reveals whether all the con-
nections present in the data are presented in the model. The better the model
20AMOS 17 reports long list of t indices. Since some of them are just new representations of
the older t indices, we report only those that seem to o¤er some new insights to the analysis.
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reects the data smaller the SRMR statistics. While there is no rule of thumb for
the cut-o¤ value, values smaller than 0.05 are acceptable.
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1 Introduction
The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union created 15 new independent states. These,
along with the other countries in Eastern Europe, entered in a transition from
centrally planned economy to market economy. Each met with varying degrees of
success; some posted solid growth, others struggled with sharp reversals of fortune
(see Havrylyshyn and Wolf, 1999). This paper analyzes the determinants of growth
in transition. In line with the emerging academic consensus, we present evidence
that successful governmental and institutional reforms are necessary conditions for
sustained growth.
The debate on determinants of growth initially crystallized around Solows sem-
inal 1956 paper. As growth studies evolved, there emerged a recognition that
poor protection of property rights impairs growth by reducing incentives to invest
(Mauro, 1995). The research community a half century later now generally con-
curs that good government is critical for economic success (e.g. Acemoglu, 2008;
Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005), since investment and technological advances can be
easily disturbed by bureaucratic propensities to rent-seeking or corruption. Indeed,
the lousy economic performances of transition economies were soon linked to their
institutional shortcomings (e.g. Frye and Shleifer, 1997).
Several papers seek to determine the e¤ect of institutions on growth in transition.
Fidrmuc and Tichit (2009) suggest that the data is vulnerable to structural breaks
across time and/or countries. They note that the pattern of growth in transition
has changed at least twice; yielding three distinct models of growth associated
with di¤erent stages of reform. The third regime started in mid 1990s. Babetskii
and Campos (2007) conduct meta-analysis to investigate the e¤ect of institutional
reform to growth. They nd that approximately a third of papers nd a positive and
signicant relationship, another third nds a negative and signicant relationship,
and a third nd no signicant relationship between reform and growth.
Institutions and growth might be jointly determined, whereby an exogenous
proxy for institutions is needed. Glaeser et al. (2004) completely reject the argu-
ment that institutions cause growth, claiming the causation actually works in the
opposite direction; i.e. growth and human capital accumulation drive institutional
development. They further provide evidence that human capital rather than po-
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litical institutions is the crucial element of growth. Galor et al. ( 2008) extend
this argument with their model treating human capital promoting institutions as
primary to growth.
In the present discussion, we empirically investigate the relationship of the gov-
ernment, institutions, human capital, and economic growth. Transition economies
form an ideal set for study as they have all been part of a natural experiment.
Due to communism, they share relatively similar history. Moreover, all faced the
same shock as they abandoned communism and command economies; all inherited
dysfunctional institutions. This shock and the following structural change causes
a break between the level of development (growth) and institutions as proposed by
Glaeser et al. (2004). The citizens in all these countries are generally well educated,
and perhaps more important for our purposes here, education levels, literacy rates,
etc. were similar across this group at the start of transition. The relative similarity
of human capital stock allows us to examine for di¤erences as they emerge across
countries as transition progresses, particularly with respect to reforms of economic
and political institutions.1 It also provides an opportunity to distinguish the e¤ect
of institutions on growth from the e¤ect of human capital since as we show later
the latter has been almost stable across time and space evaluated in this paper.
Although many studies acknowledge that informal (or illegal) production ac-
counts for a signicant chunk of total production in transition countries, most base
their analysis solely on o¢ cial output growth gures. This is a huge omission.
For example, Schneider (2004) estimates the unweighted average of the size of the
shadow economy in transition economies during 20022003 equaled 40.1% of o¢ cial
GDP, implying that nearly 30% of total production in transition economies occurred
underground. Feige and Urban (2008), on the other hand, note the weaknesses of
measurements of underground activities. They propose that conclusions concern-
ing the success of transition rely heavily on recorded measures of GDP and thus
viewed with skepticism. We attempt to correct for the omission of underground
production by evaluating the growth of real GDP per worker, a measurement of
1Åslund (2007) proposes that when the former communist block was reformed in early 1990s,
liberal reformers won out in Central Europe and the Baltics, while rent-seekers came to dominate
in CIS countries.
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productivity. By concentrating on those listed as employed in the formal economy,
GDP per worker gives a sharper picture of average productivity and the growth
potential of these nations.
We use yearly data from 1998 to 2005 to avoid possible breaks present in the
early years of transition in these 25 economies, and control for endogeneity using
the dynamic GMM method proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). As the prob-
lems of the two-step GMM are generally well-documented (see Windmeijer, 2005
and Roodman, 2009), we use the proposed measures to correct the biases in this
method. Applying a regression tree analysis, we test for regimes of growth (i.e. non-
linearity) with respect to human capital or institutions. While testing for regimes of
growth, we use a fairly rich set of variables, for example, we recalculate the Human
Development Index, excluding GDP per capita, to portray the evolution of human
capital. Also following Fidrmuc and Tichit (2009), we calculate a weighted aver-
age of transition indicators to proxy the evolution of institutions. We test several
interaction terms to allow for non-linearity in the growth model we estimate.
Our ndings contain several notable insights. First, we nd no regimes on
growth; all countries surveyed obey the same model and laws of motion and the
relationship between growth and human capital (institutions) is linear across space.
Second, at the beginning economic freedom and investment contribute positively
on growth in transition. When the countries reach their population averages in
terms of economic freedom or investment the negative interaction takes its toll; the
full marginal e¤ect of investment (economic freedom) to growth is negative if the
economic freedom is above its average. Third, increased government consumption
(our measure of the size of public sector) seems to have a negative impact on growth.
These ndings are robust when we drop resource-rich countries from the dataset.
Finally, our robustness analysis shows similar results when evaluating real growth
per capita, although investment and size of government seem to matter more for
productivity growth than growth per capita.
Comparing previous estimations of growth in transition economies against our
results vindicates a number of research claims. We conrm the results of Fidrmuc
and Tichit (2009), who suggest that the countries surveyed adhered to a common
growth model during the later years of transition. Contrary to some earlier ndings,
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our results infer that di¤erent government policies a¤ect growth in terms of forming
institutions and setting the size of the government. How we measure institutions
apparently makes a di¤erence; our results change when we use Fidrmuc and Tichits
recalibrated index of economic reform. Moreover, when measuring productivity and
economic well-being, it makes a di¤erence whether one uses real GDP per capita
or per worker. Our results indicate some of the contradictory results in the earlier
literature may arise from the use of an inappropriate model, yet we also conrm
many previous ndings.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the growth theory litera-
ture, particularly key empirical studies. Those familiar with the literature can skip
the review and go straight to Section 3 for a presentation of the empirical results.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Literature
Soon after Barro (1990) published his frame-breaking work modelling public services
in an endogenous growth setting, he was followed with an extension of the analysis to
capture varieties of public goods (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). Devarajan et al.
(1996) responded with a model postulating two types of government expenditure,
productive and unproductive, to show how changes in the composition of public
expenditure a¤ect long-term economic growth rates.
Following a di¤erent track, Lucas (1988) and Mankiw et al. (1992) proposed that
the human capital accumulation is essential for economic growth. Hall and Jones
(1999) synthesized these perspective into a model in which social infrastructure
inuences growth via production inputs. Recently Galor et al. ( 2008) extend
these arguments with their model treating human capital promoting institutions as
primary to growth.
Throughout the literature, there seems to be a common acceptance of the no-
tion that bad economic policies harm development. The political economy view
emphasizes the role of the market reforms and controlling against opportunities for
rent-seeking and corruption. Vested interests for government o¢ cials can halt the
reform process, create incentives for the underground production, and slow progress
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in the o¢ cial economy (Harstad and Svensson, 2006).2 Moreover, the role of insti-
tutions has been emphasized and disputed, as several papers seek to determine the
e¤ect of institutions on growth. According to Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), incomes
improved in colonies where Europeans developed good institutions.3 The institu-
tions hypothesis has also gained empirical support: Easterly and Levine (2003) and
Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) in the area of contract enforcement, Djankov et al.
(2006) in the area of business regulations, and Acemoglu and Johnson (2003a) and
Brunt (2007) in the area of property rights. As noted by Hanushek and Woessmann
(2008), education and skills may not have the desired impact on economic outcomes
in the absence of proper institutions.
It is often suggested that public goods are a vital part of the private production
due to strategic complementarity, whereby the composition of public expenditure
a¤ects growth. Devarajan et al. (1996) nd that the share of current expenditure
has a positive e¤ect on growth, while an increase in the capital component of public
expenditure has a negative growth e¤ect. They characterize this as the too much
of a good thinge¤ect of capital expenditure, i.e. excessive spending in developing
countries renders them unproductive at the margin. Shioji (2001) nds that the
infrastructure component of public capital has a signicant and positive e¤ect on
long-run output in the US and in Japan. Blankenau et al. (2007) nd a posi-
tive relationship between public education expenditures and long-term growth after
controlling for government budget constraints. Aschauer (2000) argues that the
relationship between public capital and economic growth is non-linear. Also Minier
(2007) tests the non-linearities of growth model and shows that either squared terms
or interaction terms of scal variables should be present in the model. Moreover,
allowing for non-linearities, several scal variables become robust.
2For an excellent debate and theoretical analysis, see Acemoglu (2008), who contrasts the
oligarchic and democratic societies and studies the entry barriers in place. Under oligarchic
regimes, the elite withhold the monopoly position. In democracies, taxes create distortions. See
also Frye and Shleifer (1997) and their grabbing-hand model. For further discussion, see La Porta
et al. (1999).
3This view is further elaborated by Acemoglu et al. (2003b), who show that distortionary
macroeconomic policies are more likely to be symptoms of underlying institutional problems.
Fogli (2003) presents a critical view, proposing that technological adoption is signicantly linked
to institutional variables and that its omission is not neutral to the analysis.
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There have been other attempts to dene the determinants of growth and reduce
model uncertainty. Durlauf et al. (2005) list 145 potential explanatory variables
in growth regressions. Magnus et al. (2008) attempt to reduce model uncertainty
and determine the focusand auxiliary regressors for growth. They nd that
constant, initial GDP per capita, real equipment investment share of GDP, initial
total gross enrollment ratio for primary education, and life expectancy at age 0
are the focus variables. Thereafter, average growth rate of population, rule of
law, tropical land area, ethnolinguistic fragmentation, and fraction of Confucian
population (as a proxy for religion or culture) are found to be focus or auxiliary
variables depending on the model.
3 Growth in Transition
3.1 Measurement
When measuring the income of nations, standard real GDP per capita can be mis-
leading. As the output of the informal sector is not directly measurable, the o¢ cial
GDP per capita gure likely underestimates the true prosperity of a country with
a sizeable informal sector. For example, Schneider (2004) nds that the estimated
size of the shadow economy in transition economies during 20022003 ranged from
20.1 in the Czech Republic to 68.0 in Georgia. In terms of total production (le-
gal plus illegal), this means that non-observedproduction ranged from 16.7% to
40.5% of the total. Thus, welfare comparisons and productivity growth estimates
may be misleading if we concentrate solely on measured production.
One possible way to correct for this measurement error is to use GDP per worker
instead of GDP per capita. Those not part of o¢ cial employment are likely to
make their living outside the formal economy, so real GDP per worker tracks total
productivity much more closely.4 Hence, the evolution of real GDP per worker
should o¤er insight into actual wealth and growth potential of these nations. We
4Using GDP per worker has an additional benet. It is a closer measure of standards of living
as it corrects for home production and leisure.
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illustrate this as
Y
POP
=
Y
L
 L
POP
; (1)
where Y is the real income, L is the labor force and POP is the population. Equa-
tion (1) suggests that real GDP per capita can rise either from growth in labor
productivity or because labor force participation increases. Here, we concentrate
on the former.
To estimate the relationship between real GDP per worker and institutions, the
following model is proposed
yt;i = yt 1;i + INSt;i + Xt;i + ut;i; (2)
where yt;i is the log of real GDP per worker, INSt;i is the measure of the quality
of the institutions and Xt;i are the control variables. Since yt 1;i is correlated with
ut;i = i + vt;i, the use of an instrumental variables approach is preferred. Here,
we use Arellano and Bonds dynamic GMM. Subtracting the lagged version of (2)
from yt;i we obtain
yt;i yt 1;i =  (yt 1;i   yt 2;i)+ (INSt;i   INSt 1;i)+ (Xt;i  Xt 1;i)+(vt;i   vt 1;i) ;
(3)
where twice or more lagged levels of the dependent variable and predetermined
variables can be used as instruments for (3).
It has been found that the estimated asymptotic standard errors of the Arellano
and Bonds two-step estimator exhibit downward bias in small samples (see Wind-
meijer (2005)). Moreover, since the internal instrument set includes the past obser-
vations of the instrumented variables, the number of instruments grows quadrati-
cally with respect to T. According to Roodman (2009), a large collection of (weak)
instruments overts endogenous variables and weakens the Hansen test of the in-
strumentsjoint validity. While the practice has often been to reduce the number
of instruments by using only certain lags, Roodman (2009) recommends collaps-
ingeither alone or with constrained lags. This way the instrument count will be
linear in T, which mitigates the problem of overtting bias. With respect to bias
in standard errors, Windmeijer (2005) provides a method to correct the estimate
of the variance. He also provides evidence for that the corrected two-step GMM
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estimator outperforms the uncorrected two-step estimator and may even outper-
form the one-step estimator. We use these as they are options available in STATA
(xtabond2).
The annual data for 25 transition economies is drawn frommultiple sources, since
none of them provides a complete set of data for all countries even over our short
time horizon (1995-2005). Real GDP per worker data are drawn from World Bank
World Development Indicators, while the share of government expenditure relative
to GDP is taken from the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development SEI
database. Last, the Penn World Tables (version 6.2) provide data on the share of
investment relative to GDP (for details, see Appendix A).
To measure human capital, we calculate a re-scaled human development index
(HDI), basically an average of life expectancy index and education index as reported
in the UNs Human Development Report.5 We interpret it as a broad measure of
the human capital accumulation (see Kalaitzidakis et al., 2001). For the measure of
economic freedom, we use the Heritage Foundations Index of Economic Freedom
(EFI).6 To compare our results against other studies, we also calculate the weighted
average of transition indicators (EBRD). Thus is determined using weights proposed
by Fidrmuc and Tichit (2009), who conduct a factor analysis to determine how well
each EBRD indicator reect progress in transition.7 Our nal measure of transition
is thus the composite of eight indicators reported by the EBRD rather than the
overall unweighted indicator reported by the EBRD.
5Originally HDI has also an third indicator as a measure of decent standard of living, namely
GDP per capita re-scaled to a GDP index. Two remaining indices are life-expectancy at birth
(life-expectanty index) and education index. The latter is comprised of adult literacy index (adult
literacy rate) and GER index (gross school enrolment ratio).
6The Heritage Foundations Index of Economic Freedom comprises 10 components: business
freedom, trade freedom, scal freedom, government size, monetary freedom, investment freedom,
nancial freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption, and labor freedom. For detailed
information on the each sub-category, go to www.heritage.org.
7These 8 indicators reect the scale of reform in di¤erent sectors of an economy. The indicators
and the assigned weights are as follows: price liberalization (0.08), foreign exchange and trade
liberalization (0.15), small privatization (0.13), large privatization (0.14), enterprise reform (0.21),
competition liberalization (0.10), bank liberalization (0.18) and non bank liberalization (0.09). For
more details see Fidrmuc and Tichit (2009) and the EBRD Transition Indicators Database.
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To verify the hypotheses that these countries obey the same growth model and
that there are no non-linearities with regard to human capital or institutions, we
rst determine if the data can be divided into clubs using the regression tree
method proposed by Durlauf and Johnson (1995). Calculate the average growth of
real GDP per worker (1995-2005), and applying indicators for the initial (i.e. 1995)
level of human capital and institutions, their changes and average growth rates,8
we nd there is no e¢ cient split with regard to any of aforementioned variables.
This nding suggests that during the observation period these countries obey either
the same laws of motion, or at least relatively similar growth models as proposed
by Fidrmuc and Tichit (2009). This is reasonable since the countries share fairly
similar histories.
Figure 1 in Appendix B presents the 1995 and 2005 values of human capital
across these economies. It conrms our prior assumption that, in terms of human
capital, post-communist countries were relatively homogenous at the start of tran-
sition. With respect to changes in human capital, the levels of 2005 vary more than
the levels of 1995. It is safe, however, to conclude that the level of human capital
has been stable across time and space. Figure 2 in Appendix B tells a di¤erent
story. The variations in economic freedom across economies increase between 1995
and 2005. In this respect, human capital does not drive di¤erences in institutions
or economic growth. The transition from the communism to market economies and
the break in the growth model proposed by Fidrmuc and Tichit (2009) also sug-
gest that pre-transition levels of development are not determinative of the route or
institutions adopted in the new model. The structural break in the system should
break the link from the level of development to institutions.
In what follows we use share of investment, share of government consumption
and two controls for the institutions namely the Heritage Foundations EFI and re-
scaled EBRD indicator on transition as drivers of growth of real GDP per worker. As
mentioned, human capital is relatively constant over time and space so it cannot be
used as an explanatory variable in the estimations. Therefore, the lower diagonal
of Table 1 presents the pair-wise correlations between the variables used in the
8To make sure that our results are not completely driven by the use of these two indicators,
we also test fertility rate, Gini coe¢ cients and overall upper secondary enrollment rates.
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following estimations. Generally, the correlation is either not present or very low.
The exception is the correlation between measurements of institutions (0.70). In
essence, they reect the same phenomenon and are driven by the same process. The
basic statistics in terms of means and standard errors are presented in Appendix A.
Variables Growth Investment Govt Cons. EFI EBRD
Growth 1
Investment 0.06 1
Govt Cons. -0.25 0.05 1
EFI 0.26 0.13 0.32 1
EBRD 0.21 0.22 0.35 0.70 1
Table 1: Correlation among key variables.
3.2 Dynamic GMM
Our second step involves estimating the dynamic growth regression by GMM using
the method proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The panel unit root tests gener-
ally suggest that growth of real GDP per worker is stationary. To obtain consistent
estimators, the lagged levels (or di¤erences) of the proposed explanatory variables
may be used as long as they are correlated with the variable they are supposed
to instrument. Evaluating the correlation with xt and xt p (or xt and xt p
for system-GMM) for p = 1; 2; 3 shows that all the rst di¤erences of explanatory
variables correlate up to at least their third-level lag.
The following instruments were used. Lags two and three are included for
growth, and, following Roodman (2009), collapsed. For other variables, which are
likely predetermined rather than strongly exogenous, only third lags are included.
The instrument list is also collapsed. Standard errors, which should be consistent in
the presence of any pattern of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within panels,
are corrected for the small sample bias in line with Windmeijer (2005).
Table 2 presents the estimation results for the economic growth with di¤erent
model specications. The results vary considerably depending on the model spec-
ication used. The Sargan, and in particular, Hansen test-statistics are generally
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insignicant, i.e. the instruments are valid. Moreover, the models seem to pass the
Arellano-Bond test for second-order serial correlation and the Wald test for joint
signicance for coe¢ cients.
The results of the baseline model, where growth is explained by its own lag,
investment, government consumption, and economic freedom, show that previous
growth rate and economic freedom are statistically signicant while investment
and government consumption are not. This nding is in line with similar earlier
studies. The coe¢ cient for lagged growth is 0.287 and highly signicant (1% level of
signicance), while the measure of the economic freedom also obtains a statistically
signicant coe¢ cient 0.01. The Wald test for joint signicance for coe¢ cients is
214.68, indicating the model is valid.
Following Minier (2007), we test several interaction terms. In particular, we
introduce the interactions of economic freedom with other variables into our model.9
The second model brings the interaction between economic freedom and investment
to the estimated model, which changes the results compared to our baseline model.
The coe¢ cient of growth is reduced, but remains signicant. Both investment and
government consumption now seem to have an impact on growth. The impact of
investment is positive, while the impact of government consumption is negative,
possibly an indication of wasteful spending. The most interesting result is that
the interaction term is negative and signicant: i.e. in the presence of greater
economic freedom, previous investment tends to have a negative e¤ect. We next
test the interaction between economic freedom and government consumption in the
third model. There are again notable changes. The baseline results reappear, but
investment is now also statistically signicant. Lastly, introducing the interaction
between economic freedom and growth into the model makes a notable change
compared to previous models as lag of growth is no longer signicant.
Since all the models seem to pass the tests for measuring the performance of
instruments and/or the model, it is di¢ cult to judge which one is preferable. If the
fourth model represents the full (general) model, then the last interaction terms
which are statistically insignicant do not seem to bring any value-added to the
9Other interactions were tested, but only those that seemed to have an impact are presented
here.
104
model or the results. Therefore, model two with one interaction term would seem
to specify a correct model. These results also have an intuitive appeal.
In order to ease the interpretation of the results, we re-estimate model two using
standardized variables. First, increases in investment have a higher impact than
that of any other variable with the exception of interaction. This runs counter to
some previous ndings. As the interaction is signicant, the entire marginal e¤ect
should be considered. For the sake of simplicity, we assume we are one standard
deviation above the expected level of economic freedom. Increasing investment by
one standard deviation slightly decreases growth (1.6-1.7=-0.1). Moreover, assum-
ing we are one standard deviation above the expected level of investment, we nd
that increasing economic freedom by one standard deviation decreases growth quite
substantially (0.7-1.7=-1.0). If we are below the expected levels, the impact is the
opposite: the presence of interaction increases the total marginal e¤ect and the
impact on growth is magnied.
In summary, economic freedom and investment initially impact positively on
growth, whereas the size of government seems to have an negative impact on growth.
However, in the presence of high level of economic freedom (investment), the impact
of investment (economic freedom) seems to have a detrimental e¤ect on growth. If
we have economic freedom (investment) below or close to its expected value, then
increases in investment (economic freedom) surely increase growth. There appears
to be a too much of a good thingphenomenon at work at their joint presence.10
Increases in investment and economic freedom are good as long as they are not
overdone.
10We also tested this idea by including the square of size of government, investments and
economic freedom instead of their interactions, which all turned out to be insignicant. While the
interpretation of interactions term as an indicator of a "too much of a good thing" phenomenon
might seem unconventional, it is in fact what happens here. Since the total marginal e¤ect of
either one of variables becomes negative if we increase the other beyond its mean value, taken
together these positive forces become detrimental.
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Variables Growth of real GDP per worker 1998-2005, N=25, T=8
Model (1) (2a) (2b) (3) (4)
(rst lags) Coe¤. Coe¤. z-values Coe¤. Coe¤.
Growth .287*** .191** .174*** .261*** .035
(.110) (.098) (.071) (.087) (.579)
Investment .001 .011*** 1.595*** .010** .013***
(.001) (.003) (.431) (.005) (.004)
Govt Cons. -.001 -.004*** -.752*** -.003 -.005*
(.001) (.001) (.162) (.003) (.003)
EFI .001** .003*** .730*** .002** .003**
(-6.5e 4) (.001) (.255) (8.9e 4) (.001)
EFI*Investment - -1.8e 4*** -1.718*** -1.6e 4 -2.3e 4**
(5.6e 5) (.542) (1.1e 4) (9.7e 5)
EFI*Govt Cons. - - - -7.6e 6 3.4e 5
(7.2e 5) (6.1e 5)
EFI*Growth - - - .004
.010
Instruments 9 11 11 13 15
Observations 232 232 232 232 232
Sargan J-test 7.50 5.00 5.02 5.56 7.81
p-value 0.19 0.54 0.54 0.59 0.45
Hansen J-test 4.66 2.50 2.18 4.78 6.92
p-value 0.46 0.87 0.90 0.69 0.54
m2 -0.80 -0.96 -0.79 -0.91 -0.62
p-value 0.43 0.338 0.43 0.365 0.53
Wald test 214.68*** 113.4*** 74.44*** 346.31*** 387.85***
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 2: Estimation results with Arellano and Bond two-step GMM. (***) and
(**) and (*) indicate that the coe¢ cient is signicant at 1, 5 and 10 % level of
signicance. Robust standard errors are reported below the coe¢ cients.
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3.3 Robustness Check
We perform three tests to check the robustness of the results (Table 3). In the rst
check, we drop the resource-rich countries from the data,11 and redo the analysis
concentrating on non-oil economies. Surprisingly, there is little change in the results.
The most notable change for non-oil economies is that lagged growth is no longer
statistically signicant. With respect to the general model, the results resemble
those of a full sample. Turning to growth per capita estimates, we see that they
appear very similar to those for growth per worker, but there are small di¤erences
in the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients. For example, the coe¢ cient for the investment
has decreased from 0.011 to 0.007. It appears as most of the variables have smaller
impact on measured production than on total production with the exception of
previous growth, which now seems to have a larger impact on todays growth. All
these ndings disappear, of course, when we evaluate the general version of the
model; there is only one statistically signicant e¤ect in the full model. Finally,
we use the recalculated index of economic reform as in Fidrmuc and Tichit (2009)
instead of economic freedom. For these countries, the economic reform has strong,
positive impact on growth, although most of growth seems to be explained by its
own lag. The interaction is no longer statistically signicant. The inference for
the full model is not available, however, since the variables seem to su¤er from
multicollinearity that introduces a singular covariance matrix.
In summary, it makes a di¤erence how the institutions are measured. Growth
per worker and growth per capita are not explained by the same model.
Our results are in line with Fidrmuc and Tichit (2009), who nd a positive rela-
tionship between growth and institutions in their third growth regime. These results
are consistent with the ndings of Iradian (2007), who concludes that the growth
impetus associated with market reforms in CIS has been substantial due to its e¤ect
on overall productivity. Our results, however, suggest one can overdo both invest-
ment and reform. Moreover, we nd a statistically signicant interaction between
economic freedom and investment, which might help to explain earlier, contradic-
tory ndings. As is shown in the rst model, if this e¤ect is left uncontrolled, we nd
no signicant relationship between growth and investment. Finally, these results
11Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia.
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Variables Non-oil, N=21 Growth per capita Growth per worker
(rst lags) Coe¤. Coe¤. Coe¤. Coe¤. Coe¤.
Growth .221 .256 .299*** .368 Growth .285***
(.139) (.420) (.099) (.471) (.104)
Investment .014*** .017*** .007** .004 Investment .007*
(.003) (.004) (.003) (.004) (.004)
Govt Cons. -.004*** -.007** -.003*** 4.7e 4 Govt Cons. -.002
(.001) (.003) (.001) (.003) (.001)
EFI .003*** .002** .002*** .003* EBRD .024**
(.001) (5.3e 4) (8.3e 4) (.001) (.012)
EFI*Investment -2.2e 4*** -2.9e 4*** -1.2e 4** -6.0e 5 EBRD -9.1e 5
(5.3e 5) (8.7e 5) (4.7e 5) (8.4e 5) *Invest. (-6.7e 5)
EFI*Govt Cons. - 6.5e 5 - -8.5e 5 -
(5.5e 5) (7.3e 5)
EFI*Growth - -4.9e 4 - .002 -
(.008) (.012)
Instruments 11 15 11 15 11
Observations 205 205 228 228 232
Sargan J-test 2.87 8.74 8.78 9.56 10.93
p-value 0.84 0.36 0.19 0.30 0.09
Hansen J-test 2.54 7.21 5.98 5.16 6.31
p-value 0.86 0.51 0.57 0.74 0.39
m2 -1.35 -0.77 0.22 -0.62 -0.98
p-value 0.18 0.44 0.83 0.54 0.33
Wald test 193.18*** 474.27*** 130.45*** 292.51*** 151.82***
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 3: Estimation results with Arellano and Bond two-step GMM. (***) and
(**) and (*) indicate that the coe¢ cient is signicant at 1, 5 and 10 % level of
signicance. Robust standard errors are reported below the coe¢ cients.
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speak to the question on errors-in-variables in the measure of total productivity
and reform posed by Babetskii and Campos (2007). How economic performance
is measured makes a di¤erence, even if real GDP per capita grows very much in
line with total productivity. When using the composite index of economic freedom
as a proxy for institutions, it seems to make relatively little di¤erence if oil-rich
countries are included in the dataset.
4 Conclusions
We considered here whether growth is driven by institutions and investment, con-
centrating on the recent experiences of the transition economies of the former Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. These countries all experienced the upheaval of moving
from a planned economy to a market economy, and all started the transition process
with fairly similar human capital endowments. We conclude that with a relatively
skilled labor pool, and as long as there are insu¢ cient institutions or private capital,
improvements in institutions and investment tend to boost productivity growth.
Policy-makers can glean several conclusions from this study. First, in the pres-
ence of a high level of human capital as characterizes these transition economies,
economic freedom, institutions and private investment do promote growth. As
economic freedom (investment) increases, however, greater investment (economic
freedom) appears to have a detrimental impact on growth. Our results seem to sug-
gest that one can overdo both Investment and marketization, although with such a
limited experience of transition process these conclusions might be premature.
Second, government consumption has a negative impact on growth. Since this
can also be viewed as a measure of size of the government or the extent of public
interventions in markets, our results seems to indicate that hyper-active government
and the wasteful spending it engenders is a hindrance to growth. The general policy
of limiting government scope makes sense with a caveat that we here we could not
control for the size or composition of budgets.
One insight from these results is that growth researchers should use care in
selecting indicators for measurement of economic well-being. The presence of non-
linearities should also be tested, since we show that non-linearities are present in
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the growth model in terms of interactions. Our results indicate that the somewhat
contradictory results in the earlier literature, e.g. that institutions do not matter
for growth or that Investment have a negative impact on growth in transition, might
be due to an inappropriate choice of model. Even if we do not fully contradict these
earlier results, we show that the e¤ect is more complicated than previously argued.
Some issues remain, most strikingly the question of how best to measure human
capital. In a limited scope of time and space, one might nd, as we did, a set of
countries where it the quality of human capital is more or less constant. Due to this
limited scope, however, the ndings do not provide useful insights outside the scope
of the sample. Clearly, current measures of human capital are far from perfect and
better measurement methods are needed.
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A Data
Table 4 lists the countries in our data set. The rst 22 are not oil producers; the
last three are.
Non-oil Hungary Slovenia
Albania Kyrgyz Republic Tajikistan
Armenia Latvia Turkmenistan
Belarus Lithuania Ukraine
Bulgaria Moldova Uzbekistan
Croatia Poland Oil
Czech Republic FYR Macedonia Azerbaijan
Estonia Romania Kazakhstan
Georgia Slovakia Russia
Table 4: List of countries.
Table 5 lists the variables, their sources and their scales.
Variable Scale Source
Growth Real GDP per Worker World Bank WDI
(Private) Investment Share of the GDP NBER PWT 6.2
General Government Expenditure Share of the GDP EBRD SEI
Human Development Indicator From 0 to 1 UNDP
Transition Index From 0 to 4+ EBRD Transition indicators
Economic Freedom From 0-100 Quality of Gov. Institute
Fertility Rate From 0- UNDP
Gini Coe¢ cients From 0-1 Wider Institute
Upper Secondary Enrollment rates From 0-100 World Bank WDI
Table 5: List of variables and their sources. The general government expenditure
does not include public investments.
Table 6 gives the descriptive statistics on the variables that were used in the
estimations.
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Variables Growth Investment Govt Cons. EFI EBRD
mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std
Non-oil
Albania 8.1 8.1 40.1 5.7 30.5 3.1 54.6 3.4 3.0 0.2
Armenia 11.1 5.5 10.9 1.0 23.3 4.6 64.1 7.6 3.0 0.3
Belarus 6.0 4.4 15.4 2.0 30.5 3.1 39.1 5.1 1.8 0.2
Bulgaria 3.1 5.7 7.7 2.7 38.2 2.4 54.2 6.1 3.3 0.4
Croatia 5.2 3.0 16.8 2.9 50.3 3.6 53.1 1.5 3.5 0.2
Czech Republic 3.3 1.8 21.1 1.4 43.6 2.0 69.0 2.3 4.0 0.2
Estonia 7.5 2.2 15.8 1.9 36.5 2.3 76.9 2.5 3.9 0.2
Georgia 5.5 12.0 7.4 1.1 19.4 3.1 53.3 5.5 3.1 0.3
Hungary 3.6 1.2 20.8 2.3 49.9 2.0 63.8 3.0 4.1 0.2
Kyrgyz Republic 2.3 4.2 8.8 1.4 30.4 3.1 53.9 4.0 3.1 0.1
Latvia 8.1 8.1 13.4 3.7 36.4 2.0 64.6 2.1 3.6 0.3
Lithuania 7.1 3.6 13.4 1.7 33.0 1.9 66.8 4.0 3.6 0.3
Moldova 4.2 6.8 8.7 0.5 38.3 6.6 55.2 2.9 3.0 0.1
Poland 4.9 2.0 19.8 2.1 44.9 3.1 61.6 1.9 3.9 0.2
FYR Macedonia 2.9 7.5 12.3 1.0 37.0 2.3 55.8 2.9 3.1 0.2
Romania 3.3 10.8 11.4 1.1 33.3 1.8 51.6 4.4 3.2 0.2
Slovakia 3.8 1.1 21.0 2.7 51.3 10.8 57.7 5.0 3.8 0.2
Slovenia 3.0 2.4 25.9 2.8 46.4 1.8 59.4 2.5 3.6 0.1
Tajikistan 3.2 6.2 6.2 2.0 18.8 3.0 44.9 5.2 2.3 0.3
Turkmenistan 5.5 13.2 24.5 4.8 20.6 2.8 40.9 4.9 1.4 0.1
Ukraine 2.5 8.6 8.9 1.5 38.4 3.6 48.0 5.2 2.8 0.2
Uzbekistan 1.8 2.5 6.0 0.9 35.1 3.8 37.6 6.5 2.3 0.1
Oil
Azerbaijan 8.1 8.9 15.3 5.7 22.6 3.8 48.8 4.2 2.5 0.3
Kazakhstan 8.9 6.0 9.0 1.4 22.1 1.9 48.8 5.9 3.0 0.2
Russia 3.2 4.1 10.1 2.9 38.4 5.4 50.4 2.2 3.0 0.2
Table 6: Descriptive statistics
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B Figures
Figure 1: Human Development in 1995 and 2005 (own calculations).
Figure 2: Economic Freedom Index 1995 and 2005.
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1 Introduction
The literature on the cross-country convergence of incomes is full of controversies
and puzzles, but recently it has been suggested that the demographic transition may
explain many conicting observations (Galor 2007). The main argument is that
di¤erences in the timing of the demographic transition have segmented countries
to the di¤erent regimes, and the simultaneous existence of these regimes makes the
observations di¢ cult to understand if their demographic background is not properly
understood.
Demographics can increase our understanding in two ways. Since it is well known
that convergence fails in heterogeneous samples of countries, it has been suggested
earlier that countries should be classied into homogenous clubs according to com-
mon history (Baumol 1986), geographical location (Maddison 1994), mutual trade
(Ben-David and Loewy 1998), or productivity thresholds (Azariadis and Drazen
1990). In this paper, we claim that in the post-war period countries were in di¤er-
ent stages of their demographic transitions, so that classication according to these
stages should generate homogenous clubs. The underlying tendency for conver-
gence should then manifest itself within these clubs. On the other hand, since the
demographic transition is a dynamic process, far from completed, many countries
will move ahead toward more mature stages. Therefore, an important question is
whether these movements imply a more equal distribution of world incomes, i.e.,
will there be convergence in the future?
In the demographic transition considerable changes in all demographic variables
take place, but di¤erent authors emphasize di¤erent factors. Soares (2007), for
example, maintains that infant mortality has the leading role: once it starts to fall
fertility follows and the transition proceeds according to its internal laws. On the
other hand, Ram (1998), Fogel (1994, 2004), Becker et al. (2005), and Lorenzen et
al. (2008) claim that life lengthening is decisive as short-sighted and deterministic
attitudes give way to optimistic views, whereas Bloom and Williamson (1998) stress
the practical role of the dependence rate. In the Unied Growth Theory", Galor
and Weil (2000) emphasize the interplay between population growth and technical
change. The number of demographic clubs has been disputed as well. Bloom and
Williamson (1998) argue that this number should be limited to two, whereas Galor
and Weil (2000) advocate three clubs, the Malthusian", "Post Malthusian" and
Modern". Chesnais (1992), in turn, claims that the correct number of demographic
stages is six.
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In order to evaluate the role of the demographic transition in the convergence
of incomes, one has to evaluate whether demographic clubs exist in the data, what
their number is, and which demographic factors best discriminate between them.
The next question concerns economic convergence within the clubs and, nally, one
has to evaluate what the observations can tell us about the future.
To answer these questions, we identify the number and boundaries of the clubs
by the regression tree method suggested by Breiman et al. (1984) and Durlauf
and Johnson (1995). The main advantage is that this method chooses the vari-
ables and factors which most e¢ ciently classify the data, thus providing important
information about the clubs.
We apply various convergence tests to the clubs. The interest in growth and
convergence has been extensive and a number of papers evaluate the topic from
di¤erent perspectives. Li and Papell (1999) maintain that the failure to nd con-
vergence is due to structural changes, nding evidence for convergence if breaks are
allowed. Their results are conrmed by Strazicich et al. (2004) for the OECD coun-
tries and by Cunado and Perez de Garcia (2006) for 43 African countries. Authors,
such as Pedroni (2007) and Li and Papell (1999) nd, however, that even within the
OECD only a sub-set of countries is prone to convergence. While Pesaran (2007c)
nds evidence for pair-wise convergence across the Middle East, North Africa and
the Rest of the World, his ndings, however, indicate that in a panel of countries
one can rarely expect to nd a convergence as a signicant fraction of each sub-set
fails to converge to the output mean. Hineline (2008) also highlights the merits of
clustering the data when di¤erent countries obey di¤erent laws of motion.
Our results highlight the shortcomings of the cross-sectional tests and the po-
tential problems in the rst generation unit root tests when the data exhibits cross-
section dependence, undermining the reliability of these tests. In the context of out-
put convergence, this means that convergence may be found where it does not exist.
We provide new evidence on the presence of cross-section dependence and show the
variation of the convergence tests by di¤erent techniques from strong evidence in
the traditional -convergence tests to the failure to reject the non-convergence null
by the second generation unit root tests. Thus, our results are best in line with the
critical ndings of Pedroni (2007), Li and Papell (1999), and Pesaran (2007c). To
understand the implications of the demographic transition, we evaluate its progress
in the future, predicting take-o¤s even among the poorest countries. These take-
o¤s, however, will be insu¢ cient to raise their incomes to meet the income of the
rich, implying bi-polarization in the future.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the data and methods,
Section 3 generates the clubs, Section 4 provides the convergence tests, and Section 5
discusses the future growth prospects. Section 6 discusses the merits of the ndings.
2 Data and Methods
To investigate the role of demographics in the convergence of countries, we collect
data for incomes and demographic variables. There are several candidates for demo-
graphic threshold variables, but we choose the total fertility rate, dependence rate,
life expectancy, and infant mortality rate since their role is frequently discussed in
the literature. Thus the variables are
yt = log of real per capita GDP (international dollars, base
year 2000).
GROWTH = annual average growth rate of real per capita GDP dened
by (yt0+T   yt0 ) =T .
TFR = Total fertility rate (children per woman).
DEP = dependence rate (ratio of population aged 0-14 and 65+
per 100 population 15-64).
LIF = Life expectancy (at birth, both sexes).
IMR = Infant mortality (infant deaths per 1,000 live births).
To keep the threshold variables exogenous, they are measured at the beginning of
the research period, which extends from 1960 to 2003. Data for these variables is
available for 85 countries. The countries that have experienced extreme economic or
social changes are excluded.1 The demographic data come from the United Nations
(2007) and the economic data from Heston et al. (2006).
To see whether multiple regimes should be taken seriously we make data splits
according to the mean of each demographic threshold variable in country i (xi), and
1The excluded countries are the highest AIDS prevalence countries (Lesotho, South-Africa and
Zimbabwe), the oil countries (OPEC members), and the East-European countries. We also exclude
Rwanda and China because of the mass murders in the former and the population policy in the
latter. The demographic data for Taiwan is replaced by that of South Korea which has quite a
similar demographic history. The need to keep Taiwan arises because of the scarcity of countries
with remarkable slow-downs in fertility.
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test whether GROWTH is identical in the sub-samples by estimating
(yi;t0+T   yi;t0 ) =T = '+ xi + i: (1)
The Wald-test for the similarity of the coe¢ cients ' and  in the sub-samples
yields highly signicant F statistics for three of the four splits. Thus, we reject
the similarity in favor of the sub-samples.
Even though the specication test suggests that some demographic clubs exist in
the data, their number and boundaries are not adequately revealed by mechanical
splits. Hence, clubs are discovered by using the regression tree analysis, suggested
by Durlauf and Johnson (1995).2 This data-sorting method splits the range of the
regressors to nd the best piecewise linear model. In principle, the growth model
might be di¤erent from one regime to another and this method helps to uncover
the presence of non-linearities over space. We let the algorithm choose both the
splitting variable and the split value (threshold) to generate the largest possible
decreases in the models residual deviance. Only one-step look ahead and binary
splits are used. Successive splits grow up a tree, starting from the root (the full
sample) to the leaves (clubs).
Since we aim to minimize the sum of squared residuals of model (1), we need to
set restrictions to this minimization problem. Otherwise the optimal" number of
clubs would probably be equal to N. To choose the best number of clubs, several
criteria are available. The Vfold validation method, for example, can be used to
control for the potential over-tting. This method, however, is computationally
demanding since V-fold validation3 is done for all possible sizes of the tree, and its
2Hansen (2000) develops an asymptotic distribution theory for threshold coe¢ cients and cal-
culates their condence limits while Fiaschi and Lavezzi (2007) apply Markov transition matrices
to reveal non-linearities in the data.
3V-fold cross validation is a technique for performing independent tree size tests. The data is
split to samples (folds), their number of amounting V (typically 10). The samples should imitate
the original data as closely as possible. Then a pseudo-data is created by leaving out one of the
folds and a test tree is build. This tree is tted to the remaining sample to assess its t. The
process is repeated 10 times for 10 di¤erent test samples. These ten trees give classication error
for each tree size, according to which the reference tree can be pruned. It appears that this method
requires sample size that is vastly greater than ours.
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not available in the software we use to do this task. In our case we can resort to
other criteria, as we also face the limits of the convergence tests, implying that the
club size should not be too small. Therefore, we apply the pre-determined club-size
criteria of ten members. A detailed description of the regression tree method is
available in Breiman et al. (1980) and Durlauf and Johnson (1995).
Another important question is whether the generated clubs exhibit the con-
vergence of incomes. A cross-section of countries is said to exhibit unconditional
 convergence if the estimated  in the model
Model 1: (yi;t0+T   yi;t0 ) =T = + yi;t0 + "i;t
is negative, indicating that economic growth in the poorer countries is faster than in
the richer (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992). Evans (1998) rst applied the panel unit
root tests for the stationarity of output di¤erences. This property can be tested by
using three nested specications from general to specic:
Model 2 : (yi;t   yt) = i + it+ i (yi;t 1   yt 1) + (ui;t   ut) ;
Model 3 : (yi;t   yt) = i + i (yi;t 1   yt 1) + (ui;t   ut) ;
Model 4 : (yi;t   yt) = i (yi;t 1   yt 1) + (ui;t   ut) ;
where y = 1
N
PN
i=1 yi;t and ui;t is iid. Models 2 and 3 include a country-specic
constant i, necessary if some slowly-changing factor wedges the incomes from the
mean. Model 2 also includes a country-specic trend it, addressing time-related
factors, such as the di¤usion of technology, which may take place at di¤erent pace
in di¤erent countries (Lee et al. 1997). It is often necessary to allow this kind
of heterogeneity even within clubs since a complete control of heterogeneity by
clustering may not be possible. Only the test with no intercept and trend (Model 4 )
always refers to decreasing income gaps, i.e., to unconditional convergence, whereas
Models 2 and 3 only refer to the conditional one. For discussion see Pesaran (2007b)
and Pedroni (2007).
In Models 2-4, country i converges to the mean (has a stationary time series of
income di¤erences) if the estimate for i is negative, but several test variants exist
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in terms of similarity of this estimate across countries. Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC,
2002) assume convergence at a common rate, i.e., i =  for all i. Im, Pesaran and
Shin (IPS, 2003) propose a test statistics which builds on the Augmented Dickey
Fuller (ADF) test. This test, as well as the Fisher inverse square test by Maddala
and Wu (M&W, 1999) and Chois (2001) inverse normal test all assume individual
unit root processes, indicating that countries may convergence at di¤erent rates and
some countries may not converge at all. For the convergence of the sample it is then
enough to show that  < 0. The di¤erence between LLC and the other tests is that
LLC pools the data while the other tests pool the test statistics, hence di¤erent
assumptions about i.
Recently, Pesaran (2007a) has criticized the use of these so called rst genera-
tion panel unit root tests because they do not account for cross-section dependence,
arising across countries due to spatial and spill over e¤ects or unobserved common
factors (Baltagi and Pesaran 2007). Although IPS and Choi both allow for a limited
amount of cross-section dependence due to demeaning in the presence of common
time e¤ects (common business cycles, for example), demeaning does not help if
reaction to shocks di¤ers across countries.4 Pesaran (2007a) investigates the prop-
erties of the IPS, M&W, and Choi tests in the presence of cross-section dependence
by Monte Carlo simulations. With low dependence, IPS and Choi perform reason-
ably well, whereas M&W begins to work when T increases. With high cross-section
dependence, all tests tend to over-reject the no-convergence null.
To correct for the bias rising from cross-section dependence, Pesaran (2007a)
proposes a modied IPS in the presence of a single unobserved common factor, but
this does not come without costs: if no dependence exists, the corrected IPS (CIPS)
performs worse than the original test.5 While the CIPS test rarely over-rejects the
4Assume that ui;t=jft + "i;t. If j =  for all j then demeaning, as suggested in Models 2 to
4, is enough to whiten the error term, otherwise we need to resort to second generation unit root
tests.
5The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (of order one) in the presence of individual e¤ects can be
written as zi;t = ai + izi;t 1 + ci1zi;t 1 + "i;t. This regression gives the base for the IPS-
tests. The modied ADF-test in the presence of single common factor ft can be estimated from
zi;t = ai + izi;t 1 + bizt 1 + ci1zt + "i;t. While the standard ADF regression uses the lagged
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null, its power is often relatively low, i.e., if the null hypothesis is false, the test
may fail to reject it. The second pitfall is that since Pesarans test builds on IPS,
the unconditional convergence in Model 4 can not be tested with it.
To discover the cross-section dependence on the data, the CD-test proposed by
Pesaran (2007a) calculates
CD =
s
2T
N (N   1)
 
N 1X
i=1
NX
j=i+1
^ij
!
; (2)
where T and N are the number of observations in time and cross-sections, and ^ij
is the residual correlation between countries i and j, these residuals being obtained
from individual ADF(p) regression6 The statistics of this test is normally distributed
with N (0; 1), but the drawback is that it lacks power if the population average pair-
wise correlation is (close to) zero. Another test, proposed by Breusch and Pagan
(1980)
LM = T
N 1X
i=1
NX
j=i+1
^2ij (3)
is based on 2N(N 1)=2 distribution. While this test is not a¤ected by the zero
averages, it is likely to exhibit substantial size distortions when N is large and T is
small.
3 Demographic Clubs
Figure 1 reports the results of the regression tree analysis. The rst split is in
terms of life expectancy, the split value being LIF = 48:01. Countries with LIFi <
di¤erence(s) of zi;t, the modied test uses zt 1 and zt, i.e. the cross-section averages, as a proxy
for the common factor ft (for more details see Pesaran 2007a and our Appendix A). Then for the
(C)IPS unit root test one calculates the mean of the individual specic t-statistics.
6Pesaran et al. (2007), who proposed the use of a bias-adjusted LM test, show that this test is
more robust than the other two. The problem with the adjusted LM test is that it assumes strong
exogeneity, which does not hold in our data.
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48:01 constitute the rst club (35 countries).7 The second split is in terms of life
expectancy again, the split value being LIF = 55:785, thus partitioning the rest
of the sample into the sub-samples of 12 and 38 countries (LIFi < 55:785 and
LIFi  55:785). The next split violated the club-size requirement, whereby the
(maximum) number of clubs is three. Most developing countries are allocated to
Club I, the East-Asian Tigers to Club II, and the Western countries to Club III.
A complete list of countries and clubs with demographic and economic statistics is
given in Appendix A.
Figure 1: The regression tree. The left arrow indicates the observations for which
the split variable < Split Value. The right arrow indicates the observations for
which the split variable  Split Value.
The order by which the threshold variables enter to partition the data indicates
their importance in terms of the dependent variable. Our study emphasizes the
7The algorithm then suggests the second split in terms of the dependence rate with the split
value DEP = 94:94 but, unfortunately, the number of members in the club with DEPi  94:94 is
too low (eight countries), thus violating the pre-determined minimum size for the clubs. To be able
to continue the partition further we exclude the dependence rate from the threshold candidates.
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importance of life expectancy. Two types of intuitive explanation arise. The rst
derives from the role of the physical capacity of workers (Fogel 1994, 2004) and
highlights better incentives to invest in human capital associated with the length-
ening of life (Ram 1998, Weil 2007, Lorentzen et al. 2008). Acemoglu and Johnson
(2009) argue, however, that the causal link from life expectancy to economic growth
may be weak as the rise in the supply of a qualied labor force may decrease its
marginal productivity, in particular if investments are weak. A more reliable ex-
planation is thus that because the di¤usion of production and health technologies
go hand in hand, life expectancy acts as an indicator for adaption of latest tech-
nologies to increase income (Soares 2007). This explanation also sheds light on the
growth di¤erentials between the clubs. Given that technological di¤usion depends
on the gap to the leaders and the ability to adopt information, Club II, where both
conditions hold, exhibits highest growth (Cf. Figure 1), while Club I, with the
largest gap, su¤ers from decient adoption. Club III is at the frontier. Naturally,
there might be gaps within the clubs leading to convergence as recently illustrated
in Lehmijoki (2009).
The derived number of the demographic clubs is identical with that suggested by
Galor andWeil (2000). As the discussion above suggests, their driving variables, hu-
man capital and technical change, may not be so di¤erent from our life expectancy.
Furthermore, the increasing life-expectancy status from Club I to Club III seems to
conrm the interpretation of our clubs as successive demographic stages, denoted
as Malthusian", Post Malthusian" and Modern" by Galor and Weil (2000).8
8Fiaschi and Lavezzi (2007) also nd three clubs out of 122 countries, although based on initial
incomes. The number of the literacy and income-based regimes (96 countries) in Durlauf and
Johnson (1995) is four, their club 1 being a sub-set of our Club I, while their club 4 is a sub-set
of our Club III. Their intermediate clubs consist of countries from all of our clubs.
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4 Convergence Within the Clubs
4.1 Unconditional  Convergence
In this section we concentrate on the convergence of incomes within demographic
clubs, starting from the unconditional -convergence dened in Model 1. Table 1
shows that the estimated  in the full sample is positive and signicant, i.e., the
sample diverges. By contrast,  is negative in clubs although signicant at the 5 %
level only in Clubs I and III. Convergence in samples similar to Club III has been
shown in earlier studies but the now-shown -convergence in Club I is a new result.
The estimated  in Club II is large but signicant only at the 8 % level. A closer
examination shows that its members have changed their relative positions and the
correlation of rank orders in 1960 and 2003 is  0:06, i.e., there is leapfrogging
in this club. This possibility was discussed by Sala-i-Martin (1996) and is now
exemplied in Club II.
club Model 1
 t-test prob.
Full sample 0.354 2.212 0.015
Club I -0.640 -2.339 0.013
Club II -1.912 -1.511 0.081
Club III -0.479 -1.836 0.037
Table 1: The results for Model 1
4.2 Cross-Section Dependence and Unit Root Tests
To evaluate the presence of cross-sectional dependence, we ran the ADF(p) regres-
sions with the individual values of p to compute the pair-wise cross-section correla-
tions for the residuals (Pesaran 2007a). Table 2 shows that the average correlations
are -0.021, -0.061, and -0.01 for Clubs I   III respectively.9 The CD statistics for
9Since we are testing the convergence hypothesis, we ran the ADF(p) regressions for the de-
meaned data. If the cross-section dependence is still present, it is o¤ more complex form than
expected by the rst generation tests so that they are biased.
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Club I Club II Club III
N 35 12 38
ij -0.021 -0.061 -0.011
CD -3.333 -3.307 -1.852
LM 641.7 105.3 1181.0
df 595 66 703
Table 2: Descriptive statistics from Clubs IIII.
Clubs I  III are -3.33, -3.31, and -1.85. The rst two values are highly signicant,
while the value for the third is not signicant at 5 % level (CD< j1:96j). The CD
test indicates strong cross-section dependence in Clubs I and II. Moreover, since the
power of this test is low when the average correlations tend to zero as in Club III, it
may be the case that Club III is prone to cross-section dependence as well. The LM
test statistics are also high and signicant, although Clubs I and III are probably
too large to yield reliable results. Hence, there is some cross-section dependence on
the data, rendering the use of second generation tests.
Table 3 summarizes the rst generation unit root tests for Model 2, showing
that no convergence exists in the full sample.10 The tests also accept the null of
no convergence for Clubs II and III, while the LLC and M&W tests o¤er weak
support for convergence in Club I. The second generation test (Pesarans CIPS),
on the other hand, suggests that the null of non-stationarity cannot be rejected for
any of the clubs.11 The power of the CIPS test is relatively low in the presence
of trends, so that the rejection of non-stationarity is somewhat expected. This
rejection, however, is supported by the conventional IPS and the Choi tests, which
are rather robust in the presence of moderate cross-section dependence. Moreover,
as they tend to over-reject the null in this case, the fact that they do not strengthen
the nding.
10All rst generation tests were performed by Eviews and cross-checked with Stata. We allowed
automatic selection of lags based on Scwartz Information Criteria and when kernels had to be
used, we used Newey-West bandwidth selection by Bartlett. The second generation test is only
available in Stata; individual lags were allowed here.
11The critical values of CIPS-test are tabulated by Pesaran (2007a) Tables II(a)-II(c).
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Club I Club II Club III Full sample
test p-value test p-value test p-value test p-value
LLC -2.010 0.022 0.513 0.696 0.615 0.731 -0.277 0.391
IPS -0.538 0.295 -0.408 0.342 1.839 0.967 0.127 0.551
M&W 89.57 0.058 26.84 0.312 58.72 0.929 188.42 0.159
Choi 86.67 0.086 26.11 0.348 46.72 0.997 158.82 0.720
CIPS -2.016 0.985 -1.760 0.989 -1.607 1.000 -1.926 1.000
Table 3: Results for Model 2.
Table 4 reports the results with intercept but without trend (Model 3 ), i.e.
the results for conditional convergence. The rst generation unit root tests (with
the exception of IPS) suggest that Club III exhibits convergence12 but the second
generation test (Pesarans CIPS) is far from being statistically signicant. The rst
generation unit root tests that are most robust in the presence of moderate cross-
section dependence (IPS and Choi) also fail to indicate convergence. LLC and Choi
also suggest convergence for the data as a whole, but this nding is not supported
by the more robust tests.
Club I Club II Club III Full Sample
test p-value test p-value test p-value test p-value
LLC -0.110 0.456 -0.445 0.328 -3.619 0.000 -2.735 0.003
IPS 0.380 0.648 2.381 0.991 -0.373 0.355 2.522 0.994
M&W 79.58 0.203 15.58 0.900 100.35 0.032 180.49 0.277
Choi 86.80 0.085 15.32 0.911 92.76 0.093 202.87 0.043
CIPS -1.369 0.994 -0.726 1.000 -1.323 0.998 -1.186 1.000
Table 4: Results for Model 3.
Table 5 presents the results for unconditional convergence (Model 4 ) replicating
the common nding that the rich countries exhibit convergence while convergence
is not found in other clubs. Unfortunately, this test cannot be performed by IPS so
no second generation test results are yet available.
12Choi also suggest convergence for the data as a whole.
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Club I Club II Club III Full Sample
test p-value test p-value test p-value test p-value
LLC -0.795 0.213 1.440 0.925 -1.633 0.051 7.264 1.000
IPS n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
M&W 70.47 0.462 26.27 0.340 114.21 0.003 112.40 1.000
Choi 70.35 0.468 26.43 0.332 107.52 0.010 107.44 1.000
CIPS n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Table 5: Results for Model 4.
To summarize, we nd unconditional -convergence (Model 1 ) in all clubs, indi-
cating that the regression tree analysis has succeeded in uncovering three traditional
convergence clubs on the demographic basis alone. First generation unit root tests
which provide opportunities to control for the heterogeneity within the clubs (Mod-
els 2 and 3 ) also support conditional convergence in Club I but none in Club II.
The tests, however, are likely to be biased by the cross-section dependence and the
more robust tests do not nd support for conditional convergence in these clubs.
Furthermore, no support for unconditional convergence (Model 4 ) can be found for
these clubs. Maybe the most interesting is Club III as the rst generation tests
give some support for conditional convergence (Model 3 ), this result being under-
mined by the second generation test again. On the other hand, the support for
unconditional convergence is strong (Model 4 ). Unfortunately, the unavailability of
the second generation test for Model 4 leaves this question open as cross-section
dependence is also indicated in this club.
How do we now conclude with the argument that convergence, if it exists, should
manifest itself in homogenous clubs? From the technical point of view, our ndings
are in line with the development of the literature, running from the earlier ndings
of no -convergence in broad samples but some in clubs (Baumol 1986, Mankiw et
al. 1992, Maddison 1994, Ben-David and Loewy 1998) to the markedly skeptical
ndings from the recent tests (Li and Papell 1999, Pedroni 2007, Pesaran 2007c),
indicating that the quest on convergence is far from settled.13 On the other hand, a
13To compare our results with earlier works, we performed the unit root tests on the club 4 of
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demographic explanation for the mixed evidence can also be found since the demo-
graphic transition is a continuous rather than discrete process, necessarily leaving
some timing-heterogeneity in the clubs. Chesnais (1992) has also emphasized the
varying phases of the transition across countries, implying that by controlling for
the initial states alone we may have failed to control for the di¤erences in the phase.
Such control is a necessary future task, although challenging, as the phase of the
transition may be dictated by economic growth itself.
5 Demographic Transition and Future Prospects
In spite of the mixed evidence within the clubs, the demographic approach helps us
to evaluate the future growth di¤erentials between the clubs. To illustrate, consider
the club-specic average incomes at the beginning and end of the period 1960-2000
and compare Clubs I and III, for example. Because of the considerable di¤erences
in the growth rates (0:74% versus 2:49%), the income gap increased from ve to
tenfold, this increase being exacerbated by a massive demographic expansion in
the former club (Figure 2). By contrast, the income gap between Clubs III and II
decreased from four to 2.5 fold due to rapid growth (3:21%) in the latter club.
The theory of the demographic transition presupposes that countries move ahead
to more mature stages, i.e., the demographic clubs are transitional rather than
permanent, and multiple steady states may not be present in the data (Galor and
Weil 2000, Galor 2007). Unfortunately, none of the techniques above can identify
the data generating processes, but the dynamics of the demographic variables can
give some hints. Figure 3 shows that life expectancy has increased everywhere such
that its average value in Club I (Club II) in 2003 exceeded that in Club II (Club
III) in 1960. Analogous information is given by total fertility, infant mortality, and
Durlauf and Johnson (1995), as it is a sub-set of our Club III. While they nd that club 4 exhibited
unconditional -convergence at 1960-1985, we nd that it also shows both - convergence and the
convergence in the rst generation unit root tests but no convergence in the second generation
unit root test at 1960-2003.
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Figure 2: The per capita GDP in 1960 (grey bar) and 2003 (black bar). Population
ratios indicated above the bars.
the by the dependence rate, all of which have greatly decreased since 1960 as most
countries have reached the higher stages, thus supporting transitional clubs.
This makes some future explorations possible. Consider a new classication
derived by applying the earlier boundaries of the clubs to the values of the life
expectancies in 2003. This classication shows that only six countries still stay in
Club I and twelve in Club II, while all other countries (67) have proceeded to Club
III.14 One can now predict the average incomes, say, in 2040 illustrated in Figure
4.15 A comparison of Figures 4 and 2 shows that the future does not replicate the
past. On the contrary, while the average income in Club II approached that of
Club III in the1960-2003 period, in the2004-2040 period it will fall behind since the
inherited low incomes provide a limited basis regardless of rapid growth (3:21%).
Thus, the countries which have migrated from Club I to Club II will experience a
14The countries staying in Club I are Burundi, Cote dIvoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique,
Malawi, and Zambia. The countries in Club II are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Congo,
Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Chad, Tanzania, and Uganda.
15There are few attempts to predict the evolution of the future incomes, and to our knowledge,
none in a cross-country set-up. Holz (2008), however, uses Chinese real GDP growth rates from
1978-2000 to extrapolate the future to evaluate when the size of Chinese economy would surpass
that of US in absolute terms.
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Figure 3: Demographic indicators in 1960 (grey bar) and 2003 (black bar).
take-o¤, but this take-o¤ is only in terms of the countrys own history and does not
raise its income closer to the more advanced countries which have already proceeded
too far. Therefore, the catch-up opportunity gained by the countries that arrived
in Club II in the post-war period is not open to those who will arrive later. The
window of opportunity has been closed.
Figure 4: The per capita GDP in 2003 (grey bar) and 2040 (black bar).
Club III may also experience changes as 29 of its 67 members will be new-comers.
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While these new-comers may grow at the rate which was typical of this club in the
past, the old members may meet new growth-hampering problems, such as ageing,
not visible in the1960-2003 period yet. Hence, new convergence tendencies may arise
within Club III. This, together with the limited perspectives from Clubs I and II,
indicates bi-polarization rather than convergence of world incomes as a whole. The
number of countries in Clubs I and II, however, has decreased and their proportion
of population will be smaller than before.
6 Discussion
This paper explores the role of demographics in the post-war growth and conver-
gence between countries. Di¤erences in the timing of the demographic transition
have segmented countries into the di¤erent regimes or clubs and the simultane-
ous existence of these clubs makes the concept of convergence meaningless if the
existence of such clubs neglected. We evaluate the relevance of demographics by
classifying countries into demographic clubs by the regression tree method. The
discriminating variable turns out to be life expectancy, probably because of its role
as an indicator of technical di¤usion and as a necessary condition for investment in
human capital, classifying countries into three demographic clubs.
The traditional -convergence and rst generation unit root tests o¤er support
for convergence in demographic clubs but the second generation unit root test un-
dermines this result so that the evidence is equivocal. This nding is in line with
the trends in the literature, where the earlier tests suggest convergence but the most
recent tests show that homogenous clubs are di¢ cult to identify even among the
OECD countries. The rapid progress in the eld of panel estimation techniques may
shed further light on this subject in the future. On the other hand, the demographic
transition as a source of mixed evidence calls for further research e¤orts because its
phase may di¤er across countries and controlling for the initial state alone may not
lead to convergence clubs. Hence, a control for the heterogeneity from the di¤erent
phases may be necessary, although challenging, as the phase of transition may be
dictated by economic growth itself.
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Continuous demographic transition elevates countries to higher clubs, providing
important implications for future incomes. Unfortunately, this information gives
no unequivocal support to convergence of world incomes as the income gaps have
already widened to such an extent that even the take-o¤s, typical to the second stage
or club, is unable to arise the incomes of the poor su¢ ciently. Thus, new economic
miracles will hardly arise on a demographic basis alone. Therefore, economic policies
should be targeted to help the countries which remain in the lowest clubs. The good
news from the analysis here is that the ever-richer majority of countries has better
opportunity to manage this task since the number of these countries is small and
their population share is low.
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A Comparison of IPS and CIPS tests
In the presence of xed e¤ects, the augmented Dickey-Fuller test of order one is
based on
zit = ai + izi;t 1 + ci1zi;t 1 + "it (4)
where the lagged di¤erence accounts for the short-run dynamics of the errors. Then
for the IPS unit root test we calculate mean of the individual specic t-statistics
t =
1
N
NX
i=1
ti
where
ti =
z
0
iMezi; 1
^i
 
z
0
i; 1Mezi; 1
1=2
is the Dickey-Fuller t-statistic of cross section unit i, whereMe = IT  W
 
W 0 W
 1 W 0,
W = ( ;z; z 1),  = (1; 1; :::; 1)
0,z = (z1;z2; :::;zT )
0, z 1 = (z0; z1; :::; zT 1)
0
and ^2i =
z
0
iMezi
T 4 :
Now assume that the true data generating process is
zit = (1   i)i +  izi;t 1 + uit; (5)
where the error term has the single-factor structure
uit = ift + "it: (6)
We may now re-write (5) and (6) as
zit = ai + izi;t 1 + ift + "it;
where ai = (1   i), i =  i and zit = zit   zi;t 1. Then if  = 1N
NP
i=1
j 6= 0;
according to Pesaran (2007a), the common factor ft can be proxied by z and its
lagged values for N su¢ ciently large. The unit root test is based on the following
regression
zit = ai + izi;t 1 + bizt 1 + ci1zt + "it: (7)
Comparing (4) and (7) shows that while the former is augmented by the lagged
di¤erence of zt (i.e. zi;t 1) the latter is augmented by the lagged mean of zt (i.e.
zt 1) and the di¤erence of zt (i.e. zt).
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B Countries and Clubs
Country GDP60 LIF60 IMR60 TFR60 DEP60 GDP03 LIF03 IMR03 TFR03 DEP05
Benin 956 41.48 165 6.96 99.49 1345 54.68 105 5.82 88.32
Bolivia 2431 42.65 164 6.63 85.35 3006 64.06 55 3.91 74.30
Burkina F. 768 36.36 197 7.00 76.47 1071 50.81 109 6.33 97.05
Burundi 677 41.29 149 6.80 88.85 763 47.56 106 6.81 91.35
Cameroon 1947 41.52 145 5.90 78.97 2713 49.86 90 4.84 82.82
Chad 1142 40.79 169 6.09 79.30 884 50.50 124 6.51 96.80
Comoros 1354 43.44 154 6.91 90.47 1278 63.21 57 4.83 80.65
Congo 1010 46.69 130 5.99 81.50 1420 53.15 75 4.76 82.22
Cote dIv. 1334 43.67 154 7.31 85.97 2019 46.90 121 5.00 81.47
Egypt 1469 45.74 180 7.07 84.30 4759 70.00 35 3.14 61.72
Ethiopia 400 40.06 160 6.90 89.08 688 50.96 95 5.73 89.93
Gambia 722 32.99 223 6.50 74.64 937 58.18 79 5.12 81.42
Ghana 412 45.62 124 6.90 88.65 1440 58.64 63 4.32 74.34
Guatemala 2494 45.47 127 6.85 93.87 3805 69.11 38 4.55 90.27
Guinea 3072 35.12 201 7.00 83.19 2887 53.92 112 5.81 86.72
Guinea-B. 493 33.99 196 5.99 70.97 584 45.56 120 7.11 101.88
Honduras 1715 46.34 135 7.42 97.14 2291 68.77 31 3.68 79.02
India 892 41.87 140 5.81 76.75 2990 63.07 62 3.08 61.18
Jordan 4151 46.82 110 8.00 94.17 3743 71.41 23 3.49 67.75
Kenya 1179 46.29 117 8.12 100.78 1218 51.32 69 5.00 82.90
Madagascar 1268 39.87 155 6.80 87.14 759 57.54 74 5.24 88.51
Malawi 460 37.80 203 7.00 93.44 771 45.47 100 5.99 100.30
Mali 797 36.13 216 7.11 80.65 1184 52.11 137 6.71 105.49
Morocco 1299 46.68 145 7.15 90.14 4061 69.79 37 2.50 55.06
Mozambique 838 35.01 185 6.50 82.05 1452 43.79 106 5.49 90.19
Nepal 800 38.50 187 6.06 79.22 1441 61.66 63 3.64 74.27
Nicaragua 4428 47.02 131 7.33 100.95 3409 71.07 26 2.97 71.96
Niger 1167 39.08 196 7.90 100.83 834 54.77 118 7.43 104.51
Pakistan 801 46.61 148 6.28 82.70 2593 63.78 75 3.95 69.64
Peru 3129 47.68 136 6.85 87.80 4351 70.09 29 2.67 59.59
Continued
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Country GDP60 LIF60 IMR60 TFR60 DEP60 GDP03 LIF03 IMR03 TFR03 DEP05
Senegal 1776 40.39 186 7.00 82.23 1407 61.78 69 5.17 86.70
Tanzania 502 43.63 136 6.80 93.05 912 49.90 78 5.60 89.99
Togo 833 42.55 159 7.10 88.96 789 57.64 93 5.31 86.37
Uganda 873 43.95 130 6.90 94.27 1113 48.01 83 6.73 107.67
Zambia 910 45.07 127 6.62 90.17 946 39.44 101 5.60 94.69
Club1 1386 41.95 159 6.84 87.24 1882 56.81 79 4.99 83.92
Brazil 2644 54.51 109 6.15 87.02 7205 71.18 27 2.33 51.43
Cape Verde 1417 51.98 105 7.00 91.67 5117 70.38 29 3.71 78.03
Dominican R. 2080 51.69 124 7.32 101.67 6904 71.03 34 2.94 64.08
El Salvador 2991 50.42 123 6.85 94.99 4751 70.90 26 2.86 65.55
Korea 1458 54.20 70 5.63 82.72 17597 77.23 5 1.24 39.05
Malaysia 1801 53.92 63 6.72 94.89 12133 73.18 10 2.84 55.63
Philippines 2039 53.20 96 6.85 95.64 3575 70.46 27 3.51 66.61
Syria 837 49.22 119 7.60 98.61 2016 73.19 18 3.42 65.99
Taiwan 1444 54.20 70 5.63 82.72 19885 77.23 5 1.24 39.05
Thailand 1059 54.89 83 6.40 87.39 7274 68.80 12 1.83 41.79
Tunisia 2103 48.34 155 7.25 90.59 7601 73.16 22 2.01 47.72
Turkey 2250 50.26 176 6.19 84.53 5633 70.96 31 2.22 51.23
Club 2 1843 52.24 108 6.63 91.04 8308 72.31 20 2.51 55.51
Argentina 7838 64.88 60 3.09 57.04 10170 74.45 15 2.34 57.77
Australia 10815 70.73 20 3.27 62.77 27872 80.44 5 1.76 48.43
Austria 8444 68.74 32 2.78 51.90 27567 79.03 5 1.38 46.97
Barbados 7039 65.87 61 4.26 81.20 15707 76.09 12 1.50 39.02
Belgium 8070 70.10 27 2.66 55.03 25264 78.36 4 1.64 52.26
Canada 10576 71.07 26 3.61 69.61 27845 79.92 5 1.52 44.43
Chile 5086 56.90 109 5.28 79.45 12141 77.91 8 1.99 49.18
Colombia 2819 56.68 92 6.76 98.11 6094 71.82 20 2.44 54.90
Costa Rica 4513 61.45 81 7.22 98.05 8586 78.21 10 2.26 51.92
Denmark 11438 72.16 20 2.59 55.82 27970 77.42 5 1.76 51.28
Finland 7785 68.52 19 2.58 60.28 23784 78.48 4 1.76 49.90
France 8531 70.48 25 2.85 61.31 25664 79.72 4 1.88 53.14
Continued
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Country GDP60 LIF60 IMR60 TFR60 DEP60 GDP03 LIF03 IMR03 TFR03 DEP05
Greece 4177 68.73 50 2.20 53.24 15785 78.43 8 1.28 48.28
Hong Kong 3322 66.32 33 5.31 77.60 27658 81.60 4 0.94 37.18
Iceland 8380 73.37 17 3.94 74.26 26347 81.06 3 2.00 51.12
Ireland 5294 69.69 28 3.98 73.23 28248 77.88 5 1.97 46.73
Israel 6750 68.70 29 3.85 69.28 20713 79.81 5 2.89 61.34
Italy 7167 69.31 40 2.50 51.69 22925 80.00 5 1.29 50.89
Jamaica 3477 64.28 61 5.64 85.11 4585 72.12 14 2.60 64.36
Japan 4509 67.91 25 2.02 56.12 24037 81.91 3 1.29 50.67
Luxembourg 12920 68.81 29 2.37 47.42 49262 78.22 5 1.67 48.58
Mauritius 3662 59.63 61 5.72 96.35 16464 72.03 15 1.90 44.95
Mexico 3719 56.95 88 6.82 96.98 7938 75.07 20 2.37 57.70
Netherlands 10462 73.24 16 3.17 63.93 26157 78.81 5 1.72 48.28
New Zealand 12063 70.92 21 4.02 71.02 22195 79.30 6 1.97 50.64
Norway 9473 73.41 17 2.90 58.73 34011 79.37 4 1.81 52.12
Panama 2499 60.65 63 5.92 89.61 8244 74.81 20 2.69 57.11
Paraguay 2510 63.77 62 6.55 104.30 4716 70.85 35 3.44 68.34
Portugal 3689 63.34 76 3.07 59.08 17334 77.31 5 1.45 48.28
Singapore 4219 64.54 30 4.93 82.79 26999 78.91 3 1.34 38.96
Spain 4881 69.18 42 2.89 55.37 20644 80.09 4 1.30 45.45
Sri Lanka 866 61.97 63 5.50 85.97 4272 71.02 12 2.00 44.22
Sweden 11065 73.11 15 2.32 51.45 26136 80.18 3 1.67 52.99
Switzerland 15253 71.27 20 2.51 50.79 28792 80.82 4 1.41 47.34
Trinidad T 6274 63.52 48 4.99 88.72 18417 69.03 15 1.60 40.16
UK 10323 70.64 22 2.81 53.71 26046 78.57 5 1.71 51.62
USA 12892 69.88 25 3.31 66.72 34875 77.52 7 2.04 49.42
Uruguay 6143 67.71 48 2.90 56.25 8855 75.44 14 2.19 59.55
Club 3 7077 67.06 42 3.92 69.74 20798 77.42 9 1.86 50.41
Full Sample 3995 54.63 100 5.51 79.96 11246 68.21 39 3.24 64.93
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